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## EARLY AMERICAN POLICY CONCERNING OTTOMAN MINORITIES

IT was more than a century ago that the United States was first required to define its policy toward minorities residing within the Turkish dominions. The occasion was the outbreak of the War for Greek Independence in the spring of 1821—an event which stirred the American imagination and aroused American sympathy. Revolutionary Greece was made in our own image. She was fighting for freedom from an oppressive alien government; she was seeking to establish liberal, representative, perhaps republican institutions; she had built a thriving commerce in defiance of a restrictive imperialism. All of this suggested a parallel to revolutionary America of a half-century before. Even more, Greece was a Christian nation struggling for emancipation from a Moslem rule of four centuries and as such might claim the sympathies of all Christendom. Most of all, the Greeks were possessed of a great name. They were, so it seemed, heirs to the cultural heritage of the ancient Hellenes, lineal descendants of Pericles, Plato, Demosthenes, Homer and the others at whose feet every educated American had sat in reverence. As Thomas Jefferson wrote Adamantios Korais, the famous Greek patriot and scholar of Paris, whatever service Americans might render the cause of revolutionary Greece must be considered a tribute to "the splendid constellation of sages and heroes, whose blood is still flowing in your veins, and whose merits are still resting, as a heavy debt, on the shoulders of the living, and the future races



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of men".[1] A wave of Philhellenic enthusiasm swept over America, as it swept over Europe.

The White House itself was not immune to the contagion of Philhellenism. In his annual message of December 3, 1822, James Monroe, President of the United States, explained that it was not alone love of freedom at home and abroad which accounted for American interest in the Greek cause:

> The mention of Greece [runs the message] fills the mind with the most exalted sentiments and arouses in our bosoms the best feelings of which our nature is susceptible. Superior skill and refinement in the arts, heroic gallantry in action, disinterested patriotism, enthusiastic zeal and devotion in favor of public and personal liberty are associated with our recollections of ancient Greece. That such a country should have been overwhelmed and so long hidden, as it were, from the world under a gloomy despotism has been a cause of unceasing and deep regret for ages past. It was natural, therefore, that the reappearance of those people in their original character, contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor which have been so signally displayed throughout the United States. A strong hope is entertained that these people will recover their independence and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth.[2]

That the nefarious Holy Alliance frowned upon the Greek War of Liberation was but another reason why Americans should smile upon it. The struggle was between Greece, supported by liberals everywhere, and Turkey, bolstered by the reactionary governments of Europe. Daniel Webster asserted in the House of Representatives that it was part of a greater struggle "between absolute and regulated governments." Since

[1] H. A. Washington (ed.), *Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* vol. VII (New York, 1855), p. 318.

[2] J. D. Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Presidents,* vol. II (Washington, 1896), p. 193. Concerning what might be termed the "classicist attitude" toward the ancient Greeks, which has also colored our opinions of the modern Greek nation, see the significant opening paragraphs of an article by W. L. Westermann in the *Political Science Quarterly,* vol. XL (1925), pp. 517-539.

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Americans could not, even if they would, hold aloof from world affairs, they must take a stand.

> As one of the free states among the nations, as a great and rapidly rising republic, it would be impossible for us, if we were so disposed, to prevent our principles, our sentiments, and our example from producing some effect upon the opinions and hopes of society throughout the civilized world. . . . Our side of this question is settled for us, even without our own volition. Our history, our situation, our character, necessarily decide our position and our course, before we have even time to ask whether we have an option. Our place is on the side of free institutions.

The Holy Alliance fears the spread of liberalism; therefore it refers to the Greek uprising as among "criminal combinations which have been formed in the eastern parts of Europe." The allied sovereigns despise the sentiment of nationalism; therefore they lament that the Greeks should have thrown into the Ottoman Empire the "firebrand of rebellion." "Solely because it *is* a revolution" the Greek insurrection has been discountenanced and denounced by Their Most Christian Majesties,

> independent of all inquiry into the reasonableness of its causes or the enormity of the oppression which produced it; regardless of the peculiar claims which Greece possesses upon the civilized world; and regardless of what has been their own conduct towards her for a century; regardless of the interest of the Christian religion.

To no such creed can Americans subscribe, for America owes too much "to the cause of civil and religious liberty, to the principle of lawful resistance, to the principle that society has a right to partake in its own government". Therefore, said Webster, we must "avail ourselves of the interesting occasion of the Greek revolution to make our protest against the doctrines of the Allied Powers, both as they are laid down in principle and as they are applied in practice".[1] Having chal-

[1] *The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster.* National edition in eighteen volumes (Boston, 1903), vol. V, pp. 65-67, 73-76, 83, 92. See also Constantin Rados, "Webster, Monroë et le Philhellénisme aux États Unis pendant la Guerre de l'Indépendance Grecque" in *L'Acropole,* vol. I (Paris, 1920), pp. 39-48.

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lenged the Holy Alliance on the question of the Latin-American republics, concluded Webster, why not challenge it again on behalf of Greece?

Americans might have held farther aloof from the Greek cause had it not been for a variety of American interests in the Mediterranean region during the period of the Greek War of Independence. These interests—commercial, naval, diplomatic, and missionary—while not directly connected with Greece, helped to divert public opinion to the problems of the Near East and to make the Greek insurrection less remote than it otherwise might have been. First should be mentioned American commerce with the Levant which appeared to be particularly thriving during the decade of the twenties. The Ottoman city of Smyrna was the *entrepot* of an extended American trade with the entire Near East and, in addition, as the principal port of shipment of Turkish opium, was an important element in a rapidly growing American commerce with China and the Orient.[1]

The continuous presence in the Mediterranean of American merchant vessels had made necessary, furthermore, the maintenance in those waters of an American naval squadron, which commanded attention and respect by reason of its exploits earlier in the century at the expense of the Barbary pirates. This squadron—which was strengthened in size and in personnel in 1824—was an alert and interesting observer of everything that transpired in Ottoman waters from the initial outbreak in the Morea in 1821 until after the Battle of Navarino. The movements of Commodore Rodgers and his ships were keenly watched from Europe, from Greece, and from America in the fear or in the hope that they would depart from neutrality and actively aid the cause of the Greeks.[2] Rumors were

[1] *American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation,* vol. I, p. 1011, vol. II, pp. 660, 685; S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts,* 1783-1860 (Boston, 1921), pp. 180-181, 214-215, 277-278, 291-292; Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1922), pp. 115-116, 118-119, concerning, in particular, the opium trade.

[2] The best short account of the movements of the American squadron is C. O. Paullin, *Commodore John Rodgers—A Biography* (Cleveland, 1910), chap. xiii,

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recurrent in Greece and America that the American squadron had attacked the Ottoman fleet or bombarded Smyrna or landed troops in Greece,[1] but at no time, in fact, was there a departure from a policy of strict neutrality. In addition to the fact that many of the American officers were less well disposed toward the Greeks than toward the Turks,[2] the commanders of the squadron were charged at the moment with the delicate negotiation which ultimately led to the treaty of 1830 between the United States and the Ottoman Empire. In order to assure the success of their efforts to obtain the much desired treaty of amity and commerce with the Porte, Commodore Rodgers and his successors could ill afford any act of partisanship in favor of the Greeks; on the other hand, they were specifically instructed to do nothing in their negotiations with the Turks which would prejudice the cause of the Greeks. In their diplomatic, as well as in their naval operations, therefore, the commanders of the American squadrons preserved a discreet neutrality.[3]

entitled "Commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Squadron, 1824-1827". A European view is E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours* (6 vols., Paris, 1925 *et seq.*), vol. I, especially pp. 288-289, citing unpublished archives of the French Foreign Office.

[1] Dr. Samuel G. Howe, an American with the Greek forces, reported that in September, 1825, a rumor spread throughout Greece that the American fleet under Rodgers had bombarded Constantinople and Smyrna and landed four thousand troops at Napoli. This same rumor reached Lafayette in France. See his letter to Clay, November 25, 1825, in C. Colton, *Works of Henry Clay*, vol. VI, p. 246; L. E. Richards (ed.), *Letters and Journals of Samuel Gridley Howe* (2 vols., Boston, 1906-1909), vol. I, p. 119 (hereinafter cited as "Howe"); *Niles' Register*, vol. XX (1821), p. 336, tells of similar false alarms in America.

[2] Principally because of the outrages committed by Greek pirates upon American ships and because of the open slave-trade in Turkish women and children maintained by the Greeks, (Paullin, *op. cit.*, pp. 328, 336; Howe, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-236, 247, 264). John Quincy Adams in 1828, when President of the United States, recorded in his diary that "Rodgers himself, and all the commanders of our armed vessels in the Mediterranean, have great abhorrence and contempt for the Greeks". *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, vol. VII, p. 463.

[3] Rodgers was able to write the Secretary of State, Henry Clay, from Smyrna, August 31, 1825, commenting modestly on the fine impression made by the Mediterranean squadron on both Greeks and Turks, which he believed was occasioned "as well by the apparent superiority of our ships over those of

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In addition to these commercial, naval, and diplomatic activities of Americans in the Near East during the decade of the twenties, there was a vigorous missionary enterprise. Missions "in Bible lands" were the spiritual and financial concern of ardent and usually well-educated Christians, particularly in New England. The leaders of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions were men of principle, property, and position who raised and expended during this period tens of thousands of dollars in the establishment of an American missionary frontier in the Near East. Smyrna, already a center of American trade, was made the headquarters of the first missionary efforts, in 1820. Two surveys of the available mission fields in the Ottoman Empire were made: one a trip through Anatolia in 1820 by Messrs. Parsons and Fisk, and another more extended tour in 1830–1831 by Messrs. Smith and Dwight. In 1827 Elnathan Gridley, an American missionary, traveled extensively in the Morea and in the Ionian Islands to consider the services which American Protestant Christianity might render Greek Orthodox Christianity. With the exception of some unprofitable work among the Ottoman Jews, the efforts of the missionaries were concentrated upon the regeneration of the Eastern Christians. Modern Greek was the first language the American missionaries undertook to master, and the spiritual welfare of the Greek population of Asia Minor was one of their primary concerns. A printing press was established in Malta, which proceeded during the first ten years of its existence (1822–1832) to distribute some 350,000 volumes (more than twenty-one million pages of printed matter) to a bewildered Near East. Of these a considerable proportion consisted of Bibles, grammars, and other text-books in the modern Greek language which Adamantios Korais had but recently created, so that a direct and genuine contribution was

other nations which they have been accustomed to see, as the strict neutrality we have uniformly observed as between Greeks and Turks". *Twenty-second Congress, First Session, House Executive Document No. 250,* dealing with the negotiation of the Treaty of 1830 with Turkey. See also C. O. Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883* (Baltimore, 1912), chap. v.

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made by American missions to an incipient Greek cultural nationalism. Greek boys were brought to America to be educated, and an American school was set up in Athens after the evacuation of that city by the Turks. One American missionary, the Reverend Dr. Jonas King, played an active part in the distribution of relief supplies forwarded from Boston. In short, American missions in the Near East contributed directly and indirectly to arouse American interest in the Christian subjects of the Sultan and, more especially, in the cause of Greek independence.[1]

The presence of Americans in the Mediterranean in the various capacities of merchant, naval officer, and missionary led the Greek revolutionary government to believe that the United States might be persuaded to aid the cause of Greek freedom. As early as May, 1821, the Messenian Senate of Calamata addressed the following appeal to Americans:

> To the Citizens of the United States of America: Having formed the resolution to live or die for freedom, we are drawn toward you by a just sympathy; since it is in your land that Liberty has fixed her abode, and by you that she is prized as by our fathers. Hence, in invoking her name, we invoke yours at the same time, trusting that in imitating you, we shall imitate our ancestors, and be thought worthy of them if we succeed in resembling you.
>
> Though separated from you by mighty oceans, your character brings you near us. We esteem you nearer than the nations on our frontiers; and we possess, in you, friends, fellow-citizens, and brethren, because you are just, humane, and generous;—just because free, generous and liberal because Christian. Your liberty is not propped on the slavery of other nations, nor your prosperity on their calamities and sufferings. But, on the contrary, free and prosperous yourselves, you are desirous that all men should share the same blessings; that all should enjoy those

[1] *First Ten Annual Reports of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston, 1834), covering the years 1822-1834; *History of American Missions to the Heathen from their Commencement to the Present Time*, a symposium (Worcester, 1840); Eli Smith and H. G. O. Dwight, *Missionary Researches in Armenia* (2 vols., Boston, 1833); W. E. Strong, *The Story of the American Board* (Boston, 1910), chap. v.

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rights, to which all are by nature equally entitled. It is you, who first proclaimed these rights; it is you who have been the first again to recognize them, in rendering the rank of men to the Africans degraded to the level of brutes. It is by your example, that Europe has abolished the shameful and cruel trade in human flesh, from you that she receives lessons of justice, and learns to renounce her absurd and sanguinary customs. This glory, Americans, is yours alone and raises you above all the nations which have gained a name for liberty and laws.

It is for you, citizens of America, to crown this glory, in aiding us to purge Greece from the barbarians, who for four hundred years have polluted the soil. It is surely worthy of you to repay the obligations of the civilized nations, and to banish ignorance and barbarism from the country of freedom and the arts. You will not assuredly imitate the culpable indifference or rather the long ingratitude of some of the Europeans. No, the fellow-citizens of Penn, of Washington, and of Franklin will not refuse their aid to the descendants of Phocion, and Thrasybulus, of Aratus, and of Philopoemen. You have already shown them esteem and confidence in sending your children to their schools. You know with what pleasure they were welcomed and the steady kindness and attentions which they received. If such has been their conduct when enslaved, what friendship and zeal will they not manifest to you, when through your aid they shall have broken their chains. Greece will then furnish you advantages, which you can in vain seek from her ignorant and cruel tyrants; and the hands of gratitude and fraternity will forever unite the Greeks and the Americans. Our interests are of a nature more and more to cement an alliance founded on freedom and virtue.

PETER MAVROMICHALIS, Commander-in-chief.[1]

Kalamata, May 25, 1821.

This appeal was forwarded to the Greek committee at Paris for despatch to the United States. On September 15, 1821, Albert Gallatin, then in France, mailed the Greek text and a French translation to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State

[1] The full text of the appeal will be most conveniently found in English translation in the *North American Review*, vol. XVII (Boston, 1823), pp. 415-416. A French version may be found in Driault and Lhéritier, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171. I have used here the translation current in America at the time.

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in Monroe's Cabinet, and at about the same time Adamantios Korais sent a copy to Edward Everett, professor of Greek at Harvard and editor of the *North American Review*.[1] The document was widely distributed throughout the United States but aroused no comment on the part of the government at Washington.

Lafayette, like the Greeks, seems to have believed that the United States might take some positive stand on behalf of Grecian independence. On November 5, 1822, he wrote Henry Clay from Paris urging that the United States should not play the dishonorable rôle which up to that time, in his judgment, had been taken by Great Britain. "How happy should I be to see an American squadron in those seas [the Aegean and the Mediterranean]!" he wrote. "The American flag should be the natural, disinterested protector for the Grecian confederacy. Should the Ottoman navy prove impertinent, it might be crushed at once." He believed that a small naval force and the expenditure of two millions of dollars "would suffice to insure the liberties of that classic country".[2] Five days later he wrote Rufus King in a similar vein, rejoicing at the presence of the American squadron in Grecian waters, and reiterating his opinion that the United States alone could assure the Greeks their real freedom.[3]

During the years 1821 and 1822, however, little was done in the United States on behalf of the Greek cause. President Monroe's message of December, 1822, as has been seen, spoke sympathetically of Greece and wished the Greek nation Godspeed on its road to independence, but there was no hint of definite American assistance to that end. At about the same time a nation-wide campaign was launched to arouse public

[1] Henry Adams (ed.), *Writings of Albert Gallatin* (3 vols., Philadelphia, 1879), vol. II, p. 198; *North American Review, op. cit.*, p. 414.

[2] Calvin Colton (ed.), *Works of Henry Clay* (10 vols., New York, 1904), vol. IV, pp. 132-133.

[3] *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, vol. VI, p. 485. Gallatin, then in Paris, likewise may have come under Lafayette's influence, for he subsequently proposed to Monroe a course of action which coincided almost word for word with the foregoing letters. See C. F. Adams (ed.), *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, vol. VI (Philadelphia, 1875), p. 198.

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sentiment in favor of Greece and to solicit funds for the prosecution of the war; but it took time to produce results, and nothing was accomplished until much later. December 24, 1822, Mr. Dwight of Massachusetts presented to the House of Representatives a memorial of the people of the District of Columbia on behalf of the Greek revolutionaries. But "the sentiment of the House was against meddling with the subject, and the memorial was ordered to lie on the table." [1]

Shortly thereafter the government of the United States was brought face to face with the necessity of declaring a policy toward the Greek revolution. It was obliged to formulate that policy in the face of a public opinion which was overwhelmingly in sympathy with the Greek cause and which was manifesting its hatred of the Turks and of the Holy Alliance by contributions of large sums of money and of a few men to the cause of Greek freedom. The temper of this public opinion was such that it viewed caution as cowardice, inaction as criminal. But the government of the United States was committed to certain traditional foreign policies. The President in his annual messages to Congress might refer sympathetically to the cause of Greek freedom. American citizens might aid the Greek cause with oratory, with pen, with money, and even with the sword. But the Government of the United States in its diplomatic relations with other powers was wedded to the policy of non-intervention in the political affairs of Europe—and however universal might have been the cultural influence of ancient Greece, the fact remained that modern Greece was part of the European system. That Greeks were Christians and Turks were Moslems was a matter of great concern to the American people as a whole, but it could hardly be considered a major consideration in the formulation of an American diplomatic policy—the United States, indeed, had not so long since signed a treaty with an Islamic power which contained the extraordinary declaration that

> As the Government of the United States is not in any sense

[1] *Annals of Congress*, Seventeenth Congress, Second Session, pp. 457 *et seq.*

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> founded on the Christian religion, as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquillity of Musselmen . . . it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.[1]

In these circumstances, how much aid, diplomatic or military, could the Greek insurrectionaries expect from the United States of America?

It was the contention of John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State during Monroe's administration and subsequently as President, that the United States should adhere with firm determination to a policy of friendly interest in the Greek cause but of rigid non-interference in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire of which Greece formed a part. The course of action which Adams marked out is one which the Government of the United States has continued to follow for more than a century as regards minorities resident in the Turkish dominions.

In February, 1823, Andreas Luriottis, a representative of the Greek revolutionary government, delivered to the American minister in London an appeal for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece and the United States, together with the extension of such American aid as would enable Greeks to call Americans "allies as well as friends". Concerning the conversation which ensued Richard Rush reported to John Quincy Adams:

> I received him in a manner due to the interesting character which he bears. I assured him that the fortunes of his country were dear to the people of the United States, who, cherishing the freedom which they themselves inherited and enjoyed, looked with the warmest sympathy upon the struggle of the Greeks for their national liberties, and that the government of the United States participated in this feeling. Of the latter, I considered the late mention of the subject by the President in his message to Congress at the opening of the session, as the authentic proof.

[1] Article XI of the treaty of 1796 with Tripoli. W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts . . . . between the United States of America and Other Powers,* vol. II (Washington, 1910), p. 1768.

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> To the inquiries of Mr. Luriottis, whether my Government would open political or diplomatic relations with his at the present day, I replied that this formed a point on which I was wholly uninformed and could not undertake to give my opinion; that it involved considerations of expediency as applicable to the United States, as well as of advantage or otherwise as applicable to the Greek cause itself,[1] that would be maturely weighed at Washington before any decision could be pronounced. All that I could say was to reiterate the assurance of the friendly interest that was felt amongst us for the success of the cause in which his country was embarked; and I adverted to the part which my Government had acted in relation to the South American struggle—a part so much in advance of that of any Government—as a sure indication that it would feel no backwardness in welcoming, when the proper day had arrived, the new-born freedom of Greece into the family of nations.[2]

As events proved, however, the advanced stand taken by the United States as regards the Latin-American republics was in no respect considered a precedent in the case of Greece; in fact, recognition of Greece by the United States came later than recognition by Russia, one of the parties to the despised Holy Alliance.

It was not until August 15, 1823, that the question of recognition of, and assistance to, Greece came before Monroe's cabinet for discussion. Crawford (Secretary of the Treasury) and Calhoun (Secretary of War), influenced by the prevailing popular sentiment, were inclined to favor extending recognition and naval aid to the Greeks. Calhoun, in particular, "descanted upon his great enthusiasm for the Greeks" and was for "taking no heed of Turkey whatever". But the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, did not share "their contempt for

[1] Rush himself seems then, as subsequently, to have been of the opinion that American recognition of Greece might do the cause of the revolutionaries more harm than good. A year later he wrote John Quincy Adams, while Europe was still discussing the Monroe Doctrine, that "any act of our government in favor of the Greeks in the present state of things in Europe, would rather tend to retard than advance the cause of their independence". Department of State, Great Britain, vol. XXX, Despatch 367, March 22, 1824.

[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* vol. V, pp. 255-256.

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the Sublime Porte", did not think "quite so lightly of a war with Turkey", and did not possess "much esteem for enthusiasm which evaporates in words". After a futile discussion of two hours, the meeting broke up, and it was left to Adams to prepare an answer to Mr. Luriottis for the consideration of the President.[1] This answer, despatched to London three days later, represented the views of Adams, not those of Crawford and Calhoun. It said that the sentiments expressed by the President in his annual message of 1822

> are cordially felt by the people of this Union who, sympathizing with the cause of freedom and independence wherever its standard is unfurled, behold with peculiar interest the display of Grecian energy in defence of Grecian liberties, and the association of heroic exertions at the present time with the proudest glories of former ages in the land of Epaminondas and of Philopoemen.
>
> But while cheering with their best wishes the cause of the Greeks, the United States are forbidden by the duties of the situation from taking part in the war, to which their relation is that of neutrality. At peace themselves with all the world, their established policy and the obligations of the laws of nations preclude them from becoming voluntary auxiliaries to a cause which would involve them in war.
>
> If, in the progress of events, the Greeks should be enabled to establish or organize themselves as an independent nation, the United States will be among the first to welcome them in that capacity into the general family, to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with them suited to the mutual interests of the two countries, and to recognize with special satisfaction their constituted state in the character of a sister Republic.[2]

This was the final and definitive opinion of the Government of the United States on the request of the Greek revolutionary government for recognition, alliance, and assistance. It was not until 1833, after the Greek War of Independence had been fought and won with the aid of the so-called reactionary Powers of Europe, that the United States acknowledged the sovereignty

[1] *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, vol. VI, pp. 172-173.

[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, vol. V, p. 257.

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of the Kingdom of Greece. It was not until still three years later that the first Graeco-American treaty was negotiated and signed, thus establishing formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.[1]

An ex-president of the United States, James Madison, was not as certain as President Monroe and Secretary Adams that the traditional policy of isolation should be permitted to apply in this case. In a letter of October 30, 1823, addressed to President Monroe concerning the Canning-Rush correspondence on the subject of the Spanish-American republics, Madison said:

> Will it not be honorable to our Country, and possibly not altogether in vain to invite the British Government to extend the "avowed disapprobation" of the project against the Spanish Colonies, to the enterprise of France against Spain herself, and even to join in some declaratory Act in behalf of the Greeks.[2]

Two weeks later he wrote Richard Rush, the American Minister to Great Britain, likewise suggesting that Canning be invited to participate in an Anglo-American declaration on behalf of the Greeks, and expressing the opinion that "the good which would result to the world from such an invitation if accepted, and the honor to our country even if declined, outweigh the sacrifices that would be required, or the risks that would be incurred"[3]. Had Madison's advice been accepted, the Monroe Doctrine would have been a very different sort of policy from what it proved ultimately to be. But President Monroe, in his now famous message of December 2, 1823, gave no indication

[1] J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law,* vol. I, pp. 111-112; A. W. Dulles, "The Recognition of New States—Greece", in *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law,* April, 1924, pp. 98-107.

[2] Gaillard Hunt (ed.), *Writings of James Madison,* vol. IX (New York, 1910), p. 159.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 161. A third, and the only other living ex-President of the United States, the venerable John Adams, wrote to the Greek committee at New York, December 29, 1823, that his heart "beat in unison" with them and with the Greeks and that he would be glad to contribute his "mite" to this "virtuous work", to which he wished all success. *Niles' Register,* vol. XXV (1824), p. 324.

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that the United States would depart in the case of Greece from the traditional American policy of non-interference in European affairs. He confined himself, instead, to a renewed expression of sympathy for the cause of Greek independence and a prophecy that the Greek people would win emancipation from Ottoman rule:

> A strong hope has been long entertained, founded on the heroic struggle of the Greeks, that they would succeed in their contest and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth. It is believed that the whole civilized world takes a deep interest in their welfare. Although no power has declared in their favor, yet none, according to our information, has taken part against them. Their cause and their name have protected them from dangers which might ere this have overwhelmed any other people. The ordinary calculations of interest and of acquisition with a view to aggrandizement, which mingles so much in the transactions of nations, seem to have had no effect in regard to them. From the facts which have come to our knowledge there is good cause to believe that their enemy has lost forever all dominion over them; that Greece will become again an independent nation. That she may obtain that rank is the object of our most ardent wishes.[1]

The policy framed by Monroe and Adams did not satisfy those large sections of public opinion which by this time had become ardent supporters of the Greeks. During the autumn of 1823 and the early winter of 1824 Philhellenic committees were organized throughout the United States under the auspices of such representative and respectable citizens as Edward Everett and Thomas L. Winthrop, of Boston; Charles King, William Bayard and Chancellor Kent, of New York; Matthew Carey and Nicholas Biddle, of Philadelphia; Governor De Witt Clinton and General Peter Gansevoort, of Albany; and General William Henry Harrison, of Cincinnati. These committees devoted themselves so assiduously to the raising of funds for support of the Greek cause that there was hardly a school, a

[1] Richardson, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 217. A similar sentiment is expressed in Monroe's eighth and last annual message, December 7, 1824. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

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college, a parish church, or a merchants' association in the eastern states which had not been aroused to sympathy for the picturesque and heroic rebels of the Morea. In addition, the several committees undertook to educate public opinion concerning the issues of the Greek war, to spread blood-curdling accounts of Turkish atrocities (conveniently overlooking excesses on the part of the Greeks), and to bring pressure upon Congress to the end that some official action be taken by the United States in support of Greek independence.

The Philhellenic theme of the Greek relief committees was speedily taken up by the press, which was uniformly friendly to the Greek cause, if we except the fact that now and then was sounded a note of caution lest the government thereby become involved in the tangled politics of Europe. The state legislatures of Maryland, South Carolina and Kentucky adopted resolutions, and the governors of New York and Massachusetts delivered messages of warm sympathy for the Greeks.[1] During the single month of December, 1823, the House of Representatives received resolutions of the legislature of South Carolina stating that her citizens would "hail with pleasure the recognition by the American Government of the independence of Greece"; a memorial from the citizens of Boston reciting Turkish atrocities in the Peloponnesus and the Aegean islands; a petition from a distinguished committee in New York expressing the hope "either that the independence of the Greeks may be speedily and formally recognized, or such steps preparatory thereto taken as may, in the opinion of the Government, be consistent with its interests, its policy, and its honor"; a request from residents of the District of Columbia that the cause of the Greeks "may engage the early and favorable attention of Congress".[2] Pulpits throughout the country rang with sermons and orations in praise of the Greeks and in appeal for those supplies which would enable them to throw off a despotic

[1] C. Z. Lincoln (ed.), *Messages from Governors*, vol. III (Albany, 1909); *Boston Daily Advertiser*, January 8, 1824.

[2] *Annals of Congress*, Eighteenth Congress, First Session, vol. I, pp. 843, 847, 889, 931, 1083; *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, vol. V, pp. 251-252, 261-262.

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and infidel rule. In imitation of Lord Byron poets and literary men like William Cullen Bryant and Fitz-Green Halleck wielded their pens in stout defense of the Greeks, in whom they saw heroic descendants of classic forefathers. A number of idealistic and venturesome Americans, likewise inspired by Lord Byron, left for Greece to offer their hearts and swords to the cause of Greek freedom.

By resolution of the House of Representatives, December 19, 1823, the President was requested to lay before Congress any information he might have received and deemed it proper to give concerning the condition and future prospects of the Greeks. In reply, the President submitted on December 31 the Rush-Adams-Luriottis correspondence as described above, together with other materials of lesser importance.[1] These documents were published generally by the press early in January and received favorable editorial comment, the attitude of the Government being described as thoroughly in accord with the principles of George Washington. In the meantime, however, Daniel Webster, deeply interested in the Philhellenic cause, introduced in the House the following resolution, which he announced he would shortly thereafter press in debate:

> Resolved, that provision ought to be made by law for defraying the expense incident to the appointment of an Agent or Commissioner to Greece, whenever the President shall deem it expedient to make such appointment.[2]

It was in support of this resolution that Webster delivered his eloquent speech of January 19, 1824, which precipitated a de-

[1] *Annals of Congress,* Eighteenth Session, First Session, vol. I, pp. 843, 847, 917; *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* vol. V, pp. 252-260.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 847, 871, 917, etc. Webster was moved to take this step by Everett and appears to have had no desire to embarrass Monroe in the formulation of a government policy. Webster, indeed, was led to believe by Calhoun and by Monroe himself that there would be no positive objection to his resolution—although Monroe subsequently changed his mind. Webster hoped to have Everett designated agent or commissioner as provided in the resolution; to any such appointment the Secretary of State would have objected because "Everett was already too much committed as a partisan" to the Greek cause. See *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams,* vol. VI, pp. 227, 230, 240.

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bate memorable in American Congressional annals and which served to clarify American policy as affecting Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire.

Webster's oration was a classic of the type with which his name is associated. He disavowed any intention to be swayed by respect for the great cultural heritage of the Greeks—he had not introduced his motion "in the vain hope of discharging anything of this accumulated debt of centuries". He was rather concerned with "the struggle of an interesting and gallant people, in the cause of liberty and Christianity" and with the significance of that struggle to the existence of independent nations and free governments. "What I have to say of Greece, therefore, concerns the modern, not the ancient; the living and not the dead. It regards her, not as she exists in history, triumphant over time, and tyranny, and ignorance; but as she now is, contending against fearful odds, for being, and for the common privileges of human nature." He did not propose that we should endanger our pacific relations by interfering directly in the Greek cause or in any other purely European question. But as the Holy Alliance had expressed itself in this crisis as being in accord with the Ottoman government, so we should exert our moral influence on the side of freedom and nationality. The securing of information and the expression of sympathy were the underlying motives of his resolution.

> It may now be asked, perhaps, whether the expression of our sympathy, and that of the country may do them any good? I hope it may. It may give them courage and spirit, it may assure them of public regard, teach them that they are not wholly forgotten by the civilized world, and inspire them with constancy in the pursuit of their great end. At any rate, Sir, it appears to me that the measure which I have proposed is due to our own character, and called for by our own duty. When we shall have discharged that duty, we may leave the rest to the disposition of Providence.

The claim of Greece upon America is too powerful to be lightly brushed aside:

> The Greeks address the civilized world with a pathos not easy to

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> be resisted. They invoke our favor by more moving considerations than can well belong to the condition of any other people. They stretch out their arms to the Christian communities of the earth, beseeching them, by a generous recollection of their ancestors, by the consideration of their desolated and ruined cities and villages, by their wives and children sold into an accursed slavery, by their blood, which they seem willing to pour out like water, by the common faith, and in the name, which unites all Christians, that they would extend to them at least some token of compassionate regard.[1]

Henry Clay, in support of Webster's resolution, delivered a speech no less eloquent. He pointed out that

> everywhere the interest in the Grecian cause is felt with the deepest intensity, expressed in every form, and increases with every new day and passing hour. And are the representatives of the people alone to be insulated from the common moral atmosphere of the whole land? Shall we shut ourselves up in apathy, and separate ourselves from our country, from our constituents, from our chief magistrate, from our principles?

He did not believe that we could be "so mean, so base, so despicable, that we may not attempt to express our horror, utter our indignation, at the most brutal and atrocious war that ever stained earth or shocked high heaven". However coolly and calmly the rest of Christendom might look on, Americans must demonstrate that "there are hearts not yet closed against compassion for human woes, that can pour out indignant feelings at the oppression of a people endeared to us by every ancient recollection, and every modern tie". He believed it impossible that history should record that in the year 1824 of our Lord and Saviour,—"the Saviour of Greece and of us"—while the people of the United States were spontaneously expressing the deep feelings of the nation in respect to Greek freedom, "a proposition was offered in the American

[1] *Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster,* vol. V, pp. 60-93. There is a lengthy discussion of Turkish atrocities, pp. 84-85, 87-88. Webster's speech was translated into Greek, printed in pamphlet form, and shipped to Greece in large numbers for distribution there. *Niles' Register,* vol. XXVI (1824), p. 431.

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Congress to send a messenger to Greece, to inquire into her state and condition, with a kind expression of our good wishes and our sympathies—and it was rejected". If such be the record, the members of the House must be prepared to face their angry constituents with the admission "that the specters of cimeters, and crowns, and crescents, gleamed before and alarmed" them; that they had "suppressed all the noble feelings prompted by religion, by liberty, by national independence, and by humanity".[1]

Webster's resolution, eloquently as it was espoused, could not pass. The opposition, headed by John Randolph of Virginia, Mr. Poinsett of South Carolina, Mr. Wood of New York, and Mr. Bartlett of New Hampshire, persuaded the House to dispose of the resolution without a formal vote. The principal arguments advanced against despatching an agent to Greece, as proposed by Webster, were that it would mark a dangerous departure from our traditional policy of non-interference in European affairs; that it offered the possibility of trouble with the Ottoman Empire (in the internal politics of which we proposed to meddle) or with the Holy Alliance (against the principles of which the resolution was avowedly aimed); that it savored of a crusade on behalf of republican principles, setting a dangerous precedent and exposing our own institutions to attack from Europe; that it pursued the questionable course of encouraging the Greeks to count upon American aid, when no such aid would be forthcoming; that it involved encroachment by the House upon the prerogatives of the Executive in the conduct of foreign relations. Throughout the debate opponents of the resolution made it clear that Government policy in all such cases must be divorced from popular sentiment. Members of the House as men and as citizens might voice their sympathy for Greece and exercise their generosity on behalf of the Greek cause; as representatives of the nation, however,

[1] C. Colton (ed.), *Works of Henry Clay*, vol. VI (New York, 1904), pp. 245-253. It is of interest to compare this speech with Clay's address to Kossuth some twenty-five years later. *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 221-224. On the latter occasion Clay was much less interested in freedom in Hungary than he was in the maintenance of free institutions in the United States.

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they had a stern duty not to "indulge their sympathies, however noble, or give way to their feelings, however generous". The debate was marked by the expression of so many of the principles which subsequently have regulated American relations with the Near East that it is deserving of somewhat more extensive analysis.[1]

John Randolph sought to bring the House back to earth after the high-sounding oratory of Webster and Clay. He said he was aware that "this was perhaps one of the finest and the prettiest themes for declamation ever presented to a deliberative assembly". He wished to make it clear, however, that he and his colleagues were "delegated to this house to guard the interests of the People of the United States, not to guard the interests of other people". A policy of Quixotism, whether it were in Greece or South America or elsewhere, was dangerous; but he was particularly opposed to any American interference in the problems of the Mediterranean, which would be for us "to open this Pandora's box of political evils". That the proposed intervention in Greek affairs was to be in the name of Liberty and Religion made it the more portentous, and he would have none of it. Mr. Wood of New York was in agreement with Mr. Randolph in denouncing the doctrine "that the United States are the guardians of liberty, and are bound to propagate it among all nations". Because the world was full of oppression was no reason why America should consider itself "the Hercules that is to free it from the monsters of tyranny and slavery". The true mission of the United States is to be achieved "not by embarking in a military crusade to establish the empire of our principles—not by establishing a corps of diplomatic apostles of liberty, but by the moral influence of its example" in maintaining republicanism at home and peace abroad.

Opponents of Webster's motion were convinced that it risked

[1] The text of the several speeches is available in a 43-page pamphlet, *Eighteenth Congress, House of Representatives, Discussion of the Greek Question* (Washington, 1824); a somewhat less detailed account is in *Abridgement of the Debates of Congress,* vol. VII, pp. 641 *et seq.,* and in *Annals of Congress,* Eighteenth Congress, First Session, vol. I, pp. 1084-1099.

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serious diplomatic difficulties with the Porte and with the Holy Alliance which might eventuate in war. It had been our traditional policy to recognize governments only when firmly established. The South American republics, it was said, had in fact been free before we recognized them; they were hardly in a state of insurrection. It was the opinion of Mr. Wood that the Greeks had as yet neither established their independence nor determined their form of government. The revolution might result in a Grecian monarchy, and certainly Americans could have no sympathy

> in a change from one despotism to another. Any political mission, till the fact of their independence is ascertained, is an infringement of the law of nations. Public ministers are the organs of intercourse between independent nations; but the law of nations does not recognize a mission from one independent nation to the subjects of another.

Unléss the United States were prepared to recognize the independence of Greece and support that recognition, if need be, by force, the government had best take no action at all. Mr. Poinsett, a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, pointed out that the Sultan was in a position to menace American lives and property at Smyrna and thus jeopardize all American interests in the Mediterranean. In such an event would the United States be prepared to defend its rights by armed force? If so, it would mean war. If not, what would become of the American prestige in the Near East which it was the purpose of the resolution to promote? Mr. Bartlett believed that under no circumstances should we hazard hostile measures on the part of the Turks, particularly as the enthusiasm of New England was likely to evaporate at the first sign of war, as in 1812:

> When our property is captured and the Turkish cimeter is dyed in American blood—where then will be your Greek committees—your Greek dancers? You may then pipe in vain for them to dance. Where will then be your volunteer pilgrims to the tomb of Leonidas and Socrates? They will prefer the domestic fireside to any tomb, ancient or modern, to be found in the Ottoman

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> Empire. We ought not to refuse instruction from the experience of the late war. It was a war in defence of *our own* rights, for the liberties of our own captive citizens. And yet, is this to be so much more *holy* and *righteous* that our pulpits shall not again resound with the cry of murder?

It was made clear, furthermore, that the volume of American trade with Smyrna, and the amount of American property in that city, were not such as to permit Congress to dismiss them without serious concern. Thomas H. Perkins, the most prominent American merchant dealing with Smyrna, had refused to serve on the Boston committee for Greek relief, perhaps for fear that his interests in Turkey would thereby be seriously compromised.[1] The American consul at Smyrna subsequently reported that Americans holding property at that port—to the value of more than two hundred thousand dollars—were exceedingly uneasy concerning the possible effect upon their interests of Philhellenic activities in the United States.[2] The Secretary of the Treasury, on request of the House, reported that American trade with Smyrna—representing substantially the whole trade with the Ottoman dominions, including Greece—amounted for the years 1820–1822 inclusive to more than $2,300,000, and that customs duties collected thereon were in excess of $170,000.[3] During 1823, furthermore, the Smyrna trade rose to a figure in excess of $1,200,000.[4] No member of Congress was disposed to treat these interests lightly, except Clay, who said that

> a wretched invoice of figs and opium has been spread before us to repress our sensibilities and to eradicate our humanity. Ah! sir, "what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose

[1] *Boston Daily Advertiser,* January 21, 1824. Josiah Quincy, John Welles, and Benjamin Gorham also refused to serve. It is of interest to note that Quincy later served as Chairman of the New England Committee for the Famine in Ireland and Scotland, in 1847.

[2] *Consular Letters, Smyrna,* vol. I. Despatch from David Offley to John Quincy Adams, March 17, 1824.

[3] *Eighteenth Congress, First Session, Executive Papers,* vol. II, No. 32 (Washington, 1824).

[4] *Ibid., State Papers,* vol. IV, No. 73.

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> his own soul?" or what shall it avail a nation to save the whole of a miserable trade, and lose its liberties?

If American interests were going to be jeopardized in the name of liberty and religion, it must be demonstrated that corresponding advantages were to accrue to Greece, if not to the United States, from the adoption of the resolution. Here Webster's opponents hit upon a genuinely weak spot in his case, for the friends of Greece were not clear as to what the proposed special agent was intended to accomplish. To some, the resolution was an "unpretending, inoffensive expression of good feeling and good nature"; to others it promised to be to the enemies of Greece "more terrible than an army with banners, to carry the Cross over the Crescent to the heart of the Ottoman Empire". It seemed to one member of the opposition, in these circumstances, that the measure either was or was not intended to have substance. If intended to give aid or the hope of aid to the Greeks, that should be made perfectly clear and the measure would collapse of its own weight. If not, the resolution was "words, mere words". But, in the opinion of another member, it was worse than mere verbiage, for it would deceive the Greeks, leading them to expect aid which would not be forthcoming—we should "approach the struggling Greeks with fair words and a smiling countenance, but with nothing in our hand to aid them". Moral support without military assistance from France during our Revolution would have availed us nothing and would now avail Greece nothing. Opponents of the resolution were sensitive to the charge that they were committed to a "cold-hearted, pence-calculating policy", whereas "a disregard of consequences is termed generous, noble, glorious". But the majority of the House was clearly in accord with Mr. Poinsett when he said:

> In whatever light we may regard a policy which sacrifices to its selfish views the rights of humanity and justice, and the claims of a suffering Christian people, in matters relating exclusively to Europe we ought not to interfere. We cannot do so without departing from those principles of sound policy which have hitherto guided our councils and directed our conduct. Any

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interference on our part, in favor of a cause which not even remotely affects our interest, could only be regarded in the light of a Crusade.

Back of opposition to Webster's resolution in the House of Representatives was John Quincy Adams. Indeed, he furnished to members many of the arguments presented in the House against adoption of the resolution. And as it was he who determined the policy of the government, it is of interest and importance to analyze his views on the Greek question. To begin with, he suspected Calhoun, Gallatin and Clay of seeking to make political capital of the prevailing popular sympathy for the Greeks and of ignoring the larger questions of foreign policy involved. As for himself, he chose to see the matter in a different perspective. He was not averse to challenging the Holy Alliance, but believed that it ought to be "upon grounds exclusively American". If the United States presumed to call the Allied Powers to account on questions of purely European concern, what was to prevent the Holy Alliance from interfering in American affairs? "The ground that I wish to take", said Adams, therefore, "is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that." With the Monroe Doctrine—which had just been proclaimed—and its corollary of non-intervention in European affairs, aid to the Greeks, in any form, was clearly in conflict. Furthermore, action by the Government of the United States on behalf of rebellious subjects of the Ottoman Empire would jeopardize success of the delicate negotiations then in progress for a much-needed treaty with the Sublime Porte. Concerning these negotiations Congress was in ignorance. But that only increased the irritation of Adams. For if the House of Representatives was unwittingly damaging American diplomatic interests in Turkey, it was attributable to an altogether unwarranted interference on its part with the prerogatives of the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs! Adams felt so keenly on these points that he would not even subscribe to

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the fund being raised in Washington for the Greek cause, nor would he advise the President to subscribe.[1]

It must not be understood, however, that John Quincy Adams was opposed to the cause of the Greeks as such. He was merely determined that no rash measures in their favor should be permitted to interfere with certain more vital considerations of foreign policy which were weighing heavily on his mind. Later, when he himself was President, and when European policy was less hostile to the Greeks than formerly, Adams pursued precisely the course which Webster had advocated and he himself had opposed in the winter of 1824—that is, he determined to send a special agent to Greece. In September, 1825, William C. Somerville was despatched to the seat of the Greek revolutionary government with the following instructions:

> *Sir:*
>
> The very deep interest which the people of the United States naturally feel in the existing contest between Greece and Turkey has induced the President to appoint you an agent for the Government of the United States to proceed to Greece. You will accordingly embark on board the United States frigate *Brandywine*, which is to carry General LaFayette to France, and, upon your arrival there you will thence continue in that vessel, or proceed without delay, in such other manner as may appear to you most eligible, to the point of your destination. Upon reaching Greece you will repair to the actual seat of Government, and communicate to the existing authorities your arrival and your appointment. You will let them know that the people of the United States and their Government throughout the whole of the present struggle of Greece, have constantly felt an anxious desire that it might terminate in the re-establishment of the liberty and independence of that country, and that they have consequently observed the events of the war, with the most lively interest, sympa-

[1] *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, vol. VI, pp. 172-173, 197-198, 204, 227, 230, 233, 240, 324-325. For the direct influence of Adams on the debate in the House see especially pp. 227, 230, and 233 concerning his conversations with Mr. Poinsett of South Carolina and Mr. Fuller of Massachusetts, and compare with account of the debate itself as cited above.

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thizing with Greece when they have unfortunately been adverse, and rejoicing when they have been propitious to her cause. Nor ought any indifference to its issue, on the part of the United States, to be inferred, from the neutrality which they have hitherto prescribed, and probably will continue to prescribe, to themselves. That neutrality is according to the policy which has characterized this Government from its origin, which has observed during all the revolutionary wars of France, and which has been also extended to the contest between Spain and her American colonies. It is better for both the United States and Greece that it should not be departed from in the present instance.

It is a principal object of your agency to collect and transmit from time to time, to this Department, information of the present state and future progress of the war by land and at sea; the capacity of the Greeks to maintain the contest; the number and condition of her Armies; the state of her marine; of the public Revenue; the amount, dispositions and degree of education of her population; the character and views of the Chiefs,—and, in short, whatever will tend to enable the Government of the United States to form a correct judgment, in regard to the ability of Greece to prosecute the war, and to sustain an independent Government.

Without any officious interference in their affairs, or obtruding your advice upon them, you will, whenever applied to, communicate all the information which may be desired, as to this country and its institutions; and you will, on suitable occasions, lend your friendly offices to heal any difficulties, or soothe any angry passions, in the way to that harmonious concert between the Grecian functionaries and commanders, without which their cause cannot prosper.

You will also render any aid that you can to our commerce and seamen in the ports and harbours of Greece. Information, which, it is hoped is not correct, has reached this Department, of one or two American merchantmen having engaged in the Turkish service, to transport military men or means. If any such instances should fall within your observation, you will acquaint the parties concerned with the high displeasure of the President at conduct so unworthy of American citizens, and so contrary to their duty, as well as their honour; and that if they should bring themselves, in consequence of such misconduct, into any difficulties, they will

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have no right to expect the interposition of their Government on their behalf.

. . . . . .

HENRY CLAY[1]

6 September, 1825

Somerville reached Paris, en route to Greece, in October, 1825. He was detained in France by illness and died there in January, 1826. He never reached the country to which he was sent, therefore, and no successor to him was appointed.

During the administration of John Quincy Adams, the American committee for the relief of the Greeks did noble work and, along with the Americans fighting with Greek armies did much to earn for the United States an enviable name among the Greek revolutionaries. By the end of the year 1827 there was every indication that Greek independence was not far distant. When the Russians crossed the Pruth in May, 1828, the freedom of the modern Hellenes was assured. The steps which led to Russian intervention had been watched with keen interest in the United States. In his third annual message to Congress, December 4, 1827, President John Quincy Adams complimented the Tsar Nicholas for espousing the Greek cause and prophesied that as a result of his aid and the cooperation of other powers

> the friends of freedom and humanity may indulge the hope that they [the Greeks] will obtain relief from that most unequal of conflicts which they have so long and so gallantly sustained; that they will enjoy the blessings of self-government, which by their sufferings in the cause of liberty they have richly earned, and that their independence will be secured by those liberal institutions of which their country furnished the earliest examples in the history of mankind, and which have consecrated to immortal remembrance the very soil for which they are now again profusely pouring forth their blood. The sympathies which the people and Government of the United States have so warmly indulged with their cause have been acknowledged by their Government in a letter of thanks, which I have received from their illustrious

[1] *Department of State, Special Missions*, 1825, pp. 31-33.

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President, a translation of which is now communicated to Congress, the representatives of that nation to whom this tribute of gratitude was intended to be paid and to whom it is justly due.[1]

The letter from Count Capo d'Istrias to which Adams referred was dated Corfu, June 15, 1827, and transmitted a testimonial from the National Assembly of Greece, signed by its President, as follows:

To His Excellency, The President of the United States of North America.

Excellency:—

In extending a helping hand towards the Old World, and in encouraging it in its march to freedom and civilization, the New World covers itself with increased glory, and does honour to humanity.

Greece, Sir, has received with gratitude the signal testimonies of the philanthropic sentiments of the people of North America, as well as its generous assistance.

Commissioned to express to your Excellency the sincere feelings of my nation, I esteem myself happy in being the organ of communication between free communities, which, although separated by space, are, nevertheless, drawn towards one another by the principles of morals, and by whatever is truly beneficial to human society.[2]

While the country was contemplating with pleasure this exchange of Graeco-American courtesies came the news of Navarino, which was everywhere received with rejoicing.[3] The day of Hellenic emancipation was at hand.

American sympathy with the cause of modern Greece did not, however, die with the birth of the Greek Kingdom. Philhellenism had come to stay. It flared up with renewed bril-

[1] Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* vol. VI, p. 637; also *Twentieth Congress, First Session, Senate Documents,* vol. I, p. 33.

[3] See especially New York *Evening Post,* December 27 and 31, 1827, and the *Commercial Advertiser,* December 31, 1827; *Boston Advertiser,* December 24, 1827.

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liance at the time of the Cretan insurrection of 1866.[1] It was in evidence during the Graeco-Turkish War of 1897. It was sedulously promoted by a rapidly growing Graeco-American population, recruited by an immigration which became numerically important after 1900. It was captivated by the activities of Eleutherios Venizelos, who was described as the unifier of Greece, as Cavour had been the unifier of modern Italy and Bismarck of modern Germany. It spoke of the "Crusaders" who under Greek banners marched with other Balkan Christians in 1912 to expel the Turks from the soil of Europe. It was pleased with the Anatolian campaign of 1919–1922, designed, in the minds of some, to restore the ancient Greek empire in Asia Minor. It was shocked by the Turkish victory of Sakaria, the precipitate Hellenic retreat to the Aegean, and the destruction (1922) of Smyrna, the home of tens of thousands of Greeks who were thereby condemned to the lot of refugees. It supported those generous efforts of Americans to relieve the suffering occasioned by the wholesale interchange of Greek and Turkish populations provided for by the Conference of Lausanne. In the form of Philhellenic societies, promoted principally by professors of archaeology and of the classics, it still lives, prepared as occasion presents itself to urge friendly relations between the United States and Greece. For over a century it has colored American public opinion concerning the Near East.

But a study of American official policy toward nationalist minorities of the Ottoman Empire reveals no important departures from the precepts which John Quincy Adams enunciated more than one hundred years ago. Throughout the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, the Government of the United States has welcomed American popular interest in the cause of the Greeks and, later, of the Armenians; it has expressed its "peculiar interest" in the cause of freedom in the Near East; it has cheered these people on in their laudable

[1] Concerning American Philhellenic activities during the Cretan insurrection see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1866, Part II, p. 256; 1867, Part II, pp. 14-15; 1868, Part II, pp. 123-131. Also Julia Ward Howe, *Reminiscences*, pp. 312-320; S. G. Howe, *Letters and Journals*, vol. II, chap. xvii.

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purpose to determine their own destinies; occasionally it has used its good offices on their behalf. But not once has the Government of this republic signed a treaty guaranteeing the rights of minorities in the Turkish dominions; not once has it taken an active part, diplomatic or military, in the emancipation of Christian peoples of the Near East from Moslem rule. To be sure, Greeks and Armenians have been led unofficially to expect American aid, but such aid has not been forthcoming from the authorities at Washington. There has been much loose talk by Near Easterners, and by their American friends concerning the manner in which the United States has violated its sacred pledges to the Christian subjects of the Sultan. But the truth of the matter is that there have been no pledges inconsistent with our traditional policy. Non-interference in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire has been a fundamental principle of the Government of the United States, from which there has been no departure.[1] There is in this respect a sharp clash between official American policy and what might be called popular American policy, for American citizens as individuals have been most outspoken in their desire to see the Ottoman Empire broken up, have espoused most ardently the cause of oppressed nationalities, and have given of their lives and their fortunes that Greece might be free and that Armenia might be established as a sovereign entity. The record of 1821–1829, therefore, suggested an American program which was to be followed for more than a century. Nor is there a probability that the course of action thus defined will shortly be altered.

EDWARD MEAD EARLE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

[1] Be it noted that the United States did not declare war on Turkey in 1917; that the United States was not a signatory to the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920; that the United States Senate would assume no responsibility for the Armenian boundary decision of President Wilson or for the proposed American mandate for Armenia.

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# THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF HAITI II[1]

## IV

*Power and Achievements of the American Occupation*

THE foregoing description should have indicated that the Haitian government has in reality no genuinely independent power and that the actual control is in the hands of the American Occupation. Such is indeed the case. Behind the President's palace, as has been said, there are barracks and in those barracks is quartered a regiment of American marines. These are now virtually all the marines on the island, although another regiment was stationed there until 1925. These marines perform a double function: on the one hand they prevent the President from being assassinated, while on the other they enable the American High Commissioner, General John H. Russell, to give the Haitians authoritative advice—a function analogous to that which Lord Cromer once exercised in Egypt.

There is, in addition, the Haitian gendarmerie which now numbers 2700.[2] This is composed of Haitians but predominately officered by American marines who receive, besides their regular army pay, an added stipend from the Haitian government. These gendarmerie officers are predominantly non-commissioned marine officers, although there are also a number of marine privates in such positions. The Haitians in general feel that not enough of their number have been trained for officers. Only one has a captaincy. They complain that after nearly twelve years of the occupation, their army has not been allowed to have enough native leaders to enable it to be truly a National Army. The American domination over it is quite

[1] This is the concluding installment of Professor Douglas' article. Part I was published in the June, 1927, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY.

[2] *Fourth Annual Report of American High Commissioner,* February 15, 1926, p. 12. For other statements of the composition and work of the gendarmerie see the second and third annual reports, pp. 29-33, 24-26.



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complete although the attempt is naturally made to keep this fact in the background as much as possible.[1] In virtually all of the communes, the officer of the gendarmes, usually an American, acts as adviser to the communal council. He audits expenditures, helps to form their budget, sees that schools are maintained and tries to enforce attendance. The Haitians complain that in many instances these local officers have domineered over the local officials. Unquestionably a great deal of power has been given to these young marines, and it is not incredible that in some cases the power has not been wisely exercised.

Such is the military set-up. By means of it and the tacit pressure of the United States, the American High Commissioner has become the virtual dictator of Haitian policies. In August, 1918, upon the request of the American Occupation, the Haitian government agreed to submit to the official American representative all legislative proposals touching matters covered in the treaty of 1915.[2] If there were a disagreement, the matter was to be taken up in joint conference between the two countries. In 1919 the American Minister complained[3] that acts had been passed by the Council of State on pensions and trademarks which had not been submitted to the American Legation. These acts, declared the Minister, "will not be recognized as laws by my government. I have notified the Receiver General of Customs [an American official] to this effect." The Americans maintained that *all* legislation, whether or not the Haitians believed that it touched upon the treaty, should be submitted to the Legation for approval; President Dartiguenave, it was stated, had agreed to this in November, 1918.[4] The Haitians, denying that any such general pledge had been given, wished to stand on the written memorandum of August. The American interpretation, however, now pre-

[1] Slightly over one million is spent annually by Haiti on the gendarmerie. See *Budget-Générale 1923-24.*

[2] *Documents Diplomatiques, République d'Haïti* (1921), p. 6.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

[4] Acting Secretary Davis' note, *ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

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vails and all proposed measures are submitted to the American High Commissioner[1] for approval. If he gives his consent, the measure may then be passed by the Council of State. If he disapproves, the matter is supposed to be adjusted between the two governments. In practice, of course, the veto of the High Commissioner is sufficient. The Occupation may also stimulate legislation which it desires.

In practice, therefore, the American Occupation controls the Haitian government. It is therefore distinctly disingenuous for members of our State Department to argue, as they have at times done, that such acts as the failure to call for the congressional elections have rested solely upon the decision of the Haitian government. The plain truth of the matter is that if our State Department wanted to have such elections held, it could have them called. The fiction of an independent Haitian government has enabled our officials to divert responsibility for certain actions to the Haitians.

Thus the nominal request of our State Department to President Borno in March of this year that Senator King of Utah be permitted to enter Haiti after he had been barred by Mr. Borno cannot be regarded as expressing the real policy of the United States Government. Had our government actually tried to have Senator King admitted, there can be no doubt that he would have been allowed to enter. It is, moreover, difficult to believe that President Borno could have taken such an initial step without the knowledge and approval of the American Occupation. Senator King, as is well known, has been most active in the attempt to secure the withdrawal of the American marines and the abandonment of American political control.

While major matters of policy do rest in American hands, it is true that the United States has found it expedient to grant the Haitian administration a certain degree of latitude in matters of minor importance.

[1] There is now no United States Minister to Haiti, but there is instead a High Commissioner, who, though a marine officer, is responsible to the State Department.

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The only two important instruments of government which we do not directly control are the schools and the courts. These, it will be remembered, were not included in the Treaty of 1915. The American Occupation, however, through the Financial-Adviser, is able to control the amount of money allotted in the budget for education. These appropriations have been limited to approximately the amounts expended for this purpose before American control.[1] The common schools have therefore not shared in the general expansion brought about in other services by the increase in revenues, the reduction in the public debt, and the American administration. From all the estimates which I can make, it seems probable that there are not more than 36,000 children in school out of a total population of from two and a quarter to two and a half millions. The quality of instruction offered can be inferred from the fact that the prevailing salary for country school teachers is $6 a month, or only sixty per cent of the money pay of a private in the gendarmerie while the latter secures board, room and clothing in addition. When these are counted in, the salaries of school-teachers are less than a fourth those of the privates in the gendarmes. The Americans defend the scanty grants for the common schools on the ground of the poverty of the country and the corruption which would attend the expenditure of larger funds by the Haitian Ministry of Education. A certain merit is lent to this last argument by the many frauds which have in the past characterized public school administration.

The American Occupation would be willing to grant increased funds for public school education if the Haitians would surrender control to them. Overtures to this effect have been made[2] but the Haitians have refused to make such a concession. This may be partially due to a desire to retain profitable opportunities for petty graft, but it is also in large part caused

[1] The amount appropriated for the year 1914-15 was 1,893,000 gourdes, while the sum allowed for 1923-24 was 2,169,000 gourdes. *Budget-Générale, 1914-15*, p. 3; *idem, 1923-24*.

[2] See *République d'Haïti, Relations Extèrieures, Documents Diplomatiques*, pp. 223-24.

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by fear that the Americans would try to break down Haitian culture, which is of French derivation, and pursue a program of Americanization. The Haitians also complain that the appropriations for higher education have been somewhat stinted. On the other hand, it is undeniable that more schoolhouses have been built in the last two years under the Occupation than in any previous comparable period.

In the last few years, the Occupation has been trying to build up a system of agricultural and industrial education directly under its control.[1] Several district farm schools have been started and agricultural extension work, with demonstration farms, has been attempted. A central school for training leaders and teachers of agriculture has been opened near Port-au-Prince, but the students thus far have been drawn almost exclusively from the children of middle and upper class town groups who have had virtually no experience in farming.[2] An attempt is also being made to improve the quality of the farm animals, notably the donkeys. A great deal of money is being spent upon this type of work, yet I found few, whether Haitians or Americans, who had much confidence in its success. Some time, however, will be required before a final judgment can be rendered on this point.

The fact that the courts are in Haitian hands and that the higher judges hold office for life has been a thorn in the side of the Occupation.[3] To be sure, no member of the Occupation can be tried by a Haitian court,[4] whether or not the complain-

[1] The clause in the treaty which is cited as giving the Occupation such power is Article I, "The Government of the United States will, by its good offices, aid the Haitian government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural . . . . resources."

[2] An unfortunate feature connected with the construction of this school was the purchase of land for it from President Borno and members of his family at prices which seem to be rather high.

[3] See *Second Annual Report of the American High Commissioner,* pp. 5-6. In this report, however, General Russell declares that "the court of Cassation [the highest court], while underpaid and somewhat unwieldy, enjoys the confidence and respect of foreigners as well as of Haitians." See also *Fourth Annual Report* (1926), p. 3.

[4] Save where an American was out of uniform at the time the dispute occurred

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ant be a Haitian; the Occupation has its own courts to settle such disputes. Other American nationals, however, can fall under the jurisdiction of the Haitian courts. Trouble has naturally arisen in connection with judicial orders given by Haitian judges to the Haitian Government. Treaty officials have frequently thought such orders unwise, and in these instances the American advisers have generally refused to obey the court orders. As a result, the courts have found it impossible to enforce their decrees, since the gendarmerie is absolutely controlled by Americans who naturally will not enforce an order against one of their fellow treaty officials.

One of the most important issues from a legal and social viewpoint has been the so-called Jolibois case. Jolibois was a former clerk in the government service who became editor of a small paper, *Le Courier Haïtien*, and a violent critic of the American Occupation. His office was protected for some time by General Russell, to prevent the marines from wrecking it as a reprisal for attacks which Jolibois had made against them. Jolibois, however, charged that General Russell had tried to embezzle $74,000 from a flour fund which he had administered during the war and that the State Department in Washington had forced him to restore the funds. All the evidence that I could secure indicated that this charge was quite certainly false and that the delay in closing up the fund was solely attributable to the Navy Department. General Russell seems indeed to have shown good judgment and perfect integrity in managing this fund, the balance of which had been turned over to build a hospital at Hinche. General Russell allowed these attacks to continue for some months and then President Borno, acting at the request, as it is believed, of General Russell, ordered Jolibois to be imprisoned. After some time he was released, only to renew the attack. Once more he was thrown into prison, again without trial, and his assistants, upon repeating the charge, were likewise imprisoned. Since then the government has played cat-and-mouse with Jolibois, releasing him periodi-

and the Haitians could not have known that he was a member of the Occupation. This was the case when an American naval officer was murdered in an unsavory water-front region.

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cally and then locking him up again when he repeats his charges.[1] He has not yet faced a jury. The right of trial by jury has therefore not been granted to political opponents of the government and the American Occupation. The question naturally occurs as to why General Russell did not sue Jolibois for libel instead of having him thrown into jail without trial. The reasons were undoubtedly two: first, because he believed that the Haitian courts, because of their prejudice against the Occupation, would not have convicted Jolibois; and, second, because of his realization that if members of the Occupation sued Haitians, they could also be sued by them, and consequently the acts of the Occupation would come under the control of the courts. This the Occupation could not tolerate, for, as one of its members said to me, "the military must be above the civil."

It is nevertheless my judgment that it was a mistake to have Jolibois imprisoned without trial. It has given the impression to many that the Occupation was unwilling to have Jolibois' charges aired in court. The danger, moreover, of permitting the executive to throw critics into prison without trial is too evident to deserve much elaboration. Anglo-Saxon countries have been striving to guard against such arbitrary power since the days of Magna Charta. It is humiliating to find Americans careless of individual liberty and of the right to a fair trial in a country which the United States has virtually conquered.

The Financial Adviser, who is now also the Receiver of Customs, not only superintends the collection of expenses and draws up the budget, but also audits the expenditures. The two posts were formerly filled by a series of political appointees with little or no financial experience. J. A. McIlherny, who was Financial Adviser for over four years, spent less than a quarter of this time in Haiti and for the remainder of the time was in the United States where he continued to draw his annual salary of $12,000 from the Haitian government and to charge in addition $15 a day for traveling expenses.[2] McIlherny's

[1] Jolibois has also been prevented from delivering public addresses, notably at Cape Haïtien.

[2] *Hearings*, McCormick Committee, p. 1442.

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defense was that the negotiation of the loan required his presence in the United States, but it seems highly doubtful whether this justified such long absences as he took. Haitians, and indeed many Americans, charge that Mr. McIlherny spent a considerable portion of this time on his pineapple plantation in Louisiana.

The office of Receiver-General of Customs was filled for some years by Mr. A. J. Maumus, whose honesty was unquestioned but whose technical competence was less irreproachable. For nearly eight years the technical administration of Haitian finances was not greatly improved, save for the important fact that the revenues were now collected far more honestly than under the Haitian régime.

With the coming of Dr. W. W. Cumberland in 1923 and the combination of the two offices, the work has been made much more efficient. The accounting system has been notably improved and the tariff has been revised. The duties had formerly been levied in such a way as to bear most heavily upon the poor and largely to exempt the well-to-do. Thus by far the major portion of the revenue was raised by (1) the export tax of three cents a pound on coffee, and (2) the import duties on such necessaries of life as cotton, cloth, flour, fish, etc.[1] Since the price of coffee is primarily fixed at the Havre market and since Haiti furnishes but a small proportion of the world crop, the export tax on coffee naturally served to depress the price which the Haitian peasant received for his crop. Moreover since the tax was fixed from year to year, and since other charges, such as merchants' commissions, etc., were relatively stable, almost the full burden of any decreases in price were shifted back to the peasants. While the importation of necessities was taxed quite heavily, certain articles consumed by the élite, such as champagne and perfumery, were taxed but lightly and in consequence sold at a relatively low price in the country. The revision of the tariff lessened many of these injustices besides simplifying the procedure which had become complicated be-

[1] For the previous tariff law see *Législation Douanière* (Port-au-Prince, 1917), p. 157.

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cause of the fact that the basic act had dated back as far as 1858. A Bureau of Internal Revenue has also been established and it is intended to increase the revenues from this source.

Another accomplishment of the Occupation has been the construction of a system of public roads. The old French roads had been allowed to fall into ruin by the Haitians and had degenerated into mere bridle-paths. There were no carriage roads between the cities. The American marines soon began the construction of the roads but were hampered by the lack of funds. The Occupation then revived an old law authorizing the *corvée*, which had been inoperative for over half a century. Haitians were forced to build roads without pay, although they were, of course, fed. No appreciable abuses occurred as long as the construction was carried on in the lowlands. In the mountainous regions, however, the number of peasants was insufficient to do the work required and it was thought necessary to compel Haitians from the plains to come into the mountains to work. They worked under guard and were quartered in stockades. Some naturally tried to escape and the evidence seems to indicate that fugitives were frequently treated as deserters and shot.[1] This naturally aroused opposition and helped to lead to an armed revolt in the north against the Occupation. The *corvée* was finally abolished, although a few commanders continued to enforce it for some time after they had been ordered to discontinue it. Since then, however, the workmen have been paid the current rates of wages and no complaints of abuses have been made during recent years. Virtually all of the cities are now connected by highways totaling approximately 500 miles. The Occupation is now proceeding to put in more bridges over the Haitian streams, which rise rapidly after a rain. A considerable amount of automobile

[1] See testimony before McCormick Committee, *Hearings,* pp. 460-509. Major Turner, who investigated the situation for the Marine Corps, reported "that there were killings and many of them is undoubtedly true, but I believe that all of these can be directly traced to Major Clark H. Wells who was in command of the District." Major Turner later added: "I would like to state that these killings were in the *corvée* and escaped *corvée* prisoners. They were people who attempted to escape and in my opinion they were killed." *Ibid.*, p. 479. See also the findings of General R. W. Catlin, *ibid.*, pp. 483-85.

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traffic has developed and the access of the peasants to the markets has been facilitated. Future construction should probably be primarily of trails rather than additional roads and it is understood that this is the plan of the Occupation.[1] During the year 1925, slightly over $1,500,000 or approximately one-sixth of the total expenditures of the government, was spent on public works.[2]

The work done by the medical service has been particularly effective. The Haitians are ridden with syphilis, malaria and tuberculosis. There are some good Haitian doctors, but the marine medical officers have greatly improved the situation. The hospitals have been renovated and are now strikingly well-managed. Port-au-Prince has been made into a sanitary city. Over forty rural clinics have been established which give approximately 400,000 treatments a year.[3] All but the most ardent Nationalists admit the good work done by the health service, although the Haitian doctors, like those of other countries, naturally tend to oppose socialized medicine, on the ground that it draws away many patients who otherwise would pay the family physician.

One of the criticisms advanced against the Occupation is that the treaty officials receive disproportionately large salaries as compared with those paid to the Haitians who are associated with them. It should be remembered, also, that those engineers, doctors and officers in the gendarmerie who are members of the marine corps receive salaries from both the American and the Haitian governments, the latter making added grants to the regular marine corps salaries. Those who, like the members of the staff of the Financial Adviser and the Agricultural Service, are not members of the marine corps, receive their salaries exclusively from Haiti, and hence cost Haiti more in salaries than the other treaty officials. Thus the Financial Adviser is paid $13,500 a year; the head of one of his bureaus,

[1] The officials are apparently cognizant of the error made by the American Occupation in Santo Domingo in constructing a too elaborate system of roads.

[2] *Fourth Annual Report of the American High Commissioner to Haiti,* p. 16.

[3] *Bulletin mensuel, publié par le Bureau du Conseiller Financier-Receveur Général,* Septembre, 1925, p. 21.

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$7,500; the head of the Service Technique, $10,000, etc. The high salary for Haitians who were chiefs of divisions was, on the other hand, $120 a month. It is true, however, that the total amount paid from Haitian funds to Americans is only $425,000 a year as compared with the $2,850,000 paid to Haitians in government service. Thus the Americans absorb only thirteen per cent of the total expenditures for personnel. The additional amounts paid yearly by the United States to the members of its marine corps who are assigned to duty in the Haitian government is $495,000, or sixteen per cent more than that paid by Haiti to Americans.[1]

The building of the roads and the organization of the gendarmerie, backed up as the latter is by the marines, have enabled the Occupation to put down the Cacos and virtually all of these bands have been broken up. In the process, however, a great many Haitians who were not Cacos were killed, some, as stated, for attempting to escape from work on the roads, and others because the marines were not always careful to distinguish precisely what a Caco was. One respectable Haitian, Charlemagne Perault, led a revolt in 1918 against the Occupation in the north but was killed by the American forces in 1919.[2] There was also an attack on Port-au-Prince in 1920. In all, the Marine Corps set the number of Haitians killed, up to October, 1919, as 2,250,[3] although in an earlier estimate they had fixed the probable number at 3,300.[4] It is probable that the number killed was well in excess of 2,500. Since 1920, however, there have been virtually no disturbances, for the Haitians have been disarmed and realize that it would be useless to attempt to revolt.

To sum up, the American Occupation has rendered real ser-

[1] These figures were published in the Monthly Bulletin (*Bulletin mensuel*) of the Financial Adviser for January 1926. The sums listed as paid by the American government do not, of course, include those paid to the marines in the regiment quartered in Port-au-Prince.

[2] *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,* 1920, p. 288.

[3] Summary by General Barnett, printed in *Hearings,* McCormick Committee, p. 1597.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 1596, 1599.

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vice: (1) in putting down revolutions and freeing citizens for industry; (2) in building roads; (3) in collecting the receipts honestly, and (4) in extending sanitation and medical service. There were some grave abuses in building the roads, and in putting down the Cacos many relatively innocent Haitians were killed. There seems to have been a disposition on the part of most of the navy and marine officials to whitewash the marine officers on charges where the weight of evidence against them seemed heavy.[1] In the last six years, however, there have been few such abuses and the country has enjoyed a degree of enforced peace which it had not previously possessed.

## V

### *The Economic and Financial Policies of the American Occupation*

The chief financial measures which thus far have not been discussed are: (1) the refunding of the former foreign and internal loans, (2) the dealings with the National Railway of Haiti and the Plaine-de-Cul-de-Sac Railroad, (3) the relations with the National Bank of Haiti, (4) the work of the Claims Commission, and (5) the land policy. Each of these will be dealt with briefly.

### 1. *The Refunding of the National Debt*

At the time of the American Occupation, the amount of foreign claims outstanding amounted to approximately 120 million gourdes[2] ($24,000,000). There was in addition a large in-

[1] See the exculpation of Lavoie, Doxey, Williams and Wells; *cf.* testimony of Major Turner on this score with letters quoted from Colonel Russell, General Catlin and others. *Hearings,* McCormick Committee, pp. 457-509. It is difficult to reconcile these with the whitewash given by the Mayo board, *ibid.,* p. 1668.

[2] This was composed as follows:

| | *Amount due in millions of gourdes* |
|---|---|
| Loan of 1875 | 19.3 |
| Loan of 1896 | 37.7 |
| Loan of 1910 | 64.0 |
| Total | 121.0 |

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ternal debt which had been contracted as a means of financing previous revolutions. Speculative or forced loans to revolutionary leaders had generally been converted at a high premium into government securities when the leaders secured the presidency. The total amount of internal loans outstanding in 1915 has been estimated at 37.2 million gourdes ($7,400,000).[1]

Despite the American Occupation, no interest was paid on these obligations for some years. This was due primarily to the shrinkage in receipts caused by the European War.[2] In 1919, the protocol[3] which set up a Claims Commission to pass upon the various claims which had accumulated against the Haitian Government, also authorized a loan of forty million dollars (1) to meet the judgments and other charges fixed by this Commission, (2) to refund the foreign loans, and (3) to carry out public improvements. It was provided that the United States should retain the administration of the Haitian customs until this loan was paid off. American control over the customs was thus prolonged beyond the period provided by the Treaty of 1915 and the extension of 1917. Due to the depreciation of the franc, it seemed advisable to Financial Adviser McIlherny to refund the foreign debt first and thus to effect savings through the fall in the value of the French currency. A loan of $16,000,000 was authorized for this purpose and after a considerable amount of negotiation was disposed of

[1] *Annual Report* of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver of Haiti (1925-26), p. 80.

[2] The annual customs receipts, which comprised from 90 to 95 per cent of total receipts, were as follows:

| *Year* | *Receipts* | *Year* | *Receipts* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1912-13..... | $6,325,000 | 1919-20..... | $6,421,000 |
| 1913-14..... | 5,074,000 | 1920-21..... | 3,606,000 |
| 1914-15..... | 5,018,000 | 1921-22..... | 4,673,000 |
| 1915-16..... | 4,559,000 | 1922-23..... | 5,838,000 |
| 1916-17..... | 3,795,000 | 1923-24..... | 5,991,000 |
| 1917-18..... | 3,178,000 | 1924-25..... | 7,150,000 |
| 1918-19..... | 5,747,000 | 1925-26..... | 8,119,000 |

[3] *Treaty Series, No. 643.* Protocol between the United States and Haiti. Establishment of Claims Commission. (1919.)

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to the National City Bank.[1] The rate of interest was set at six per cent with a thirty-year period of amortization. Largely because of the provision for American customs control, the bid of the National City Bank was 92.1. Thus in reality the Haitian government secured funds at what amounted to about 6½ per cent—a rate which is without doubt appreciably less than Haiti would have been compelled to pay had she borrowed solely on her own security. The National City Bank, therefore, cannot be charged with profiting unduly from the flotation of this loan.[2]

Although a group of French bondholders alleged that the loan of 1910 called for payment in gold francs (the text of the loan seems to be silent upon this point), the Financial Adviser held that French holders of foreign securities should not be given greater protection than the holders of internal French securities, the real value of which has depreciated because of the inflation of the currency. Accordingly, it was decided to repay the French bondholders in paper francs. The funds were deposited in escrow in the Paris branch of the National City Bank, but some of the holders having demanded payment in gold francs, these have remained on deposit there. The further decrease in the value of the franc between 1923 and 1926 will mean a still smaller payment to these bondholders, and a profit for the National City Bank, with which the funds were deposited. If Mr. McIlherny had been able to prevision the extent of the franc's decline, and had postponed the refunding, he could have saved Haiti several millions of dollars.

The internal debts were refunded by exchange into Series B

[1] These bonds are listed as Series A. The National City Bank, in floating the loan, advertised that Haiti had agreed to customs control by the United States during the life of the loan.

[2] Many Haitians charge, however, that Mr. McIlherny and others tried at one time to allow Lee, Higginson & Co. to float the loan at a much lower price. For a Haitian description of the negotiations, see the articles by J. S. Pressoir, former Minister of Finance, "L'Historique de l'Emprunt," *Le Nouvelliste* (Port-au-Prince), Dec. 30, 1925–Jan. 16, 1926. Mr. McIlherny has testified that he believed the offer of Lee, Higginson & Co. of 85, which would have meant an interest rate of 7¼ per cent, a very reasonable price. *Hearings*, McCormick Committee, p. 1415.

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bonds. There had been considerable speculation in these securities and in large measure they had passed out of the hands of their original holders. In 1924 the market price of these bonds was in the low fifties but they sold for 83 in 1925–26. This was considerably lower than the quotations on the Series A bonds. The causes of this discrepancy were the narrower market in which they were sold and a ten-per-cent Haitian income tax.[1]

### 2. *Dealings with the Railways*

No interest was paid on the bonds of the National Railway during the first seven years of the American Occupation. The protocol of 1919, however, recognized the claim of the railway for interest against Haiti without submission to the Claims Commission.[2] The claim of the railway company that the construction of a completed line was not required for recognizing the validity of bonds issued to finance the building of sections was thus upheld. Had the American Occupation not been in control, Haiti would undoubtedly have refused to recognize the validity of these bonds.

In 1923 the arrearages of interest, amounting to over $1,900,000, were paid. The road, meanwhile, had proved to be an almost complete financial failure, partly because its sections were still disconnected, and partly because of the competition with water and with the two types of beasts of burden in Hait —donkeys and women. The total revenues of the road from 1914 to 1922 averaged less than $90,000 a year, while the operating cost alone, if depreciation be included, amounted annually to $170,000. The annual interest charges were $216,000 plus the compounded interest on arrears. The income of the road, briefly, amounted only to approximately one-half of the

[1] *Annual Report* of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver of Haiti (1925-26), p. 81.

[2] *Treaty Series, No. 643.* Protocol between the United States and Haiti. Article III: "It is understood however that the Commission shall not have jurisdiction to consider or pass upon . . . . the sum due as interest . . . . upon the bonds of the Compagnie Nationale des Chemins de Fer d'Haïti, duly authorized and bearing the guarantee of the Haitian government to the amount of $3,544,548.74."

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operating costs, and to only twenty-two per cent of the total annual charges. The remainder came from the Haitian peasants who ultimately paid the taxes, and from the roadbed and rolling stock, which naturally depreciated.

In 1920, a friendly suit for receivership was filed and Judge Julius Meyer appointed as receiver Mr. Farnham, who, as stated, had been president of the road. The actual receivership lasted four years. Mr. Farnham charged and received $25,000 a year for his services and paid Sullivan and Cromwell, the well-known firm of New York lawyers, $20,000 annually for legal advice.[1] Thus the receivership fees paid to men in New York amounted to approximately half of the total annual receipts. These fees absorbed virtually all of the funds which had been set aside for the purposes of amortization at the rate of one per cent for each year. Judge Meyer retired from the bench a few days after the receivership was primarily terminated but issued a parting statement to the press in which he declared that "the fortunate results of this receivership refute the contention sometimes advanced that the courts are incapable of dealing successfully with administrative as well as legal problems."[2] He asserted that there had "been a complete rehabilitation to the great advantage of the many investors both here and abroad." Judge Meyer also fixed the future salary of Mr. Farnham at $18,000 a year,[3] which is the amount he now receives, although he apparently spends but a small fraction of his time in Haiti. Mr. Farnham has been an expensive luxury for the Haitian peasants to support.

In 1924, an agreement was negotiated between Mr. Farnham and the American Financial Adviser which provided that the bonds of the railway should be exchanged at a discount of

[1] For the records of the receivership see the files of the U. S. Federal Court in New York City. *De Acosta v. Compagnie Nationale des Chemins de Fer d'Haïti, In Equity, No. E–18–196.* See especially amended order of July 7, 1924, pp. 3-4, fixing the fees.

[2] *New York Times,* July 20, 1924.

[3] Files of *De Acosta v. Compagnie Nationale des Chemins de Fer d'Haïti, In Equity, No. E–18–196.* Stenographer's minutes of hearing, July 3, 1924, filed July 10, 1924, p. 13.

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twenty-five per cent for Series C bonds of the Republic of Haiti. The total amount of the bonds was thereby reduced to $2,660,000. Interest was fixed at six per cent and a thirty-year amortization period was provided.[1] At the same time, $600,000 of the interest previously paid out was recaptured for the purpose of extending the road into territory which it was hoped would bring in more revenue. These Series C bonds like the others are, of course, guaranteed under the 1919 protocol by American control of customs until they are redeemed.

Before the bonds are finally retired, the railroad will have cost Haiti, in principal and in interest, well over $8,000,000. One of the most interesting features of the whole situation is that had the American Financial Adviser acted promptly in 1920, the Haitian government might have retired the issue for less than a million. In that year the bonds of the railway had fallen to around 55, in terms of francs, on the Paris Bourse. Because of the depreciation of the franc, it would have been possible to buy up some of these bonds for as low as 27 in dollars, and the value of the entire issue at this rate would have been only a little more than $800,000. When it is remembered that the accrued interest alone was by this time approximately twice this figure, the saving in both interest and principal which such purchases would have effected is evident. But the opportunity was neglected.

Who, then, did buy the bonds? It is not denied that the National City Bank now owns from two-thirds to three-quarters of the issue. The bank declares that it did not buy such bonds as it holds directly in the Paris market but rather obtained them as collateral for an unpaid debt. Who this client was and what the bonds cost the National City Bank, I do not know. It is certain, however, that some one made a profit from the transaction. The cost of these bonds, assuming that they constitute seventy per cent of the issue, could scarcely have been more than $600,000 or $700,000, even after allowing for some increase in price resulting from bidding them in.

[1] For the details of this arrangement see *Annual Report* of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver of Haiti (1923-24), pp. 85-89.

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The accrued back interest permanently retained would amount to not less than $950,000, while the exchange for Haitian bonds at 75 would have meant an additional capital gain of $1,850,000. Unknown individuals or the National City Bank, or both, seem therefore to have made more than $2,000,000 on the series of transactions.

Some members of the American Occupation defend the policy followed on the ground that the Haitians should be taught the sanctity of contracts and that once the railroad concession had been made by the Antoine Simon government it was the duty of the Haitians to live up to it. But this contention ignores the fact that if a contract is tainted with fraud at its outset, as this concession so notoriously was, it ceases to be a contract. It is of course on precisely this ground that the United States is seeking to invalidate the Teapot Dome and Elk Hill leases. The citizens and taxpayers of a country are entitled to that protection against the acts of dishonest officials.

There is still another railroad in Haiti and the interest on its bonds is guaranteed by the Haitian government. This is the Plaine-de-Cul-de-Sac Railroad which is owned by the Haitian-American Sugar Corporation and the annual payments to which amount to approximately $41,000. It is in just as pitiable a condition as the National Railway. It sought to have the Claims Commission validate its claim that the government should also meet alleged deficits in operation for the period prior to 1916. This claim was not allowed by the Commission, but the company, it is understood, is seeking to have the claim recognized for the period subsequent to 1916.

### 3. *Relations with the National Bank of Haiti*

During the war, the National City Bank bought out the interests of the three other American banking firms in the National Bank of Haiti and after the war bought for approximately $1,400,000 the interests of the Banque de l'Union Parisienne. Because of the changed ownership of the National Bank, a new contract was drawn up in 1922 by our State Department and the Financial Adviser. In some particulars, this contract was more favorable to Haiti than that of 1910. Thus

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the commission to be received by the bank, as fiscal agent, of 1½ per cent on receipts and expenditures was reduced to one per cent while the profit on subsidiary coinage was given to the government. In one respect, however, a serious mistake was permitted. The original contract drawn up by the State Department provided that the National Bank of Haiti should pay interest on government funds deposited with it.[1] Nevertheless, when the contract was finally approved no more mention was made than in 1910 of requiring the bank to pay interest upon such deposits. This had not been a matter of great importance in the period prior to the American Occupation, since the government was seldom in possession of a surplus. The American Occupation, however, came to accumulate a surplus of approximately $4,000,000 to meet possible decreases in the revenue, and hence the question of interest became of more than academic concern. The results of this unfortunate neglect are that on the one million dollars deposited in Port-au-Prince, the bank pays no interest at all[2] although the bank secures nine per cent when it loans out these funds. Some $3,000,000 was transferred to the National City Bank in New York, which pays, so it is understood in Port-au-Prince, 2½ per cent interest on such deposits. The market rate for such deposits, which are not call loans, is approximately 3½ per cent. The government is therefore receiving approximately $80,000 less annually than it would if the market rate of interest were paid.

Why then was not a clause inserted in the contract requiring the Banque Nationale de la République d'Haïti and the National City Bank to pay the market rate on government surpluses? The two Haitian ministers of finance under whom the contract was negotiated, MM. J. C. Pressoir and Louis Ethéard, declare

[1] For the text of this proposed contract see *Documents Diplomatiques, République d'Haïti* (1921), pp. 116-18. *Cf.* pp. 115 and 119.

[2] See *Annual Report* of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver of Haiti (1923-24). "Unfortunately arrangements have not thus far been made by which the Haitian Government receives interest on deposits carried with the Banque National de la République d'Haïti. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to carry the bulk of the funds of the General Receiver in New York, so that they may be productive." (p. 77.)

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that they were the ones who refused to allow the bank to pay this interest.[1] They justify their action on the ground that if the bank paid interest it would then loan out the deposits again to borrowers, whereas if no interest were paid, the bank would impound the money and keep it in a vault so that the Haitian officials would be able to call for it at any time that they wished! This misapprehension of the principles of modern banking seems almost inexcusable. It is in part explained, however, by the difficulty which the Haitians feel they had in securing possession in 1914–15 of their customs receipts and of the funds which were earmarked for the redemption of paper money. The desire to be able to lay their hands on the money at any moment led these two ministers of finance to regard the modern bank as analogous to a safety-deposit vault and to misunderstand the way in which banks, by keeping their assets liquid, can meet the demands of their depositors. While the ignorance of the Haitian ministers of finance as to the elementary principles of banking was lamentable, it must be added that the National City Bank and the American officials must bear some share of the responsibility in the matter. It would seem that the bank should have been unwilling to take advantage of the ignorance of the Haitians. Moreover, while the American officials did not propose that the National Bank should be given the deposits without interest, their obligation as trustees should have impelled them to prevent the final capitulation to the interests of the bank.

It is obvious, therefore, that every effort should be made by the government to recover this amount. If the National City Bank refuses to pay the market rate, then an effort might be made so to interpret the contract that the surplus funds might be deposited with other banks which could pay the current rate of interest. It is believed that the contract does not necessarily grant to the Banque Nationale de la République d'Haïti the exclusive right to all government deposits, since the phrase "exclusive service of the treasury" might be interpreted as not identical with an exclusive right to retain all deposits.

[1] In personal conversations with the writer.

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The National Bank of Haiti has also the potentiality of large profits from the monopoly of note issue which has been given to it. Due to the rather primitive economic conditions, bank credit is extended in the form of the loaning of banknotes rather than in the creation of checking accounts. Against these issues of banknotes, for which nine per cent interest is charged on the average, a reserve of one-third is required. This reserve need not be in gold, but only in American money, and half of this may in turn be deposited outside of the country where it will, of course, draw interest. Since the bank averages approximately nine per cent upon its loans, it will be seen that a high rate of profit is possible. In practice, however, the bank has kept over sixty-five per cent reserve, and this, plus the expenses of issuing and handling the notes, has greatly reduced the profits. The Royal Bank of Canada is the only rival to the National Bank of Haiti. Since it does not have the privilege of issuing Haitian money, the only way in which it can make loans of banknotes is by importing specie or American money secured from its banking transactions outside of Haiti and then buying Haitian money (gourdes) with this over the counter of the National Bank of Haiti.

In 1920, Financial Adviser McIlherny proposed the immediate enactment of a new law which would give him the power to regulate the amount of foreign money which could be imported and exported. Further he proposed that a clause in the new contract with the bank should provide that this power should be exercised afterwards with the advice of the National Bank of Haiti. The Royal Bank of Canada feared that this power would be used to prevent it from importing specie and thus securing the monetary medium which it could loan out. If this were to be accomplished, it would of course mean that the National Bank of Haiti would have a virtual monopoly of banking and of note issue. Nevertheless, the Royal Bank of Canada is said to have offered to agree to the bill if the National Bank of Haiti would in turn agree to accept New York drafts presented by the Royal Bank for gourdes. But this offer, it is understood, was refused by the National Bank of Haiti. The Royal Bank of Canada then openly opposed the proposal and

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succeeded in convincing virtually all of the important foreign business houses on the island that the result of such a measure would probably be a banking monopoly and that this in turn would raise the rate of interest on commercial loans. Backed up by these interests, the Haitian government refused to ratify such a control over the importation of specie and foreign money. Mr. McIlherny, with the knowledge and consent of the United States Department of State, as he later testified, then proceeded to withhold the payment of salaries to Haitian officials[1] in order to secure an acceptance of this and certain other provisions. Despite this pressure, the opposition to the proposal was so strong that the bill was killed.

The officials of the American Occupation, on the other hand, claim that it was necessary to limit the free importation of specie and foreign money in order to prevent the Royal Bank of Canada from disturbing the currency situation.

### 4. *The Work of the Claims Commission*

The protocol of 1919 provided for a Claims Commission of three members, one to be nominated by the Haitian Minister of Finance, the second by the United States Secretary of State and the third, who was not to be a citizen either of Haiti or the United States, by the American Financial Adviser.[2] This Commission began its work in 1923 and found 73,269 claims amounting to 199.6 million gourdes, or approximately $40,000,000. The following table[3] shows the results of the four years' work of the Commission:

| | *Claims Awarded (in thousands of gourdes)* | *Claims Rejected (in thousands of gourdes)* |
|---|---|---|
| 1923 | 1,924 | 2,345 |
| 1924 | 9,678 | 31,595 |
| 1925 | 2,249 | 70,168 |
| 1926 | 3,627 | 78,059 |
| | 17,478 | 182,167 |

[1] See *Hearings,* McCormick Committee, pp. 1417-33.

[2] *Treaty Series No. 643,* Protocol between the United States and Haiti, p. 3.

[3] *Annual Report* of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver (1925-26), p. 94.

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It appears that the awards formed only 8.7 per cent of the claims. Approximately one-third of this amount was paid in the form of cash, derived from the balance of the Series A loan, and two-thirds in Series B bonds. The expenses of the Commission amounted to 1,017,000 gourdes, or half of one per cent of the claims submitted and 5.8 per cent of the awards made.[1]

Little fault has been found on the whole with the work of the Commission, save for the fact that in its early stages it did not make such progress as seemed possible. The awards, however, have been generally approved. The National Railway was denied most of its claims for damages alleged to have been suffered because of revolutions, on the ground that these damages could scarcely be regarded as liabilities of the government. The Plaine-de-Cul-de-Sac Railroad, as has been stated, was also denied its claim for indemnification on alleged operating deficits. On the whole, the work of the Claims Commission has been sound and no legitimate complaint can be made that it has sacrificed the interests of the Haitians for those of foreign claimants.

### 5. *Land Policy*

The land is at present occupied largely by peasants who hold three to five acre strips but few of whom, unfortunately, can produce a sound legal title to their land. There are few plantations, yet many of the Haitians seem to be afraid that the Americans are planning to take their land and build up a plantation system. A large portion of the land—it is not known precisely how much—is owned by the government. It would be theoretically possible, therefore, for the government, by evicting its tenants and by demanding that the occupants of non-government land produce a title as proof of their ownership, to drive off large numbers of the peasants from their lands, and consolidate the small holdings into plantations. Recently 30,000 *carreaux* have been taken under a law passed early in the winter granting the government the right to take land for "public purposes." The Nationalists charge that this is the beginning of the dispossession of the Haitian peasant.

[1] *Annual Report, op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

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There are four barriers, however, which render any such general dispossession unlikely, namely: (1) the fact that a bloody popular uprising would necessarily follow any such program; (2) the lessened interest of foreign investors because of the failure within the last four years of such few foreign-owned plantations as there are in Haiti to make profits; (3) the mountainous character of the country which limits the amount of land available for plantation farming; and (4) the apparently honest desire on the part of most American officials to prevent the peasants from being completely divorced from their land. The real menace to the Haitian peasants seems indeed to come from their own rather than from the American officials. It is probable, however, that if the Artibonite Valley, which was a rich sugar-producing region in the days of the French occupation, were irrigated, a plantation system would grow up there as the only effective means of paying for the cost of the irrigation. Such irrigation is proposed and part of the $40,000,000 loan may be utilized to carry it through. The development of a few more plantations in Haiti, if they did not seriously reduce the amount of land left for the Haitians, would probably benefit the peasants economically by serving as demonstration centers for improved agricultural practices.

## VI

### *What Should Be Our Policy?*

What then of the future? There are three main possible lines of action: First, to stay in Haiti indefinitely through the negotiation of a new treaty; second, to withdraw completely in 1936 and to use the intervening years both to taper off our control and to develop the capacity of the Haitians for self-government; and finally, to withdraw immediately and completely, as Senator King desires.

It would be quite easy for the United States to negotiate with the dummy Haitian government another treaty which would prolong the period of the American Occupation beyond 1936. Whether such a treaty would be ratified by the United States Senate would depend, of course, upon the political complexion of the United States at that time and the degree of in-

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terest taken in Haiti. It would also be possible for our State Department to keep troops in Haiti and thus maintain control without submitting any formal treaty for ratification. Any such continuance of our control would mean a definite abandonment by the United States of the belief in the right of each people to work out its own future and would explicitly commit us to a program of imperialism in the Caribbean. It would unite the South American countries with increased hostility against us. It would effectively inhibit us from protesting against imperialistic acts by other nations. Our fear that the legitimacy of our credentials in Haiti would be questioned would continue to serve as a deterrent, as our present occupation is indeed doing, to our entrance into the League of Nations.

Happily the economic interests working for the perpetuation of our control are not strong. The difficulty with the railroad has been settled. The foreign loans are being amortized more rapidly than was planned and at the present rate will be retired (unless a new issue is offered) in 1942. The American bondholders are still further protected by the 1919 agreement that an American shall collect the customs until the bonds are finally paid off. The majority of the Haitians would be willing to accept this arrangement (which is similar to the one now operative in the Dominican Republic) if the Americans would withdraw. The Haitians, however, would much prefer to have the collector appointed by the American bondholders rather than by the Washington government. Few foreigners own land, and because of the topography of the country and the failure of existing enterprises to net a profit, there seems little prospect of much more foreign capital entering the country, unless the Artibonite Valley is irrigated. The recent careful geological survey of the country shows that there is virtually no mineral wealth, the island being of a limestone formation. The National City Bank, which would naturally prefer to deal with the Occupation rather than with an independent Haitian government, is the strongest economic force making for continuance of the Occupation in Haiti.

Nor are there any valid political reasons for continued control of Haiti. Our naval station at Guantanamo in Cuba is a

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sufficient protection of the approach to the Panama Canal through the Windward Passage. Haiti has given assurances over and over again that no foreign power will be allowed to develop a naval base on her territory. There is indeed no danger to the Canal from any source in the Greater Antilles.

A second course would be to give definite assurances that American forces will leave in 1936, and to devote the next nine years to an honest attempt to prepare the Haitians for genuine and efficient democratic government. Certainly the first step in any such program would be publicly to reassure the Haitians and to put ourselves on record by a pledge that we will not seek a renewal of the treaty nor try to perpetuate our military control after 1936.

Such a policy as this would also carry with it a program for increasingly tapering off American control within the ten years. This program should include at least the following steps: (1) The calling of the congressional elections. When reestablished, the Haitian Congress should be permitted to interpolate the officials of the American Occupation. In order that the Haitians may democratically manage their own affairs in 1936, it is imperative that we restore parliamentary government to them at the earliest possible moment. (2) The reduction of the garrison of marines to a battalion or less and the appointment of a civilian to the High Commissionership. It is highly important to convince the Haitians of our good faith and it is difficult to do this so long as there is a military commander of the Occupation and a considerable military force. Despite General Russell's sincerity, it would be better to replace him by an equally able civilian. (3) Increased emphasis on the training of Haitian officers in the gendarmerie and of doctors in the medical service. There is at present but one Haitian captain in the gendarmerie. More must be trained if the Haitians are to keep their independence. It would appear advisable to make a definite statement that half of the officers will be Haitians by 1930 or 1932, and a similar declaration might be made for the medical service. (4) Increased appropriations for education. If the Haitians are to manage their affairs they must at least be literate. After having allowed ten years to slip through our

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hands as we have, we should grant appreciably larger sums during the next decade. An increase to $15 a month in the salaries of all teachers who can pass adequate examinations would seem to be one way of securing more effective instruction. (5) Increased appropriations for public health work. (6) The filling of positions in the Occupation by men who either do not have pronounced racial prejudice against the negro or are willing to subdue it. Much unnecessary friction has been caused by the race prejudices of the officers of the marines and their wives, drawn as they are largely from the South.

Such a program as this would have a double purpose. It would stimulate the Americans to teach the Haitians the technique of administration and by definitely fixing a date of withdrawal would prevent them from postponing the period of Haitian control. At the same time, it would appeal to the patriotic Haitians by showing them that the more efficiently they learned the tasks of administration from the Americans, the more effectively they could serve their country when the last vestiges of American control were removed. There is little incentive for the Haitians to cooperate with the Americans at present because there is no assurance that they will get their country back any sooner because of their learning how to govern. The fixation of a definite date for withdrawal and of a definite schedule by which control would be tapered off would have somewhat the same effect in releasing the constructive efforts of the Haitians that the fixation of a definite indemnity would have had upon the energies of the German people.

Objections will be raised to such a program by those who believe that the Haitians will be no more able to govern themselves in 1936 than in 1926 and that our control should therefore be continued beyond that time. If, however, we are unable to develop the Haitians' powers of self-government sufficiently in twenty-one years of occupation, there is little likelihood of our ever being able to do so. Since we cannot ethically continue to keep them under our control indefinitely, we should be ready to have them stand on their own feet and make their own mistakes. Certainly, we have made a great many ourselves.

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For some time I favored this policy of gradual withdrawal, but within recent months the case for an earlier termination of the Occupation has been greatly strengthened. Notwithstanding the pledge of independence given to the Philippines a decade ago in the Jones act, there seems little prospect that we will let them go, as is evidenced by our refusal to allow a plebiscite to be taken on the question in that country. Our recent policy in Nicaragua, where we have returned the marines, and are keeping in power a government, the legality of whose claims is more than doubtful, and which would probably not survive were it not for our military and financial support, is further testimony of the difficulty and perhaps virtual impossibility of depending on American colonial and state officials to countenance even a gradual withdrawal. I have come, therefore, regretfully to conclude that the program of gradual withdrawal would not furnish a sufficient guarantee of the ultimate intentions of the members of our State Department, who have at present such great power in determining our foreign policy.

In view of the fear and hostility which our policy as regards Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama has aroused throughout Latin-America, the arguments seem preponderatively in favor of a more drastic program, requiring that the United States should (1) permit congressional elections in Haiti at an early date; (2) allow the Haitian Congress to draw up a new constitution and elect a President, and (3) then withdraw our military forces, leaving behind only the General-Receiver of Customs and such military, medical, engineering and financial experts as the Haitians wish to retain as advisers. I am aware that such a program as this might well lead to more corruption in government and to less effective medical service. It is also true that revolutions might still occur. The creation of the gendarmerie and the construction of roads has of course lessened the likelihood of such revolutions while the fear of another Occupation would act as a deterrent. The newer generation which has grown up outside the revolutionary ferment would be a still further barrier. But there might still be ambitious politicians who would resort to the sword rather than to the ballot; and

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the gendarmerie, deprived at once of American officers and of the presence of the marines, might find it difficult to withstand either the intrigues of the revolutionists or the mandates of a despot.

And yet despite such dangers, which the writer does not wish to minimize, there is good reason for the withdrawal of American troops as soon as a Haitian Congress can be elected. The slopes of imperialism are slippery. Our recent experiences have indicated that America may well be at a point where it must decide whether it shall be an empire or a democracy. It will be difficult for it to be both. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, a continuance of an imperialist policy will inevitably unite Latin-America, and perhaps even Europe as well, against us. Its ultimate consequences might easily be disastrous. A violent wrench is needed to break through the web in which the advocates of our newer "manifest destiny" are entangling us.[1]

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[1] For a defence of the American occupation on the grounds of the good work which it is doing in Haiti see U. G. Weatherly, "Haiti, An Experiment in Pragmatism," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1926, and a statement by Dr. Elwood Mead issued by the Department of the Interior.

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# POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE CARPENTERS' UNION

THE importance of the political and social philosophy of American trade unions was greatly accentuated by the presidential campaign of 1924, when the traditional non-partisan policy of the American Federation of Labor was believed by many to have been abandoned. Now the philosophy of the Federation is best represented by the craft unions, and the largest and strongest craft union affiliated with the Federation is the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. The potent and far-reaching influence of this union upon the other craft unions, particularly of the building industry, makes a study of the carpenters' social and political philosophy in the light of present events particularly timely.

## *1. Attitude toward Legislation*

The attitude of the Brotherhood toward legislation, like that of most of the unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, has varied with the times. At certain periods legislation has appealed to the workers as the best method of attaining their ends. At other periods they have given up all hope of getting anything by legislation and have turned to the trade union as their sole reliance. But more often legislation has been looked upon as a helpful and necessary complement to trade unionism in the fight for better conditions among the workers.

Little is known of the attitude of the early local carpenters' unions toward legislation. That the purpose of most of them was primarily economic is evidenced by their trade movements. Yet a great many of them probably supported the various legislative movements so prevalent before the Civil War. Then came the Knights of Labor with their extensive program of labor legislation, and a large number of carpenters' locals affiliated with that organization. But with the formation and de-



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velopment of the Federation, as well as of the United Brotherhood, the carpenters have relegated the legislative function to a distinctly secondary place in their program.

Nevertheless the Brotherhood itself in its early years looked to legislation not only to obtain things which could not be secured by collective bargaining but also to perform the functions now regarded as those of collective bargaining. In speaking before the 1892 convention of the Brotherhood one of the officials said, "We believe the best method of gaining the eight-hour day is through the ballot box. A stringent eight-hour law, national in its application, must be the means of attaining this end. . . . What grand and mighty reforms in governmental and industrial courses can be achieved if we but will."[1] This does not mean of course that the Brotherhood was depending solely upon legislation for the securing of the eight-hour day. It will be recalled that about this time the carpenters were carrying on a well-organized campaign, largely by means of strikes, for this very purpose. But the statement does mean that, in so far as the official spokesman expressed the sentiments of the organization, the Brotherhood had considerable confidence in the method of legal enactment.

In 1896 the convention itself made official pronouncement on the question by adopting the following resolution:

> The eight hour working day is one of the most important preliminary steps toward the ultimate emancipation of the working class, and will lessen the number of unemployed, improve the quality of work, health, strength and intelligence of the workers. This Convention declares that the time has arrived when the hours of labor should be limited to eight hours per day in all trades and occupations in our Country, and that the General Officers be instructed to draft a bill on the lines of this resolution, with a view of getting it passed through the Federal legislative bodies and thereby becoming the law of our Country.[2]

The Brotherhood entered into the fight for the enactment of

[1] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1892,* p. 38.

[2] *Ibid., 1896,* p. 41.

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mechanics' lien laws by the various states, and it was largely through the influence of the carpenters that such a law was established in Pennsylvania.[1] Their support was no small factor too in the enactment of such laws in other states. The Brotherhood also favored stringent immigration laws and as early as 1888 adopted a resolution calling upon Congress to enact suitable legislation restricting immigration.[2]

The United Brotherhood looked with favor not only upon legislation directly concerned with labor but upon legislation affecting labor indirectly. The carpenters, like a number of other unions, were unfortunately drawn into the money controversies of the nineties in opposition to those who advocated the permanent establishment of the gold standard. In 1893 Secretary M'Guire stated, "The Government of the United States is great enough to issue an American paper currency of its own, without interest, direct to the people, as a full legal tender for all debts and demands and in sufficient volume to meet the demands for business and the growth of population."[3] And in his report to the 1894 convention of the Brotherhood M'Guire said,

> Organized labor everywhere should insist on a bi-metallic standard of currency and the maintenance of silver on a parity with gold. We cannot permit the debasement of any part of our legal currency to suit the whims of mono-metallists who have brought on this stringency that they may depreciate values, undermine labor, reduce wages, and at the same time collect to the fullest value every dollar of bonded indebtedness or mortgages they hold against the industrial classes of our land.[4]

This advocacy of "more money", one of the principal doctrines held by the Democratic party, almost brought the Brotherhood into partisan politics, and the defeat of the doctrine time after time did not strengthen the Brotherhood's position.

[1] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1896,* p. 41.

[2] *Ibid., 1888,* p. 38.

[3] *The Carpenter,* June, 1893, p. 4.

[4] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1894,* p. 20.

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Yet despite the fact that the money policy held in those early days was decisively defeated, the Brotherhood at the present time officially stands for: "Abolition of national banks, and substitution for their notes, legal tender treasury notes. Issue of all money directly by the government, and establishment of postal deposit savings banks."[1] This declaration is less significant, however, than the stand taken in the nineties. At that time the membership was greatly interested in the currency situation;[2] the subject was discussed in *The Carpenter* and at the conventions. The action of the Brotherhood therefore probably represented the sentiments of the majority of the members. Today the membership has largely lost interest in the money situation. The average member does not know what the union's official attitude in the matter is and appears to care less. Of course this tendency toward ignorance and indifference prevails not only with regard to the money question but with regard to many other problems upon which the union has taken an official stand.

No longer do the officials or the members of the United Brotherhood believe that "grand and mighty reforms" can be brought about by means of legislation. For the attainment of all that pertains to the standardization policy they now rely almost solely upon collective bargaining. For the securing of better wages for its own members the Brotherhood has never depended upon legislation. To be sure it does take an official stand regarding the payment of wages to particular groups which are incapable of effective bargaining for themselves, women, children, and public employees. It has stood for the payment of wages weekly, for "equal pay for equal work" in all public departments,[3] and for legislation requiring payment of wages in lawful money and the abolition of truck pay.[4]

Less consistent has been the Brotherhood's policy regarding

[1] *Constitution, United Brotherhood,* 1924.

[2] Statement of Frank Duffy, General Secretary of the United Brotherhood, to writer, March, 1921.

[3] *Constitution, United Brotherhood,* 1924.

[4] *Ibid.*

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hours. We have already seen that the union at first believed that legislation would be an effective method of obtaining better hours. But experience has taught it that a far more effective method is collective bargaining backed up by the strike and the boycott. More successful perhaps in obtaining shorter hours by this method than any other trade union in America during the last part of the nineteenth century, the Brotherhood has finally come to believe that legislation cannot be effective in this field. Hence it has changed its policy and now relies wholly upon collective bargaining for the securing of better hours. As in the case of wages, however, the Brotherhood favors legislation as a means of gaining ground for those classes which cannot use collective bargaining effectively. It stands for legislation requiring eight-hour service for all employees engaged directly or indirectly in municipal work and for the establishment by law of the eight-hour day in all public departments both of the state and of the nation.[1] It has also supported legislation which had as its object the reduction of hours for women and children.

Not only does the Brotherhood prefer economic rather than legislative action as a means of obtaining better wages, hours, and conditions of work, but it has also opposed the interference of the government through the use of compulsory arbitration to settle disputes resulting from demands made by the union. Although the Brotherhood has always favored the settlement of these disputes by peaceful means if possible and has provided for careful investigation and for conference in an effort to make the use of the strike and the boycott unnecessary, yet it is unalterably opposed to any interference on the part of the government. The Brotherhood itself has never been confronted with this possibility, but it has scented danger in the introduction of compulsory arbitration into other industries.

The stand of the Brotherhood with regard to compulsory arbitration is well expressed in the report of the general executive board to the 1920 convention:

[1] *Constitution, United Brotherhood,* 1924.

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> We are opposed to the principle of both the Kansas Law and what is known as the Esch-Cummins Law, as under our constitutional law there is no recognized standard with which judges or Boards of Arbitration can square their decisions. We insist upon the undisputed right to associate for any purpose not criminal in the individual, and we hold, as members of such voluntary associations, that we must have the right to do as individuals may do, whether in war or in peace. We insist further, as citizens of a common country, that we have the right to be governed by law, and not by the arbitrary will of any man, no matter who he may be, either industrially, judicially, or politically. We insist that so-called equity must cease to be involved in personal relations and be again relegated to the protection of vested rights in property, pending the adjudication of what is in fact right in the case.[1]

The Brotherhood holds that compulsory arbitration strikes at the very heart of trade unionism even when it is applied, as in the case of the Kansas Industrial Court, only to those industries which are necessary to life. As the general executive board says, "It is only a matter of a short time until one court after another will read into these laws certain things and call every building a necessity of life, and insist that they be left immune from interruption by strikes."[2] Of course if the right to strike were to be taken away from the union as it exists today, the union would cease to be a very important factor in the fight for better conditions among the workers.

Although never very aggressive in its advocacy of social legislation, the Brotherhood has taken an official position on a great many questions. With regard to immigration it has always favored restrictive legislation. Its position at the present time is expressed in the following resolution, now a part of the general constitution:

> Resolved, That while we welcome to our shores all who come with the honest intention of becoming lawful citizens, we at the same time condemn the present system which allows the importation of destitute laborers, and we urge organized labor everywhere to

[1] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1920,* pp. 168-69.

[2] *Ibid.*

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endeavor to secure the enactment of more stringent immigration laws.[1]

The Brotherhood's attitude in this regard is further evidenced by its advocacy of a national law prohibiting the alien ownership of land[2] and also by its requirement that a candidate for admission to the union must be a citizen of the country in which he makes application for membership or furnish proof of his intention to become a citizen.[3]

The Brotherhood objects to "prison contract labor, because it puts the criminal in competition with honorable labor for the purpose of cutting down wages, and also because it helps to overstock the labor market."[4] It favors the enactment of suitable state laws prohibiting contract prison labor.[5] It favors also the enactment of state laws requiring state inspection of mines, workshops, and dwellings, with a view to improving the general sanitary conditions.[6] Although having no direct contact with the sweating system, the United Brotherhood officially favors laws prohibiting it.[7]

A piece of legislation which for a number of years has been constantly before the public is that pertaining to child labor. Now the carpenter industry has never been affected by child labor, largely because the union, which has controlled it so completely, has prescribed an age limit below which a candidate may not be admitted as a carpenter. And of course the very nature of the industry pretty nearly precludes the employment of children. The Brotherhood, however, has officially declared itself in favor of state laws prohibiting employment of children under sixteen years of age and in favor of the general scheme of compulsory education.[8] When the last five or six territories entered the Union, the Brotherhood used its influence to have placed in each state constitution, before application was made for a state charter, provision for the setting aside

[1] *Constitution, United Brotherhood,* 1924, sec. 3.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.,* sec. 42.
[4] *Ibid.,* sec. 3.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*

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of state lands for the support of free and compulsory education.[1] Although the union has not acted officially, the general feeling among the national officers and the membership is in favor of some kind of national legislation. Great disappointment was expressed by the present general secretary at the Supreme Court's action in declaring unconstitutional the federal child-labor law of 1919.[2]

In general the policy of the Brotherhood has been merely to express approval of certain proposed labor laws rather than to make an aggressive attempt to secure their enactment. The reason for this policy is not hard to find; with most of these laws the Brotherhood has had no direct concern. Striking exceptions have been those measures affecting the general status of trade unions, of strikes, and of the boycott. Here the Brotherhood is vitally concerned and has always been ready to lend vigorous support to any legislation which seeks to improve that status. For instance, the Brotherhood was exceedingly active in the campaign which finally resulted in the enactment of the labor provision of the Clayton Act of 1914. The organizers of the Brotherhood devoted much of their time to the fight, additional organizers were sent out primarily to aid it, and the treasury was subject to heavy drains.[3] Compare this with the Brotherhood's policy with regard to the proposed child-labor amendment. True, the officers and members have declared themselves in favor of it; but to give heavily in time and money is a different matter.

### 2. *The United Brotherhood and the Courts*

The Brotherhood's disillusionment concerning legislation as a means of attaining its ends is largely the result of its loss of faith in the administration of the law. It has learned by experience that even if after a long and bitter fight a favorable piece of legislation is finally enacted, the ends fought for have not yet been attained. Although the law as written on the

[1] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1924,* pp. 151-152.

[2] Statement of Duffy to writer, December, 1924.

[3] *Ibid.*

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statute books may appear favorable to labor, frequently an interpretation by the court renders it useless as far as labor is concerned; whereas a gain made by collective bargaining cannot in most cases be taken away by the court.

The Brotherhood, like other unions affiliated with the A. F. of L. which have had similar experiences, has developed a feeling of contempt toward the courts. The general president in his report to the 1908 convention asserted, "They [the judges] invade the great prerogative of the people, who have spoken and said the legislators shall promulgate the new laws to govern them. By these acts they tear down the Constitutions of the different States and the United States, which they have taken the oath to enforce and uphold."[1] Again in 1910 the general president, in speaking of a decision by the Supreme Court in a labor case, said, "If it was not for the absurdness of the decision rendered, with the rights involved, it would be laughable to closely observe the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States."[2] The prevailing attitude of the United Brotherhood could be no better expressed than in the words of the general president in his report to the 1912 convention:

> They (the judges) certainly have peculiar minds; they believe in going to the musty, old law books and deciding as their grandfathers and great-grandfathers did before them, but they lack the moral courage to do as their grandfathers and great-grandfathers did, namely, ride around in a jolt wagon behind a pair of Missouri mules. They, instead, ride around in automobiles and take their shower-baths every morning and evening and want everything modern except the law so that the flexibility of their minds must be abnormally developed to cling to these old precedents when it affects the workingman and divorce themselves from all precedents when it affects their physical well-being.[3]

With especial bitterness has the Brotherhood denounced the injunction, an instrument of the law which it has not been able to escape. The effectiveness with which the injunction has

[1] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1908,* p. 60.

[2] *Ibid., 1910,* p. 65.

[3] *Ibid., 1912,* p. 150.

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been used to prevent the Brotherhood from using the boycott to the best advantage in its efforts to unionize the mills undoubtedly constitutes one very good reason for the Brotherhood's relative failure in that undertaking.

A particular case may be cited to show the effectiveness of the injunction and to explain the Brotherhood's antipathy to it. In 1906 the Brotherhood adopted a uniform mill agreement for the membership of the St. Louis district. The agreement was signed by a number of the mill owners of the city, and the Brotherhood requested that all men observe it, and report where the wages were less, or the hours more, than those provided in the agreement. The Huttig Sash and Door Company, which did not sign the agreement, refused to observe union conditions, and after several unsuccessful conferences with representatives of the company, the Brotherhood placed it on the unfair list, and notified the carpenter contractors that the outside men would not be permitted to handle Huttig material. The Huttig Company took the case to court and obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the Brotherhood from placing it on the unfair list. For a short time the Brotherhood conformed to the order, but before long issued booklets containing the names of the fair companies in that district, among which, of course, that of the Huttig Company did not appear. Officials of the Brotherhood were then charged with contempt of court.

In rendering its decision the court stated,

> No one will contend for a moment that these booklets were not for all practical purposes the same as the circulars sent out by the defendants prior to the institution of the action, and the circulation of which was restrained by the Court. . . . As the lists in these booklets comprise all the firms whose materials may be handled without danger of a strike, it follows as a matter of course that all firms engaged in the manufacture of these articles in St. Louis whose names are not therein mentioned are "unfair", and that their products will not be handled by union artisans. . . . The only defense attempted is that verbal notice was always given by the respondents to the contractors and builders that, owing to the injunction issued in this cause, com-

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> plainant was not included among the "unfair" firms, and dealings with it would not be punished with a refusal to handle its material by union men. But the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that this fact was never mentioned to any contractor or builder unless he made special inquiry on the subject. Is it reasonable to suppose that every one of the several hundred contractors, builders, owners, and architects to whom these booklets were sent would make such inquiry about this particular firm, when there are many others engaged in the same business whose names did not appear on the council's lists and for this reason are supposed to be "unfair"? . . . the respondents violated the order of the Court, and did it after calm and due deliberation.[1]

The Brotherhood has had many similar experiences and although it has frequently been able to boycott unfair firms before the injunction writ has been issued, it has nevertheless been often and seriously embarrassed by that instrument. In speaking of the injunction the general president stated in his report to the 1908 convention,

> As I have said before, the injunction is most beneficent, but by judicial usurpation it has become dangerous not only to the bulwarks of our American citizens (the wage workers), but a menace to the proper respect, esteem and confidence, which we, as citizens, should and must have in the judiciary if we expect our republican form of government to maintain and endure.[2]

Again in 1912 the same officer said,

> We protest emphatically and earnestly against the issuance of injunctions in disputes between workmen and employers. They have no warrant in law and could not stand the open-handed scrutiny of any person who is disposed to be fair in law; and the demigog [sic] tactics, dollar-worshipping vantage ground occupied by these judges will be preempted by the votes of the American people, if they do not themselves call a halt.[3]

[1] Carson, *Internal Law of Trade Unions* (1919), pp. 279-291.

[2] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1908*, p. 58.

[3] *Ibid., 1912*, pp. 149-150.

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### 3. *Independent Political Action*

Disappointed in their earlier attempts to secure the enactment of favorable laws, somewhat discouraged by the practical nullification of laws whose passage they had eagerly sought, and embittered by the courts' restriction of their use of their own weapons through the writ of injunction, the carpenters have had to face the problem of separate political action. From the very beginning the Brotherhood has maintained an official policy of non-partisan political activity. In this regard the Brotherhood has been in complete accord with the Federation, holding that labor should vote for principles rather than for parties; in fact the Brotherhood has been one of the strongest forces in maintaining that policy in the Federation.[1]

The Brotherhood, however, has not been free from opposition within its own ranks. Just before the election of 1892 the general executive board received many letters urging the entrance of the Brotherhood into politics. In an editorial in *The Carpenter* soon afterwards, Mr. M'Guire wrote, "The impulse to accomplish 'more in one day at the ballot box than can be done in five years by Trade Unions, etc.,' is born of restless impatience for a speedy change of our hellish industrial conditions."[2] In 1894 the following clause was incorporated in the general constitution: "Partisan politics and sectarian discussions shall not be permitted in the meetings under any circumstances; but the discussion of questions pertaining to labor legislation and political economy shall be permitted."[3] The present constitution of the Brotherhood contains practically the same provision.[4]

That there is a minority in the Brotherhood favoring separate political action is evidenced by the introduction in the national convention from time to time of resolutions to that effect. In 1900 the following resolution was introduced and endorsed by the majority report of the resolutions committee, but failed to pass the convention:

[1] Statement of Duffy to writer, December, 1924.

[2] *The Carpenter*, February, 1893, p. 4.

[3] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1894*, p. 8.

[4] *Constitution, United Brotherhood*, 1924, sec. 3.

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> Resolved, the delegates of the United Brotherhood to the American Federation of Labor are hereby instructed to demand of the Convention that the officers and representatives of said organization refrain from further approaching the House or Senate of these United States, and to impress the Convention and the wage workers at large, of the necessity of keeping aloof from all capitalistic political parties, and to enter into independent political action on their own behalf.[1]

Again in 1904 a resolution was introduced to the effect "that the working class is economically a separate class from the capitalists and that it is their duty to constitute themselves politically for their class interests and sustain such interests with their vote at the ballot box." This resolution was also rejected by the convention.[2]

The presidential campaign of 1924 was a time of testing for the traditional non-partisan political policy of the A. F. of L. and the affiliated unions. The Federation finally endorsed the LaFollette-Wheeler ticket and, for the time being at least, appeared to have departed from its non-partisan policy. At any rate this was the general belief. That the executive committee of the Federation thought otherwise is shown by its report to the 1924 convention, which said in part: "It will be noted that by this action the American Federation of Labor did not endorse what has been miscalled a third party movement. It expressed preferment for the election of Senators LaFollette and Wheeler, the independent candidates, and their platform, as more representing the hopes and demands of labor."[3]

The report of the A. F. of L. National Non-Partisan Political Campaign Committee to the executive council held in Atlanta, August 2, 1924, and adopted by the council, said in part:

> Co-operation hereby urged is not a pledge of identification with an independent party movement or a third party, nor can it

[1] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1900,* p. 86.

[2] *Ibid., 1904,* p. 184.

[3] *Proceedings, Amrican Federation of Labor, 1924,* p. 175.

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> be construed as support for such a party group or movement, except as such action accords with our non-partisan political policy. We do not accept government as the solution of the problems of life. Major problems of life and labor must be dealt with by voluntary groups or organizations, of which trade unions are an essential and integral part. Neither can this co-operation imply our support, acceptance or endorsement of policies or principles advocated by any minority groups or organizations that may see fit to support the candidacies of Senator LaFollette and Senator Wheeler.[1]

These statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the endorsement by the executive council of the LaFollette-Wheeler ticket was pretty generally construed as endorsement of a new party and departure from the time-honored non-partisan policy of the Federation.

How did the Brotherhood figure in this action of the Federation? Although the Brotherhood took no official stand in active opposition, the prevailing sentiment among the national officers was against it. And of course the refusal of the 1924 convention of the Brotherhood to endorse the action of the executive council of the Federation amounted almost to official opposition. When at one point in the convention the general secretary directed attention to a resolution calling for endorsement of the executive council's action, President Hutcheson simply declared the resolution out of order: "Inasmuch as the Brotherhood guarantees to every applicant when becoming a member of the Brotherhood that the organization will in no way interfere with his religious beliefs or political opinions, this resolution is declared out of order."[2]

The one member of the council who from the beginning of the discussion steadfastly opposed the endorsement of the LaFollette-Wheeler ticket, and who cast his vote against it, was Frank Duffy, second general vice-president of the Federation and general secretary of the United Brotherhood. Mr. Duffy bitterly denounced the taking of such action as a depar-

[1] *Proceedings, American Federation of Labor, 1924.*

[2] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1924,* p. 299.

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ture from tradition which could bring nothing but harm to the labor movement. He declared that the labor vote could not be delivered, and that even if it could be delivered, neither the Federation nor any of its affiliated unions nor any group of labor officials should tell the members how to vote. Once the action had been taken, however, neither Mr. Duffy nor any other member of the Brotherhood's executive board fought it. On the other hand they did not actively support it. When Mr. Duffy cast his vote for President of the United States, he selected the man whom he thought to be best fitted for the office, and he expected every member of the Brotherhood to do likewise. Its non-partisan policy was followed to the letter by the United Brotherhood during the 1924 presidential campaign.[1]

As the election turned out the Brotherhood undoubtedly improved its position by taking this stand. It is not strange that the Federation's action was misinterpreted. While claiming to be non-partisan, the Federation was at the same time endorsing the third party. Although the Federation disclaimed any responsibility for the policies advocated by other adherents of the third party, it was inevitable that the general public would associate it with the socialists and other supporters. The general officers of the Brotherhood consider themselves justified in having taken the stand they did. For, at its 1924 convention, held soon after the presidential election, the Federation adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, That to accomplish such purpose the A. F. of L. will sponsor no new party at this time, but will continue as in the past, upholding the right and condemning the wrong, aiding its friends wherever they may be found."[2] There was some opposition to this resolution, but the Brotherhood's delegates were among its staunchest supporters.

It is not our purpose to consider the pros and cons of the non-partisan question. What we do wish to emphasize is that the policy of the Brotherhood has been in entire accord with that of the Federation in that regard, that even when the Federation itself has wavered, the Brotherhood has stood staunchly

[1] Statement of Duffy to writer, December, 1924.

[2] *Proceedings, American Federation of Labor, 1924,* p. 269.

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by its traditional policy. In other words, whatever success has been attained through adherence to this policy is due in no small measure to the steadfast support of the Brotherhood.

The general officers are absolutely unwavering and among them the opinion prevails that the Brotherhood will never support a labor party. One cannot say of course that this is the view of the membership because of the obvious difficulty of learning the opinions of all the members. Before the last election the writer interviewed a number of members of the Brotherhood in an effort to ascertain the general sentiment concerning separate political action. Some of course had no conviction. The great majority intended to vote the Democratic or Republican ticket, and all of these expressed disapproval of the Federation's endorsement of the third party, and, in full accord with the official attitude of the Brotherhood, were firmly convinced of the inadvisability, now or later, of forming a separate labor party. Some of those interviewed said that they intended to vote for LaFollette. Of these a very small minority approved the action of the Federation, most of them expressing the opinion that members of the Brotherhood, as well as of other trade unions, should vote as individuals and not according to the direction of any labor organization. The general opinion, in so far as it was obtained, opposed the formation of a separate labor party and predicted that the Brotherhood would adhere to its non-partisan policy.

The discussion thus far of the political policy of the Brotherhood is applicable primarily to the most powerful group in the organization, namely, the outside men. The same conclusions cannot arbitrarily be drawn with regard to the inside men. These men the Brotherhood inherited for the most part from the Amalgamated Wood Workers, which was largely dominated by the furniture men. Now there was a very strong tendency in the Furniture Workers' Union to urge independent action in politics. This is well brought out in an article which concluded as follows:

> Therefore, we believe that it is the best policy for the workmen to enter an election campaign as a class, to nominate workmen

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> for office, to elect them and make what their constituents desire should be done for the working class, instead of supporting the candidates of one or the other of the old corrupt political parties, and when they are elected to run after them with complaints and petitions. Of course it would be necessary for organized labor to step into the political arena as a solid mass. Where they fail to do this, the effect will generally be to disintegrate their organizations; and they invariably find that the other parties in no way recognize their claims. For these reasons elections ought not to be participated in except when organized workmen are united.[1]

The union officially adopted the policy set forth in this article when the following resolution was passed by its 1887 convention:

> Whereas, there is a constantly increasing tendency of the executive authorities to arbitrarily use their power against the political rights of citizens, therefore be it,
>
> Resolved, That we caution the working people to guard more effectually their rights as citizens by a most generous support to the independent political movements of the working classes.[2]

When the Furniture Workers' Union united with the Machine Wood Workers to form the Amalgamated Wood Workers' International Union, the furniture workers demanded endorsement by the new organization of the principle of an independent labor party as one of the conditions of their entrance.[3] This principle was still a part of the constitution of the Amalgamated Wood Workers when that organization was absorbed by the Brotherhood.

Now at the time the Amalgamated was formed, the sentiment among all trade-unionists was fairly strong for separate political activity and legislation was regarded as one of the most important means of gaining the workers' ends. But as labor met with disappointment after disappointment in its efforts to obtain relief by this means, the feeling began to disappear. By the

[1] *Furniture Workers' Journal,* June 19, 1885, p. 1.

[2] *Ibid.,* January 1, 1885, p. 4.

[3] *Constitution, Amalgamated Wood Workers' International Union,* 1904.

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time the Amalgamated was absorbed by the Brotherhood, even though the constitution favored independent political action, the union had for years made no attempt to carry out such a policy. Yet at the present time the inside men, while not actively in favor of a labor party, appear to incline in that direction more than the outside men, who, as we have seen, are actively opposed to such a program.

### *4. Social Philosophy*

Closely related to the political attitude of a trade union is its attitude toward social and economic organization. Frequently, of course, political action is looked upon as a means to be employed to bring about desired changes in the economic order. Here too it will be well to consider separately the outside men and the inside men.

From the outset the Furniture Workers' Union was predominantly socialistic. The membership in the early days was largely composed of German cabinet makers, most of whom were socialists. The editor of the *Furniture Workers' Journal* wrote,

> Let us hope that the masses of workmen may soon be convinced that it is not the only mission of the organization of labor to raise wages and to prevent their reduction, but that by them the continuous war for what belongs to labor—the fruit of its toil—shall be done away with altogether. . . . And if they are thus enlightened, they will no longer prevent and hamper the development of organizations by striving for temporary and comparatively small individual gains. They will no longer prevent each other from exerting themselves to the utmost to accomplish the great aim—the possession by labor of the means of production, machinery, etc., in order to no longer be dominated over and be kept in misery and want.[1]

When the furniture workers became a part of the Amalgamated Wood Workers, they insisted not only upon the inclusion in the constitution of an independent labor party clause but also that that party should be based upon the principles of

[1] *Furniture Workers' Journal,* November 6, 1885, editorial.

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socialism. And the statement of these principles remained a part of the constitution of the Amalgamated until that organization became a part of the Brotherhood. But in the meantime the socialistic philosophy of the members, like their desire for independent political activity, had lost much of its fervor. For one thing, the machine woodworkers, with whom the furniture workers had united to form the Amalgamated, had never been strongly socialistic and had accepted the socialistic principles mainly because such acceptance had been insisted upon by the furniture workers. Hence with the relative decrease in German membership and a growing indifference on the part of the machine woodworkers, actual support of socialistic doctrines had materially declined by the time the Amalgamated was taken over by the Brotherhood.

The outside men have never been much addicted to socialistic ideas. P. J. M'Guire, the founder of the Brotherhood, was a prominent socialist as a young man, having been at one time a member of the executive board of the Social Democratic Party, which was founded in May, 1874.[1] But this was true of a number of men who later became leaders in the trade-union movement. That M'Guire's beliefs later underwent a change is evident from his attitude when a political program was introduced in the 1893 convention of the A. F. of L. Now M'Guire favored a separate political party, in fact advocated an alliance with the People's Party, primarily as a remedy for the depression of the nineties.[2] But when it was moved to strike out the plank in the program which recommended to all affiliated unions that they endorse it, M'Guire voted with the majority in favor of the motion. Together with several other trade-union leaders M'Guire demanded that plank 10 also, with its pledge in favor of "collective ownership by the people of all means of production and distribution", be stricken out. In this stand he did not have the support of his own union, the United Brotherhood, which approved the plank, but with the amendment, "as the people elect to operate".[3] When in 1894 the political

[1] Commons, *History of Labour in the United States* (1918), vol. II, p. 231.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 510.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 511.

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program was again brought forward for consideration in the convention of the Federation, President Gompers strenuously opposed its adoption, even when amended by the striking out of plank 10, and a motion to endorse the amended program was lost by a vote of 1,173 to 735. The entire delegation of the Brotherhood, including, of course, M'Guire, voted with the majority.[1] In favoring the program adopted by the A. F. of L. convention of 1893 the Brotherhood approached independent political action more nearly than it has ever done before or since; and in favoring the amended form of plank 10, it came closest to the adoption of socialistic principles.

That the Brotherhood was far from socialistic even in the early days is shown by an indictment brought against it by the furniture workers. In interpreting the statements made, account must of course be taken of the unfriendly attitude of the latter toward the Brotherhood. The indictment read as follows:

> Among its membership there may often be found the rankest egotism, coupled with a most ridiculous know-nothingism, a combination that cannot so very easily be found to the same extent in any other organization. In matters industrial they are conservative and extremely reactionary in political aspects. Their leaders to-day still hold the position of the old style moss-back English trade union in spite of the fact that in this present state of development of capitalistic society every sane man ought to know that the interests of all workers are the same, that the old methods of fighting capital have become and are becoming insufficient and must needs be supplanted by others.[2]

The introduction from time to time in the national convention of resolutions calling for endorsement of socialistic doctrines indicates that there has been a socialistically inclined minority in the Brotherhood. For example the following resolution was introduced in 1902: "Resolved, That Carpenters' Union No. 90 hereby declares for the collective ownership of the means of production and distribution, and recommends to

[1] Commons, *op. cit.*, p. 513.

[2] *Condition of the Woodworkers of the United States*, 1892, pp. 14, 15.

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its members to unite in conquering the political powers now controlled almost exclusively by the capitalist class."[1] In 1906 a resolution was introduced calling upon the Brotherhood to affiliate with the Industrial Workers of the World. These and all similar resolutions have without exception been overwhelmingly defeated in the convention.

The present attitude of the Brotherhood toward programs calling for radical change in our economic organization is set forth in President Hutcheson's opening address to the 1924 convention:

> Again, there has been another form of attack made, more insidious than either of the others. That attack has been made in many instances from within our organization by men who have been misled into believing that the propaganda that has been spread by men like Foster and his kind was more in keeping with Organized Labor than the principles of our organization. What should be kept in mind is the policies and principles upon which the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America was founded, by that man whom we all reverence—P. J. M'Guire. Every member of our organization should remember that the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America is a trade union organization and that if at any time any member advocates anything that pertains to Industrialism, Communism or any other "ism" that has for its purpose the disintegration of our Brotherhood or the putting into effect of what might be termed an industrial organization, there is no place in our organization for that kind of man.
>
> Our membership should remember there are only two "isms" that should enter into our organization—that is unionism and Americanism, and all other "isms" or advocates of that sort of thing should be kicked out and kicked out quickly and in such a manner that they would understand and realize that the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America is better off without them, that we don't want them within our ranks.[2]

At the present time the constitution of the Brotherhood contains a clause in favor of government ownership of public utili-

[1] *Proceedings, United Brotherhood, 1902,* p. 208.

[2] *Ibid., 1924,* pp. 3-4.

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ties and transportation facilities. This clause, however, is not being supported in any active way and the members themselves appear for the most part to be unaware that the Brotherhood has taken this stand. And it is a long step from advocacy of government ownership of public utilities to advocacy of collective ownership of the means of production.

The Brotherhood represents perhaps as well as any other union the opportunist philosophy of the Federation and is one of its staunchest defenders. There seems to be no immediate prospect of any real change in the Brotherhood's philosophy. The organization has unquestionably been successful, and by its national officers as well as by those members who analyze the situation much of that success is attributed to the opportunistic philosophy of the union. As long as the Brotherhood continues to succeed, it will be loath to give that policy up, whether or not it has been as large a factor in the union's success as the carpenters themselves believe.

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# BARÈRE, CHAMPION OF NATIONALISM IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

IT is generally unknown, even to the well-read amateurs of historical lore, that Bertrand Barère, Barère de Vieuzac as he once called himself, played a rôle in the French Revolution of more than average importance. Nor is it easy to state why his influence has not been recorded, analyzed and disputed as has the revolutionary significance of less important personages such as, for instance, Madame Roland. The solution to the problem rests, I believe, upon two inquiries, one, into the historiography of the causes, the course, and the significance of the entire Revolution, and the other, into the historiography of the characters of the Revolution. A brief presentation of the conclusions that such inquiries have yielded will make my contention more intelligible.

The historians of the Revolution in its larger aspects passed lightly over Barère. There seemed little call to do otherwise. What has this boring rhetorician, the master of back-stage intrigues, contributed to the philosophy or the achievements of the movement? That is the question that they would have asked themselves, had they even once entertained a suspicion of his usefulness. But they did not trouble to formulate that query, for they were sufficiently informed from the writings of the historians of the special aspects of the Revolution and of its outstanding personalities. Not a single study has ever discussed the career of Barère; not even his villainy which so perturbed Lord Macaulay.

The historians of the second category have been content to let Barère lie in darkness, because they did not judge him worthy of their illumination. If they were moved to tolerance and mild dissent on the question of his reputed defects of character, they yet saw no reason to consider him as anything greater than an industrious, but untrustworthy individual of second or third rate revolutionary importance. That great fly-



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wheel of Revolutionary historiography—the tradition of making every revolutionist either a Jacobin or a Girondist—has prevented a tangent excursion into original and independent classifications. The force of intellectual inertia, more than any other single factor, has retarded the revaluation of Barère's revolutionary career [1] and allows him to be judged by the conventional criteria. Thus, by a sort of vicious cycle from which there seemed no conceivable escape, the students of the French Revolution were inexorably forced to ignore and misunderstand the significance of Barère.

There is, however, a way out. Jaurès and Morse Stephens saw it and Kuscinski too.[2] It is by renouncing a futile interest in the question of Barère's affiliation with one political faction or another, and by considering him from a more just perspective. Barère, conceived as an *ex parte* contemporary of the revolutionary struggle, deserves the opprobrium under which he has fallen, but the conception is a mockery of truth. The unity of his revolutionary career is found in his defense of the entire Revolution, both in its theory and its accomplishments. In his eyes the security of the National Convention and its protection against factions within and coalition armies without was tantamount to saving the entire revolutionary movement. His career must be viewed, then, against the background of his great loyalty. In that light his stature heightens and his form becomes bright. That light does not transfigure him, nor does it cast a halo about his head, but it does make clear why his colleagues held him in such high esteem.[3]

They recognized in him a fervent and able apostle of a doctrine that we call nationalism. That term was unknown to them. Nationality, of course, they knew; but nationalism with its broader implications was only dimly sensed by the eighteenth century. Professor C. J. H. Hayes defines it as "the

[1] See Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste,* vol. II, p. 916, and H. Morse Stephens, *The Orators of the French Revolution,* vol. II, pp. 7-8, for evaluations of Barère's character and rôle that differ sharply from the accepted interpretations.

[2] *Ibid.* See also Kuscinski, *Dictionnaire des Conventionnels,* article on "Barère".

[3] See *Mémoires de B. Barère,* (Paris, 1842), vol. I, Introduction, *passim.*

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fusion of patriotism with nationality and the predominance of national patriotism over all other human loyalties."[1] "Each nationality", he goes on to say, "should constitute a united, independent state, and every national state should expect and require of its citizens not only an exclusive patriotism, but also unshakable faith in its surpassing excellence over all other nationalities and lofty pride in its peculiarities and its destiny."[2]

This apparently complex doctrine appeals with singular directness to the imagination, particularly in those moments of emotional intensity which a war or a revolution arouses. At such stirring crises we search our souls and rack our brains for some article of faith that will dissolve doubts and misgivings and kindle the blood with manly fire. To a very great degree, our age finds that faith in nationalism. It was in the nineteenth century that nationalism developed so sturdily, a radiant hope to the many and a baleful will-o'-the-wisp to a few, but its origins we must seek in the French Revolution.

We, in the twentieth century, can readily see that circumstances were fashioning themselves in the last quarter of the eighteenth century to produce the doctrine of nationalism. The French Revolution was completing the secular tendencies of the French monarchy and creating a French nation. Before its work was actually completed, a coalition of hostile states attempted to tear it down, and the nation with matchless abandon and courage rallied to the defense of its newly-acquired liberty; even more, to the defense of its equality and its mystically-binding fraternity. In a word, it fought in defense of democracy, a democracy which it cherished all the more firmly in that it had just won it and had not yet discovered its weaknesses.

Barère had already linked himself with indissoluble ties to the revolutionary movement.[3] He had compromised himself

[1] C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1926), p. 29.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] See *Le Moniteur universel* for any of the meetings of the Constituent Assembly or the National Convention, especially for the debates of January 4, 15, 17, 1793; March 10, 1793; May 29, 30, 31, 1793; June 2, 6, 10, 1793; August 1, 1793; September 5, 1793.

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too fully to withdraw, if indeed the notion of cutting himself loose ever entered his head, and he kept pace with the march of the Revolution. To guide it lay beyond his powers; to lag behind was not salutary. The only course left for an active, intelligent mind like Barère's was to serve the cause. He did so faithfully, with inspiration, and never with greater genius than when appealing to those doctrines which nationalism later appropriated for its own uses. These are the doctrines that he propagated with amazing effectiveness in the dark years of 1793 and 1794: (1) the inculcation of national patriotism through a system of universal elementary education; (2) the dissemination throughout the nation of all the news that could intensify patriotic devotion; (3) the concept of a citizen-soldier who owed his services to the national state.

His method of procedure was pragmatic, for there was no code of etiquette to dictate the political manners of the revolutionists. Barère never had to be reminded that he was a principal in a dynamic age when the tactics and the language of yesterday were more than often unsuited to the difficulties of today. A serious danger had arisen in several frontier regions of the Republic where the local inhabitants spoke no French and conducted their affairs in their own dialects. Brittany, for instance, used a Celtic speech, the people of the Pyrenees spoke Basque, the Corsicans Italian, and the inhabitants of the Rhine departments German. Revolutionary and republican doctrines had scarcely penetrated into any of those four regions, where foreign agents and counter-revolutionaries had succeeded in stirring up religious and economic opposition to the new régime.

The situation was an intolerable one to the republican government. In practice, it was a threat to the safety of the state. The Republic had all that it could do to keep its frontiers intact against the coalition armies and could ill afford to burden itself with the additional cares of a civil war. In theory, that situation enabled the citizen who enjoyed the benefits of popular sovereignty to shirk the duties. But he could not in honesty shirk the obligations to learn the constitution and the laws and to keep an ever-vigilant eye both upon their execution and the conduct of his chosen representatives. How was he to

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perform his duties unless he could read and write and speak, albeit haltingly for the moment, the universal language in which had been framed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen? How could he defeat the "vile plotting of royalists and priests" if he could not lend an understanding and sympathetic ear to the message of democracy? Indeed, how was the Republic to survive if it could not recruit ardent volunteers from the ranks of its citizens? There is ample cause to suspect that the last factor was at least as important as the ethical nicety involved in balancing obligations and privileges, and there was good reason that that should be the case at the particular moment when the Committee of Public Safety directed Barère to read a report on the dialects spoken in the country.[1]

He descanted on "the most beautiful language of Europe, the first to proclaim frankly the rights of man and the citizen, the one language which was destined to give the world the most sublime thoughts of liberty and the greatest speculations in politics".[2] As if the absolute excellence of French were still not incontrovertibly established by his eulogium which, moreover, derived markedly from Rivarol's essay on the universality of the French language, he went on to contrast the French language and French nationality with Italian, German, Spanish and English. Italian was a fitting speech for a "soft and corrupting poetry",[3] German a "worthy organ of a feudal and military government",[4] Spanish the language of the Inquisition,[5] and English the tongue of a "tyrannical and execrable government".[6] Although Barère lacked that quasi-scientific argument which the philologists of the nineteenth century utilized in pleading the superiority of their respective national languages over all others, he fared very well without it. It might have given even greater force to his unscientific claim for the superior excellence of the French language, but it was not needed, for his plea bore speedy results.

[1] *Rapport et projet de décret au nom du Comité de salut public sur les idiômes étrangers et l'enseignement de la langue française,* 8 pluviôse, an 2 (January 27, 1794).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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On his recommendation it was decreed that an instructor of French should be sent to each district of these departments where non-French dialects and languages were spoken.[1] The instructor's pedagogical qualifications were to be his adherence to the Republic, his sponsors the local popular societies, and his electors the representatives of the nation.[2] The national treasury was to pay his salary and his pupils were to be the children who attended the national schools. To them he was to teach French and the Declaration of Rights on alternate days; but on *Décadi* days (every tenth day of the revolutionary calendar) he was to read aloud for adult citizens "the laws of the Republic, preferably those relating to agriculture and the rights of the people".[3] The intent of the decree was explicitly revolutionary. It was based upon educational forms and methods, but clearly it was designed as a military measure for the single purpose of stirring up the military temper of the people.

Despite fierce local opposition, it succeeded admirably.[4] In conjunction with other similar measures it helped to suppress dissension, aroused the martial ardor of thousands of young Frenchmen, and produced those amazing "armies of victory" which swept the French soil clear of its invaders. It succeeded even more permanently than Barère might have dreamed. For all his bombastic revolutionary verbiage he realized that the value of appeals in the name of republican virtue was merely ephemeral. He had no illusions on the matter and was resigned to reiterating his exhortations as each new occasion demanded. In fact he made more than one impassioned appeal to his fellow-countrymen before they were stirred into action. Yet his decree succeeded surprisingly well, because it established a method.

It suggested an ultra-modern phenomenon—the liaison of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 13, article 1 of the "projet de décret".

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 13, articles 2 and 3.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 13, articles 4 and 5.

[4] Guillaume, *Procès-verbaux du Comité d'Instruction publique*, vol. III, pp. 348-58, 339, note 3; vol. IV, pp. 494-98.

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national patriotism aud universal elementary education. It foreshadowed a custom of our juvenile contemporaries of the public schools who pledge allegiance to their flag with the same innocent confidence and almost in the same breath with which they recite the alphabet or the multiplication table. It anticipated the perennial witticisms about foreign languages and it implied a menacing jingoism. But for all those posthumous developments Barère can hardly be held responsible.

In truth, they were not altogether his progeny. On the one hand so keenly aware was he of the danger of revolutionary habits that in 1797 he published his brochure, *De la Pensée du Gouvernement révolutionnaire*, as a warning against the excesses of blind patriotism. "I was a revolutionary", he confessed, "I am a constitutional citizen".[1] The text bore him out. It was an *apologia* for government by law, for freedom of the press, speech, and thought; and it was a confession of faith in "*la religion de la patrie*".[2] Yet he hesitated to resort to national propaganda in times of peace. Speaking of certain "bureaus of public spirit" he said, "Bureaus of public spirit are as ridiculous in a free nation as landscapes and tempests are upon our stage".[3] Even the mild proposal to honor and subsidize patriotic writers and journalists impressed him as a measure that was undoubtedly necessary, but extremely difficult of attainment.[4]

On the other hand, he was unquestionably a benevolent godfather, if not altogether a fond parent of nationalism. He was a keen enough observer to note that nationality had no fixed and immutable character. He recorded "that it was formed in secret and was always a part of the public opinion of a nation".[5] And he was too thorough a revolutionary propagandist to entrust the development and the evolution of nationality to either the care or the neglect of private citizens. "That national character", he said, "should be directed, utilized, im-

[1] *De la Pensée du Gouvernement révolutionnaire* (1797), p. 84.

[2] *Ibid.*, chaps. xv-xx, *passim*.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 65, note 1.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 104.

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proved, and republicanized by the legislator".[1] That he did not mean to have "the legislator" draft laws to compel all Frenchmen to love their country as they could be compelled to use French currency, for instance, is patent from his concrete proposals for the inculcation and the strengthening of loyalty and love of *la patrie*. He felt that love of one's country was based on no concrete, ponderable benefits that living in that country bestowed, but rather on certain imponderable emotions which only common participation in national activities could liberate. "Public games, national festivals, republican education, those are our institutions", he declared.[2] National recognition of military valor, public rewards for civic patriotism, honors for the wounded, the apotheosis of the dead who fell in battle, frequent military manoeuvres, fêtes in honor of agriculture and the useful arts, friendly competitions in gymnastics, music, dancing and poetry—those were the agencies through which Barère would mould a homogeneous people to a common ideal and a transcending devotion.[3]

From these opinions and convictions Barère stands an avowed protagonist of national propaganda—the second corollary of the democratic dogma of the Revolution. However, we must exercise as much caution in the consideration of this aspect of his beliefs as we have previously enjoined in looking upon him as the progenitor of that cultural "sport", the democratic system of national elementary education. He combined propagandist methods with national patriotism, it is true; but the propaganda that he knew was an auxiliary aid to his cherished nationalism. The propagandist methods of the past half-century have achieved complete independence. They have become so invincibly efficacious that only another *deus ex machina* can save us from the impending menace of one national and unchallenged belief. Barère's ideal was an old-fashioned one. He had the vision of a unity, but of a unity founded upon diversity and compromise. The modern trend of nationalism might conceivably displease the old revolutionist.

[1] *De la Pensée du Gouvernement révolutionnaire* (1797), p. 103.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 89-105.

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In another report of the year 1794, a report on education in a revolutionary regime,[1] he made an outline of the faith that was to replace Catholicism as the state religion. The new faith was to be "*la religion de la patrie.*" The subject of the report was the formation of republican defense of the country and the revolutionizing of the youth through the establishment of the *École de Mars* to which were eligible those young Frenchmen who were below the minimum age for military conscription (eighteen years of age) and above the age limits for compulsory attendance at the national schools (fifteen years of age). Our present interest in that report lies in its treatment of nationalism considered as a religion.

There were four points that Barère emphasized: (1) the consecration of the citizen to *la patrie* at his birth; (2) the citizen's love of *la patrie;* (3) the inculcation of republican virtues; (4) *la patrie* as educator of the citizen. "The Republic", he would have had the Convention say to its young citizens, "leaves the guidance of your first years to your parents, but as soon as your intelligence is developed, it proudly claims the rights that it holds over you. You are born for the Republic and not for the pride or the despotism of families".[2]

Since the citizen was born for the Republic, it followed that he should love it above all other things, love it exclusively and jealously, to have no other loves before it. "Love of *la patrie* will become the dominant passion of the pupils of the *École de Mars*, for it is *la patrie* which has moulded them".[3]

But love of *la patrie* was not enough. Those young fledglings of pure republicanism must be guarded from evil and encouraged to republican virtue, for both Rousseau and Montesquieu had proclaimed that the distinctive characteristic of a republic was its virtue; otherwise corruption would destroy it. "In Republics, the individual should develop, be educated and improve his condition with no other ambition than that of being a good citizen".[4]

[1] *Rapport sur l'éducation révolutionnaire, républicaine, et militaire et décret sur la formation de l'École de Mars,* le 13 prairial, an 2 (June 1, 1794).

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 13. See also p. 4.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

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Lastly, if the citizen who was born for *la patrie* were to cherish it with a paramount devotion and to radiate republican sentiments, he would reach those spiritual heights only by submitting to the discipline of *la patrie*. There was no gainsaying Barère's conclusion that "it is neither for slaves nor mercenaries to raise free men; *la patrie* herself is going to perform that important function".[1] Under her triple aegis of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, *la patrie* would give her citizens a civic and military education.[2]

*La patrie* had already removed all possible barriers to her claim upon the supreme and exclusive loyalty of the individual. The three estates with their class privileges and restrictions could no longer command the fidelity of their former members, for these were now citizens of the French Republic, equal in rights and status. Vanished too were privileged provinces, favored municipalities, academies and universities, each with special prerogatives, all claiming some measure of allegiance from the individual. The *ci-devant* workingmen, the apprentices and journeymen of the guilds, were free to work anywhere and everywhere in the Republic, but they were not free to form associations. Those too were corporations, and was not every corporate group a rival of *la patrie* which was the greatest corporation of the people?

The corporation of the church, a rival state within the national state, was also gone, its possessions appropriated by *la patrie* "to use or abuse", that is, to hold or to sell. The church as a corporation destroyed, religion was to contribute its emotional strength to the Republic. The "philosophers" had prepared the way for the State's utilization of religious emotions. They had held that it was the duty of the State to make good Christians, and of religion to make good citizens, and the revolutionists of 1793 swept on to the logical terminus of that position by making love of the State their religion.

[1] *Rapport sur l'éducation révolutionnaire, républicaine, et militaire et décret sur la formation de l'École de Mars,* p. 13.

[2] See Rousseau, article on "Economie politique," in the *Encyclopédie,* 2e partie, quoted in part in H. Sée, *L'Évolution de la Pensée politique en France au XVIIIe siècle,* p. 164, for a similar idea.

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Barère had outlined its dogma. His colleagues gave it a catechism, religious rites, sacred emblems, and mystic devotion.[1]

The report on revolutionary education made it clear that Barère was an an advocate of military preparedness. His report on military conscription, delivered at the height of the civil strife in France had already established him as a votary of a levy-in-mass of all the human and material resources of the State.[2] He had to introduce proposals that would insure rapid and effective assistance to the sorely-tried revolutionary forces. He had to find man-power and material resources that would hold back the counter-revolutionary troops in the Vendée and the armies of the coalition in the east. He had to act rapidly, but he had to proceed carefully lest his measures provoke new disorders and provide opportunities for new intrigues. Neither new recruiting throughout the entire country, nor the levy of departmental contingents would save France, for those measures were not sufficiently drastic and elastic. His solution was this—"that the requisition of all forces is necessary", . . . that "all (citizens) are needed, but all can not go off to battle or perform the same duties". "All citizens must discharge their debt to liberty", he declared. "Some will give their labor, others their wealth, some their counsel, others their strength; all will give it the blood that flows in their veins. Thus, all Frenchmen, all sexes, all ages are called by *la patrie* to defend liberty".[3]

One additional passage from his report bears quoting for the intensity of its language and the forcefulness of its appeal:

> Young men will fight, young men will be summoned to conquer; married men will forge arms, move baggage and artillery; they will prepare food supplies; women . . . will forget their useless tasks; their delicate hands will work on soldiers' clothing, make

[1] *Cf.* Lévy-Schneider, "L'Armée et la Convention," in *L'Œuvre sociale de la Révolution*, edited by E. Faguet, pp. 441-42.

[2] *Rapport et projet de décret du 23 août, l'an 2* (August 23, 1793) *sur la réquisition civique des jeunes citoyens pour la défense de la patrie, présentés au nom du Comité de salut public.*

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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> tents, and carry their hospitable cares to the shelters where the defender of *la patrie* will have his wounds treated. Children will tear old linen into lint; it is for them that we are fighting; . . . and old men resuming the mission they once held in antiquity, will be led to the public squares; they will kindle the courage of the young warriors; they will disseminate hatred of kings and preach the unity of the Republic. . . .[1]

The decree that followed this impassioned appeal was the most radical application of the sentiment of nationalism, for everybody, young and old alike, and every material resource of the state was placed under requisition until the enemy was driven from the territory of the Republic.[2] Barère fully realized the extreme and dangerous character of his measure. He realized also that its menace was as great as its efficacy in a military emergency. After the emergency was successfully met, he earnestly warned his fellow-citizens against extraordinary measures in time of peace.[3]

But the damage was already done and the precedent established. He had set the example of nationalist tyranny. He had arrogated nationalism to the position of supreme law-giver, following no law save that of its own creating. It commanded and was obeyed—gladly and hopefully in 1793 and 1794, and again in our generation. Perhaps its force is not yet spent, but forecast is futile and prophecy belongs to the seer.

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[1] *Rapport et projet de décret du 23 août, l'an 2,* p. 6.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 13-15.

[3] Barère, *De la Pensée du Gouvernement révolutionnaire, passim.*

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# REVIEWS

*The Rise of American Civilization.* By CHARLES A. BEARD and MARY R. BEARD. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927. —two volumes, 824, 828 pp. $12.50.

In his tribute to the poet Archias Cicero confessed himself at a loss for words to express the excellence resulting from a combination of native gifts and adequate training. It is with something of the same mental tongue-tiedness that the reviewer reflects upon this work of Professor and Mrs. Beard, in which the Ciceronian ingredients are so remarkably blended. To have achieved with even indifferent success the task of synthesizing the political, economic and cultural elements in our history from the colonial days to the present would have been an accomplishment worthy of praise, but to have done that work with such mastery of material, such discrimination in judgment, such vigor and charm of style as characterize Professor and Mrs. Beard's volumes is a contribution to American historiography which can only be fitly described as epochal.

Though the economic note is always dominant (as one would expect from the name of the authors), the work is by no means an economic history of the United States. Political theory, constitutional law, scientific progress, social reform, literature, education, the fine arts, feminism, philosophy, the fibre of the frontiersmen, the flunkeyism of the "Four Hundred", and many more topics find their appropriate treatment and receive their almost uncanny appraisal in this survey of American civilization. The movement is necessarily swift, for even 1650 pages is a narrow compass in which to compress the story of the vicissitudes of American life and the varieties of American thought through three centuries. The volumes have been aptly called a long editorial on American history. Details of politics, for example, are assumed to be part of the reader's equipment. Military history is simply omitted. Many dramatic episodes which have tempted historians into pages of rhetoric are disposed of in a few penetrating sentences. The authors have other work to do than to refurbish the oft-told chronicle of the administrations of the presidents. They are concerned to show the trend of American culture through the interaction of the complex forces of industrial-



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ism and idealism, of sanctioned tradition and venturesome urge, of shirt-sleeve democracy and technological wizardry.

It would be futile to attempt in a few hundred words any summary of volumes which are themselves a brilliant summary of American civilization. They must be read; and they will be read from cover to cover with increasing admiration by everyone who is eager for a better understanding of the forces, political, economic and social, that have influenced the development of our country, and by everyone who has a vicarious joy in the creative and interpretive power of the master of his craft. There is a passage in the chapter entitled "Provincial America" (vol. I, p. 124) which seems to me to furnish the key to the authors' door of approach: "In reality the heritage, the economics, politics, culture, and international filiations of any civilization are so closely woven by fate into one human fabric that no human eye can discern the beginning of its warp or woof. And any economic interpretation, any political theory, any literary criticism, any aesthetic appreciation which ignores this perplexing fact is of necessity superficial. That a few students recognize the nature of the problem and are beginning to search for a synthesis is a striking sign of the new epoch in American intellectual development." Here is the explanation of the broad sweep of conception and the catholicity of sympathy which dignify the volumes. The mind that takes few facts into consideration, as Bacon said, is soon made up. So the historian who operates with a few chosen assumptions of political theory or economic laws is tempted to fit the facts to his prejudices, by convenient omissions, unwarranted emphases, and subtle distortions. But there is no special pleading in the work of the Beards. They rise above propaganda and apologetic. With calm, impartial common sense they go straight to the testimony of the best ascertained facts for the interpretation of events which emotional controversy and tenacious defense-complexes have muddled.

For example, in approaching the discussion of the American Revolution, they say (vol. I, p. 191): "It is necessary to inquire about the assumptions upon which the author is operating. Is he preparing to unite the English-speaking peoples in the next world war? Does he have in mind some Teutonic or Hibernian conception of American polity? Or is he desirous of discovering how the conflict arose, without any reference to the devices of current politicians? For only adolescents allow ancient grudges to affect their judgment in matters international." Could a more complete exposé of prejudices that have covered themselves with the mantle of

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"patriotism" be written in a few lines? With inexorable logic and incontrovertible evidence the authors proceed to show that the American revolution was neither "caused by a stubborn king and his obsequious ministers" nor supported by a colonial population groaning beneath a load of oppression. It was in its political aspect merely a phase of the "interminable clash" between the centralizing powers of the metropolis and the local autonomy of the province, which "began long before the founding of Jamestown and is not yet finished". Indeed, the United States had hardly secured the recognition of their independence before the same quarrel was reopened here by the establishment of "agencies of control and economic policies akin to those formerly applied by Great Britain" (vol. I, p. 203). And, more significant still, the Revolution was, as Professor J. F. Jameson has pointed out in his brilliant little volume, a social upheaval of the first importance, bringing a submerged colonial class to the fore, abolishing many quasi-feudal institutions (such as the great estates of the patrons), weakening the hold of the aristocratic Anglican Church, and revolutionizing the consecrated political doctrine of the duty of the common people to submit to the rule of the few privileged magistrates who were "set over them by the Lord".

And just as it is impossible to find any adequate explanation or interpretation of the Revolution as a mere quarrel between fiery patriots, like Samuel Adams, and Tory ministers, so the Civil War had a far deeper cause than the attacks of ardent abolitionists upon a proud and touchy class of slaveholders. Indeed, Beard calls the Civil War "the second American Revolution", because it was the culmination of a social-economic process at work during the first sixty years of the nineteenth century, and especially from the inauguration of Jackson to the election of Lincoln, which eventually shifted the center of gravity in American life from the agricultural to the industrial basis. It is with just discrimination that the authors give the subtitles "The Agricultural Era" and "The Industrial Era" respectively to the two volumes which are divided at the Civil War. The military and naval events of the war itself are disposed of in a brief summary of three pages, but the authors return again and again to the emphasis of the "Chicago agreement" of 1860, which furnishes the explanation of the triumph of the industrial economy of the North and the West over the old agricultural economy of the South. The free-soil protest alone was impotent.

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The Liberty Party, launched in 1840 (not in 1844, as the authors state) made but feeble headway, and Frémont, running in 1856, even with the stimulus of the indignation caused by the recent repeal of the Missouri Compromise, could win "only little more than one-third of the active voters" of the country. Emerson, reviving the scene through abolitionist eyes, could ruefully say in 1859 that no man living would see the end of slavery. But before the next year was out the election of Lincoln had driven the first of the cotton states to declare its independence of the Union in order to save the plantation economy. The desperate remedy of secession was the result of the tariff-homestead-free-soil "bloc" formed at Chicago in the spring of 1860 and triumphant at the polls in November. The Hamilton-Webster-Lincoln polity of financial and industrial expansion into the free lands of the West had already conquered the old agricultural system of Jefferson, McDuffee and Calhoun, sanctioned as it was by the Constitution, favored almost invariably by seventy years of legislation, and bulwarked by a social defense mechanism which produced one of the most extraordinary systems of apologetical ethics that have ever been devised. Secession and war only hastened the inevitable result. By attempting to save their "peculiar institution" by a resort to arms, the southerners only achieved its more immediate destruction.

The cultural consequences of the rapid growth of material wealth after the Civil War are treated in a chapter entitled "The Gilded Age", with a keenness of psychological analysis and a mastery of ironic style worthy of a Juvenal or a Swift. Undeterred by the pessimistic warning of Henry Adams that, since any attempt to give shape to a science of history is bound to meet the opposition of dominant political, economic and religious interests, "silence is best", the authors lay bare the sordid politics, the social crudities, the brutal appetitiveness, and the boastful chauvinism of "the gilded age" with a pen that is no less merciless because it is dipped in the fluid of irony rather than in the vitriol of denunciation. A single quotation on the attitude of big business to political control must suffice by way of illustration: "Government intervention was an evil, a violation of the inexorable laws of nature, save when practised to preserve order, grant subsidies to railroad promoters, or afford protection and bounties to manufacturers. With these subtle exceptions, the solemn duty of the state was to keep its hands off private affairs" (vol. II, p. 540).

Only once do the authors depart from the tone of dispassionate

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philosophical summary. The asinine behavior of the self-appointed saviours of the American Constitution from destruction by an imaginary host of Bolshevists in the days of hysteria immediately following the World War comes in for a royal drubbing at the hands of Professor and Mrs. Beard. They excoriate "the swivel-chair chauvinist, thrown up from obscurity for an hour," who "gave to the press under the color of dubious official authority a long list of citizens branded as traitors in his own patriotic eyes", and the "emotional conservatives" who siezed the opportunity "to blacken the character of persons whose opinions they feared or hated". And out of all the orgy of persecutions, arrests and deportations emerged the sobering fact that "not a single first-class German spy or revolutionary workingman was caught and convicted of an overt act designed to give direct aid or comfort to the enemy" (vol. II, pp. 641, 643). Perhaps the defenders of the Department of Justice in its execution of the Espionage and Sedition Acts will reply that the Beards only save themselves from error here by the clever insertion of three unimportant qualifying adjectives.

There are passages, naturally, where even the most enthusiastic reader will take issue with the authors. For example, the reviewer feels that they have not done justice to the disinterested patriotic motives of the "hundreds of captains of industry who flocked to Washington to save their country at the rate of a dollar a year" (vol. II, p. 636). One would gather from the ironic tone in which these men are discussed that their sole, or at least their dominating purpose was to "hold up" the government for fat contracts. "Even the staunchest patriots could hardly restrain their emotions as they contemplated the possibilities of the economic scene" (vol. II, p. 637). It is true, of course, that many millionaires were made overnight; but it is a question, in view of the records of the War Industries Board, whether the dollar-a-year men were not, under the inspiration of patriotism, rather traitors than purveyors to big business interests which they represented. Mr. Baruch was pitiless in his demands for the scaling of prices. A case in point is his dealing with the steel men. Steel plates were selling at thirteen to fifteen cents a pound. After exacting from Mr. Henry Frick the confession that the Steel Corporation would still make a profit at less than one-third of those figures, Mr. Baruch had the government price cut accordingly. Grover B. Clarkson in his "Industrial America in the World War" furnishes many instances of voluntary reductions in metals, textiles, chemicals, etc. In one case the men

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in control of production even handed Mr. Baruch a blank contract with the request that he fill in the prices himself.

If at times the authors speak with what seems an unjustifiable finality, it is due to the exigencies of space, one feels, rather than to any dogmatic assertiveness. To say baldly, for example, that Aaron Burr's purpose was "to wrest Mexico from Spain" (vol. I, p. 412), is to give only one of that picturesque adventurer's possible motives—and that, perhaps, not the one most favored by the special students of the Burr expedition. Again, it is rather rash, in view of President Wilson's own silence as to his motive, to state that he asked Congress for the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption act, "having in mind the Mexican problem" (vol. II, p. 516). Burton Hendrick in the Page Letters gives an entirely different reason. From other unqualified or unexplained statements one would gather that Clay was defeated in 1844 by the Birney vote (vol. I, p. 701), that Webster was in Tyler's cabinet (vol. I, p. 720), that the Fourteenth Amendment gave the negro the vote (vol. II, p. 104), that one-third of the United States Senators actually retire every two years (vol. II, p. 285), that Grant was nominated for a third term (vol. II, p. 293), that the federal Constitution fixes the conditions of suffrage in the states (vol. II, p. 563), and that the election of 1920 was, as Wilson wanted it to be, a "great and solemn referendum on the League of Nations" (vol. II, p. 662).

But it would be invidious to emphasize a few inevitable infelicities and a few slips in proof-reading in a work of such magnificence of conception and skill in execution. The Beards have tackled a most difficult task and achieved it with brilliant success. They have set a new standard in the writing of American history and have put every student of the institutions, the civilization, and the culture of our Republic deeply in their debt.

DAVID S. MUZZEY

*Facing Europe.* By FREDERICK BAUSMAN. New York, The Century Company, 1926.—ix, 330 pp. $3.00.

The author declares in his preface (p. viii) that "the scope of this work is to depict the power of Great Britain, her trade jealousy of Germany, her false propaganda to get this country into a war, the origins of which she kept concealed along with her secret treaties for conquest and profit . . . " He makes other allegations in the same tone. He is successful in holding himself to this course of ill-feeling.

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As much cannot be said, however, for his adherence to the proper use of evidence and maintenance of historical accuracy. Opinion glares truculently at the reader from the pages as indisputable fact.

The manner in which the author uses evidence is revealed in his chapter entitled "What Our Partners Seized." Even while decrying the viciousness of bargaining for the spoils of a war proclaimed as being fought in self-defense, one in search of the truth cannot yield to the insinuation that Great Britain declared war for the spoils. It is a fact, and an important one, stated by the author himself (p. 34), that Turkey "went into the war on the side of Germany in October, 1914." The agreements among the Allies for the eventual dismemberment of Turkey were all made after that date. Evidence which proves that the Allies were prepared to take advantage of Turkey as a defeated enemy is not evidence which substantiates the charge that the Allies went into the war for that purpose.

To hammer home his charge against Great Britain as a climax to this chapter, the author tells (p. 46) of the "exultation meeting of Parliament" in which Curzon addressed the House of Lords as follows in part: "Great Britain has gained in this war all and even more than she went out to win . . . As to the advantage by reason of her destroying her only great competitor upon the sea and the only great marine competitor in the world, there would be no means by which to calculate its worth." One does not have to be pro-British to hesitate to accept Curzon's exulting declarations at the end of the war, after four years of maddening strain and suffering by all the participants in the conflict, as evidence that Great Britain went into the war to destroy Germany because Germany was "her only great competitor upon the sea."

The author declares (p. 136) that Sir Edward Grey is guilty of "double dealing" and cites as evidence Grey's failure to read the last sentence of that famous letter to Cambon, French ambassador in London, in his speech before the House of Commons on August 3, 1914: "If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given them." Mr. Bausman insists (p. 139) that Grey omitted that last sentence: first, because he was afraid of the adverse opinion of the British people who were "deeply opposed to anything like military or naval alliances with a continental power"; second, because "he would be admitting having conducted and concealed from the majority of his own Cabinet during whole years such military and naval collaboration with

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France as must undoubtedly have stimulated that power and her ally Russia into the belief that what they had with Britain was an alliance, and that Grey's verbal reservations were but diplomatic expressions to save his face to his own people and to make explanation to Germany easy if necessary."

To counter the first explanation presented by the author, we may point out that Grey had expressly told Cambon, and the French ambassador had accepted the statement, that Great Britain had no obligation to help France and that an expeditionary force would not be sent to the continent unless British interests and obligations were deeply and desperately involved. Moreover, the papers in *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (vol. XI), show that the promise given to France on August 2, 1914—that Great Britain would defend the French coasts against a German naval attack—was contingent upon such an attack actually being made. As for the second explanation of Grey's slip before Commons—that he was endeavoring to save his face—we must say that it is extremely hard to believe. For Grey himself states (*Twenty-Five Years*, vol. II, p. 17) that the letter was published in full in the *White Paper* (from which the author quotes) two or three days after his speech in Commons and that he himself received the proof of that *Paper* before it was published. It seems likely that, if Grey had been so consciously desirous of saving his own face, he would not have released that last sentence of the letter to Cambon for official publication, at least not quite so soon.

To cite another case in which the author does not make proper use of the evidence before him, he declares (p. 114) that President Wilson was driven from his positive determination to keep out of the war by two forces. "First, he made an early misstep in the tantalizing path between the combatants"—that is, he became pro-British. "Second, there gradually pervaded the nation, gradually filled every channel of influence, and gradually intoxicated to the utmost every one in power and in the Cabinet itself, a vitriolic propaganda, manufactured by inexhaustible wealth, diffused through every medium, filling the very air itself, and extraordinarily calculated to overwhelm the judgment of men." But why, we may ask, does Mr. Bausman not include Germany's submarine warfare as a third force? He discusses that factor farther on; but there (pp. 217-218, 264-265) he seems to conclude that, because Wilson still shrank from war, he had not been impelled toward it by Germany's resumption of submarine warfare. The fact is that after

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January 31, 1917, Germany committed acts on the seas which were nothing less than war. Germany attacked the United States. Despite his personal feelings, President Wilson, as he himself told Congress, could not do otherwise than recognize the fact.

The author prefers to handle the submarine issue in connection with the British blockade; but he does so without making clear the essential difference between the British and German methods of interfering with the rights of neutrals. The British method involved huge losses of neutral property; the German jeopardized and destroyed neutral lives. That difference was extremely important in developing American opinion from neutrality to hostility toward Germany. Thinking in terms of Germany's case against Great Britain on account of the food blockade, the author gives us to understand (p. 265) that Germany reopened its submarine war because Wilson favored Great Britain and did not compel the British to accept Bryan's suggestion that they abandon their food blockade as the Germans dropped the use of the submarine. But the Germans themselves refused in May, 1915, to negotiate through House and Gerard for such an agreement (*Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* vol. I, pp. 442-452). Furthermore, evidence from official German sources shows clearly that Germany made its decision to reopen the submarine war, not because of any action or lack of action by President Wilson, but because as early as January, 1916, high military authorities realized that Germany could not gain victory by "military blows inflicted by land forces" (*Official German Documents Relating to the World War*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 131, 1116, 1200).

The reader has a right to expect so severe a critic at least to be accurate in his statements of simple facts. But he says (p. 41 and p. 294) that the terms of the secret treaties among the Allies were incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles. The terms of the secret treaties with respect to the territorial reorganization of Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria were certainly not incorporated in the treaty with Germany, and they were sharply modified when finally incorporated in the treaties of peace with Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey and Hungary.

Mr. Bausman declares (p. 57) that Great Britain would not permit Germany to develop the Bagdad Railway by any peaceful process. But it is a matter of fact that the British Government had agreed to do so; a treaty for that purpose, signed by British representatives and initialed by German, was before the German Govern-

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ment for acceptance when the war broke out. Incidentally, while we are considering that statement, we might note that the quotation which the author draws from Grey's *Twenty-Five Years* (vol. I, p. 54) has been carelessly made. It has to do with the position of Russia and not with Germany.

The author says (p. 265) that in 1916 "we unmistakably voted not to enter" the war. The fact is that California's vote turned the election from Hughes to Wilson and that the issue there was the relation of Hiram Johnson to the Republican organization rather than the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson. That the cry, "He Kept Us Out of War," had a great deal to do with Wilson's re-election is generally accepted. But the implication that the American people gave their votes on that issue exclusively is unsound.

Another example of the author's inaccuracy is his comment (p. 294) upon Wilson's work at the Peace Conference as resulting in: "Only the intrigues of wily Europeans expressed in a paper called the Treaty of Peace, a treaty which an American Senate, thank God, had the pride to spurn." Even the Republican opponents of President Wilson knew that there were some things in that treaty which had been put there in spite of European opposition. It is generally accepted that the Senate would have ratified the Treaty of Versailles if President Wilson had only been willing to accept Republican reservations. The record of the vote in the Senate shows that Democratic supporters of the President prevented ratification.

Perhaps more damaging to the author's case, however, than improper use of evidence or inaccuracy is his passion for opinion. His European audience will be amused at his grave remark (p. 11) that we Americans have "a hearty indifference to money." They will resent his assertion (p. 119) that, if the United States had gone into the war "as early as 1915, we should have created a terrible Frankenstein's monster. We must have placed Europe under a dark, gloomy, and corrupt power." He means Russia. His fellow Americans will be interested, but hardly convinced, when they read (p. 154) that Grey with Page, Northcliffe, and House "manoeuvred us into the war."

Irritated by European, and especially British, criticism of the American war-debt policy, the author rushes to the conclusion (p. 302) that war between Great Britain and the United States "lies in the logic of history." In the past, Great Britain has fought with its rivals for world power—Spain, France, Holland, and Germany. The United States will be the next. From a superficial knowledge

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of those past conflicts, one might reach such a conclusion. But the situations of those victims of British ambition—if the author would have it so—differ from the present situation of the United States in almost every respect.

Packed with inaccurate statements, prejudiced views, and illogical conclusions, this is an extremely dangerous book to place in the hands of uninformed and unthinking men. Whether or not designed to be so, it is the stuff of which wars are made. For according to the author's way of thinking (p. 320): "In defending a nation a danger that is possible must always be reckoned probable."

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*The Political Ideas of the English Romanticists.* By CRANE BRINTON. New York, Oxford University Press, 1926.—242 pp. $5.00.

By the English romanticists Mr. Brinton understands a "first generation of revolt" made up chiefly of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey and Hazlitt; also, a "second generation of revolt", of which the outstanding figures are Byron and Shelley. Walter Scott, a consistent Tory, is studied in contrast with Hazlitt, the one prominent representative of the earlier group who remained consistently radical. A separate chapter is devoted to the daily press and periodicals of the time which are so used as to throw interesting side lights on the literary movement.

The book is well-written and readable and abounds in observations that are just and often penetrating on all the topics treated; yet as a whole it gives the impression of being unstructural. This lack of structure would seem to be due to two main causes: first the failure to deal adequately with the historical derivation of the political ideas of the romantics, secondly, the failure to think out thoroughly enough and present with sufficient sharpness the clash between these ideas and those of the traditionalists. The tendency is more and more nowadays to place in the eighteenth century the significant phases of what was later to be called romanticism. Mr. Brinton's treatment of this all-important eighteenth-century background is rather slight. He does not seem sufficiently familiar with the development in England, from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, of the benevolent or sentimental theory of ethics or with the rise of a type of rationalism that likewise encouraged a radical break with the

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past; nor again with the revolutionary philosophy, also either rationalistic or sentimental or both, that arose about the same time in France partly under the English influence.

It was the misfortune of the English romantics that this eighteenth century radicalism came to them through a very inferior channel—"The Political Justice" of William Godwin. Mr. Brinton's failure to deal adequately with the historical background is perhaps especially visible in his treatment of Godwin. Though he mentions him repeatedly one would scarcely suspect from his book that Godwin was, in Mr. Garrod's phrase, "a disease of English poetry for thirty years." Mr. Brinton's second failure, the failure to think out with sufficient thoroughness the underlying issues involved in his subject, may perhaps be best illustrated in connection with Shelley, the most faithful of Godwin's followers. "Poets and reformers," says Mr. Brinton, "as men who wish to get something done, should always avoid the problem of the origin of evil." Poets and reformers need not waste time speculating about the *origin* of evil but they surely cannot afford to be blind to the *fact* of evil. A blindness of this kind is only too evident in Shelley and other extreme romantics. "The great secret of morals," says Shelley, continuing the sentimentalists of the eighteenth century, "is love." Like the earlier sentimentalists, Shelley associated this "love" with a state of nature which is also conceived as a state of equality and, as such, contrasted with the existing social hierarchy. On the overthrow of this hierarchy, along with the controls that it imposes, the "love," as in "Prometheus Unbound," will gush forth torrentially. Mere unrestraint is not in itself, as Mr. Brinton asserts in one passage (p. 22), romantic. It becomes romantic only when the imagination is so used, as it is in Shelley, to invest this unrestraint with the glamour of the "ideal."

Mr. Brinton has at least the merit of making plain that the outstanding trait of the whole modern movement is its unbounded expansiveness. "In its infinite yearning, its contempt for limitations, its eternal cry for more, a great deal even of Shelley's poetry," he says, "can be made to appear not at all inimical to middle class standards." Mr. Brinton is also right in affirming that the specifically romantic factor in this modern expansiveness is the doctrine of the natural goodness of man, and that this doctrine means in practice the exaltation of feeling, more or less at the expense of reason. In this sacrifice of reason to feeling not only the romantic generation, as he points out, but the Victorians were insufficiently critical.

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There is, however, a contrast even more fundamental than that between feeling and reason, the contrast namely between feeling and the quality of will that was associated in the traditional theology with divine grace. If one were to attempt a purely psychological definition of the significance of the passage from goodness by the grace of God to goodness by the grace of nature, one would say that it has meant practically the substitution of a subrational expansion of emotion for a superrational concentration of will. Mr. Brinton fails to face resolutely the issues raised by this substitution. At times he seems to recognize the need of a principle of inner control in man, such as the romantic faith in natural goodness cannot offer (p. 234). Of Shelley, the complete embodiment of this Utopian faith, he says, "His thought is in itself a pure mysticism, a counsel of the impossible and a source of discontent and revolt"; whereupon he concludes unexpectedly that there is no reason why this Shelleyan type of democracy, "profoundly irrational though its foundations be, should not be a discipline as well as a faith (p. 23)". The notion that the evils of undue expansion may be remedied expansively would seem to be a modern equivalent of *credo quia absurdum.* Even here, however, one would need to discriminate, as Mr. Brinton does not, between an irrationality based on the doctrine of divine grace and an irrationality based on a belief in the grace of nature. Like many others, Mr. Brinton applies to the expansion of undisciplined emotion encouraged by the romantic democrat the term mysticism. He reassures us regarding the dangers of such an expansion by pointing out that the Middle Ages had also known an irrational mysticism, "an ascetic fury that drove men into the deserts" (p. 238). The confusion here would seem to be obvious. "True religion," as Mr. Brinton remarks, "is less a projection of desire into another world than its annihilation in this"—a definition of religion more satisfactory perhaps to a Buddhist than to a Christian. At all events, mediaeval mysticism is more nearly related to religion in this sense than it is to mysticism of the romantic type that, so far from curbing the desires of the natural man, would expand them towards the unlimited. What does this unrestricted expansion of desire, based on a belief in natural goodness, mean, not in the dreamland projected by the romantic imagination, but in the real world? The significant relation here would seem to be that between the romantic outlook on life and a certain type of nationalism. In the course of a discussion of Wordsworth's *Tract on the Convention of Cintra,* Mr. Brinton remarks significantly that "in this nineteenth-century

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nationalism the doctrine of the natural goodness of man has at last found a settled lodging." His subject did not require him to pursue this topic further. One wonders whether he is familiar with the writings of Ernest Seillière, who has given the topic this further development, who has probably indeed been more concerned with the political implications of emotional romanticism than any other contemporary writer. (Mr. Brinton's book should, by the way, have had a bibliography, preferably annotated, and at the very least an index of names). According to Seillière, romantic nationalism finally runs into what he terms an irrational imperialism. One scarcely needs dilate on what is likely to follow when various national groups are imperialistic in this sense.

Mr. Brinton's blithe assurance that "to-day democracy alone is living" is likely to sound strangely to contemporaries of Mussolini. Nor will anyone who has studied experimentally and in its fruits the whole movement of which he has treated only a segment, acquiesce lightly in his closing assertion: "The civilization of Western Europe has always thrived on heresies; it need not fear democracy". It is not possible to discuss adequately within the limits of a review the formidable problems that lurk in the background of this subject. One may point out, however, that if the outcome of the doctrine of natural goodness proclaimed by the emotional romanticist is to discredit both inner and outer control, with a consequent release and free expansion of the will to power in both individuals and states, such an outcome may very well prove to be a menace not merely to civilization but to democracy itself. If we consider men, not from the point of view of their equality in feeling, but from the point of view of the very different degrees to which they accept the discipline of the higher will, the will that sets limits to their expansive appetites, we shall be led to abandon the equalitarian dream and turn our attention to the question the sentimental democrat has always tended to evade—the question as to the quality of political leadership. A substitution of the doctrine of the saving remnant for that of the divine average may turn out to be the only way of preserving what is worth while in democracy itself.

IRVING BABBITT

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*The World Crisis, 1916-1918.* By the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.—Two volumes, xvi, 302, x, 325 pp. $10.00.

Mr. Churchill's first two volumes have long been recognized as contributions of the highest importance to the history of the war, as well for the manner of their writing as for the matter of their content. If these new volumes do not quite measure up to the earlier standard, the fault is not so much Mr. Churchill's as the fact that from November 1915 to July 1917 he was not a member of the British Government, so that his account of those years is very largely a survey (though an extraordinarily good and challenging one) of the writings of others. It is only his record as Minister of Munitions in the last fifteen months of the war—"Not being allowed to make the plans, I was set to make the weapons" (vol. II, p. 2)—which rises to the level of first-hand testimony. Nevertheless, what the reading public and the student alike will appreciate most is not the story of munition-making, interesting and creditable as it is, but the highly controversial narrative of fighting on the western front from Verdun to the Armistice. And this narrative is not the work of a tyro, for Mr. Churchill was for some years a professional soldier and for a time commanded a battalion in France. He has read enormously in the literature of all the belligerents, he tries to deal fairly by those whom he criticises, and he understands as do few writers of our day how to make military history interesting and intelligible. He modestly disclaims having written history, but one would be thankful if most history were written in his style.

In substance his book is one sustained protest against the manner in which the war was fought, against the inveterate practice of selecting the strongest points in the German lines for the great offensives, against the doctrine of the general staffs that the war could be won by "killing Germans". "The process of attrition was at work; but it was on our side that its ravages fell, and not on the German" (vol. I, p. 42). His analysis of the "blood test" would seem to be conclusive. In the opening campaigns on the western front, the Allies lost 939,000 men, the Germans 677,000. During the trench warfare of 1915-1917, the Allies lost three soldiers to the Germans' two, and often four to two. At Verdun, although the Germans were on the offensive, the French lost 442,000, because they would not give ground, as against 278,000 for Germany (vol. I, p. 90); on the first day of the battle of the Somme, "nearly 60,000 British soldiers had fallen

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killed or wounded, or were prisoners in the hands of the enemy" (vol. I, p. 179). The Germans were actually able to conscript more new troops each year than they lost in action, so that they might have been able to resist indefinitely had they remained on the defensive. "It was their own offensive, not ours, which consummated their ruin" (vol. I, p. 45): in the operations from March 21 to April 30, 1918, "they lost for the first time, or at any rate since Ypres in 1914, two soldiers killed for every British, and three officers killed for every British" (vol. II, p. 141). It is true that the operations of 1918 cost the British and French 1,794,000 casualities as against 1,465,000 suffered by the Germans; but the Germans, by their offensive, which yielded no strategic advantages, had used up their last reserves, whereas the Allies had the Americans to turn the scales.

Mr. Churchill contends that there were other ways. He never overcame his first love for the East, and in June 1916, urged a surprise landing at Gallipoli, which was then hardly defended. Of course, he got no hearing, so he pointed out that the British losses on the Somme were in the proportion of 2.25: 1 to the German (vol. I, p. 191), and he protested against the Paschendale offensive of 1917, (vol. I, p. 261). His remedy was ever "a mechanical battle", that is, tanks. From 1915 on, he pinned his faith to them. Only he would not have disclosed them prematurely to the enemy. "Providentially however the scales of convention darkened also the vision of the German General Staff and clouded even the keen eye of Ludendorff" (vol. I, p. 187). The battle of Cambrai in November 1917 first showed their possibilities. Why had they not been so used before? It was because the generals did not believe in them and the generals were all powerful. "A series of absurd conventions became established, perhaps inevitably, in the public mind. The first and most monstrous of these was that the Generals and Admirals were more competent to deal with the broad issues of the war than abler men in other spheres of life. . . . The foolish doctrine was preached to the public through innumerable agencies that Generals and Admirals must be right on war matters and civilians of all kinds wrong" (vol. I, p. 249). Hence it came about that the British War Cabinet was not able to prevent those fruitless offensives in France, and that from fear that he would involve them in a new attack, they deliberately refused reinforcements to Haig when urgently needed in 1918 to overcome the German superiority (vol. II, p. 94). According to Mr. Churchill, only when Sir William Robertson was dismissed as chief of staff and Sir Henry Wilson appointed did the right view

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prevail; the new chief accepted the principle of the "mechanical battle", and the minister of munitions prepared to have 10,000 tanks for the battle of 1919.

The German General Staff, however, were even more obtuse than their Allied rivals. They were responsible for the invasion of Belgium, the proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare, and the offensive of 1918. "All these three errors were committed by the same forces, and by the very forces that made the military strength of the German Empire" (vol. II, p. 217). Mr. Churchill believes that Falkenhayn should have attacked not at Verdun, but in the Ukraine, which would have brought Rumania to the German side (vol. I, pp. 67-73). The submarines were loosed too soon. "If Tirpitz, exercising almost superhuman foresight and self-control, had made no submarine attack on commerce until at least two hundred U-boats were ready, and had not provoked us to counter preparations in the meanwhile, no one can say what the result would have been" (vol. I, p. 222). And when they were ready, it was not necessary to use them, for the Russian revolution was about to break; but the general staff apparently had no inkling of it, being impressed only by the mighty accumulation of armaments and men on the Russian front. After reading Mr. Churchill's criticism of the "higher leading", one wonders if the statesman was not right who said that "war is much too serious a business to entrust to soldiers".

Mr. Churchill has much of interest to say about the creation of a unified command and of Marshall Foch's exercise of it, which, with the tanks, made possible the winning of the war. There is an *excursus* on the battle of Jutland, the clearest account that the reviewer has seen. The chapter on American policy before 1917 is not altogether pleasant reading, but it may well be pondered by historians, and the last sentence is to the point: "With a roar of slowly gathered, pent-up wrath which overpowered in its din every discordant yell, the American nation sprang to arms" (vol. I, p. 239). On the high politics of the war, on secret treaties and proposals for peace, Mr. Churchill is silent. Some will contend that he does not award sufficient credit to American help in the questions of convoy and fighting the submarines; but he pays a fine tribute to the courage of President Wilson in allowing American troops at the climax of the war to serve in French and British units (vol. II, p. 197). All in all, *The World Crisis* offers a better view of the war as a whole than any book yet written, and it ought to become a classic.

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*Social Theories of the Middle Ages.* By BEDE JARRETT. Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1926.—xi, 280 pp. $4.00.

This volume is one in a series, edited by Professor H. J. Laski, on the history of political and social thought. Father Bede Jarrett, under whose auspices as Provincial of the English Dominicans the admirable translation of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas has appeared and who is already known by his studies on that Order and by his brilliant little book on *Mediaeval Socialism*, has been faced in the preparation of this volume with the task of having to write on that penumbral field of social information which embraces such topics as war, women, art and education. Considering the difficulty of the undertaking, it has been carried out with remarkable success in a literary style which is genial, with an impartiality which should appease the *odium theologicum* even of the palladins of the school of Mr. G. G. Coulton, and with a sympathetic understanding of the period more peculiar to himself. We have here no romantic presentation of an age of pennants, prayers and poesy, but excerpts from the writings of the schoolmen on social questions rough with emphasis in their startling modernity.

It is no small service to have reminded the larger educated public for which the books of this series are designed of the authoritative teaching of such men as St. Bonaventure or St. Antonino of Florence, and again to have insisted that, if the dictum is trite that the Church must not interfere in politics and business by inculcating or criticizing methods of conduct, by the standards of Ambrose, Thomas or Calvin the dictum is yet entirely false. The two spheres—metaphor beloved of churchmen since the days of Pope Gelasius—were nevertheless within one community entirely regulated by the rules of faith; and even for such an imperialist as Otto of Freising this community was *una ecclesia*. It is well to remember that, if we must to-day renounce the ecclesiastical regulation of conduct and if the clergy is to become a profession without an occupation, the alternative may not be the moral individualism and individualistic amoralism of the *Politiques*, Locke and Jefferson, but the regulation by the State of morals and of such religion as is in a modern age considered to be of civic importance. Worthy alternatives to this new Leviathan of an age of social regulation have scarcely yet received the consideration of political thinkers content with the orthodox nineteenth-century divisions between the fields of the State as, in Melbourne's phrase, concerned to "prevent crime and preserve contracts", of the in-

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dividual guided in all moral matters in this whirring world by a judgment dignified by the name of conscience, and of the Church which is allowed to conduct a kindergarten for the mentally non-adult. When students do turn their attention to this moral and political problem, they will find indispensable for their studies, if perhaps divergent from their conclusions, the teachings of Gratian, Thomas and Suarez.

The bold endeavor of the schoolmen to enunciate a doctrine of property (which such a modern churchman as Lord Hugh Cecil puts outside the field of moral argument) and a doctrine of just war is of the highest interest. The authoritative Christian doctrine of property as a trust is enunciated with perhaps less vigor by the Angelic Doctor than by the fierce Tertullian, the imperious Ambrose and the unmeasured Chrysostom, or by the sardonic Pope who put on his coins the inscription "Woe to your rich", but it is enunciated with even more precision. Father Jarrett, member of an Order vowed by Dominic to poverty, summarizes the scholastic doctrine as that "property was only compatible with Christianity when it had been recognized that the first claim upon it was not that of the man who made it but that of the man who needed it." (With interest we turn to the first page to reassure ourselves with the dignified formula of the Roman censorship: *Imprimatur, Edm. Can. Surmont, vic. gen.*). The doctrine that alms must not only be given but the trouble taken to give them in the right way, and that a man is entitled to such moderate profit as is requisite for him in order to maintain his station in life and perform its duties, seems peculiarly fruitful, although the latter shows in a strong light the failure of the churchmen to recognize the moral importance of that initiative, progress and healthy competition which felicitously distinguishes a more modern age.

As is to be expected of the period, the doctrine of war, which affects princes and nobles, is more accommodating than that which affects traders. Even here, however, we have a theory which, although the statement of a problem rather than its solution, has yet the advantage of being more definite than the current teaching of the churches. There is no absolute obligation to obey the summons of public authority except in a just war, and a just war involves the prior commission of a crime by the enemy. "He who wages a just war acts as a judge proceeding against a criminal," says Cajetan. The implication of a pervading natural law of general authority is significant, the Papal Court presumably having jurisdiction *ratione*

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*peccati* and providing arbitration in a case of conscience concerning whether a crime had been committed. A study is badly needed of the work of international arbitration performed by the papal Curia, especially between the pontificate of Alexender III and the great schism. The ecclesiastical doctrine has, however, no implication of pacifism: "The safety of the state must be preserved, for without it would come many violent deaths and evils innumerable, both spiritual and temporal".

The bibliography might with advantage have been elaborated for the use of the student who is not a specialist. And it seems a pity that Father Jarrett should have been compelled to write a chapter on education, an excursus on art (however intimate to the understanding of things mediæval) and remarks, however sound, on the vast subject of the part played by law in the Middle Ages, when we would so willingly have had much more from his pen on the theories of moral conduct in social affairs of a Raymund of Penaforte, a St. Antonino or a Vittoria, writers as yet untouched upon in the volumes of Dr. A. J. Carlyle's monumental work on *Mediæval Political Thought*. There is need for a book more detailed than the present, but still such as the plain man may read, upon the doctrine of public morals of the great schoolmen and their successors who happily combined the idealism of churchmen with the sanity of lawyers and the precision of logicians. Father Jarrett is eminently fitted to write such a book and it is to be hoped that before long he will gratify us by writing it.

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*Migration and Business Cycles.* By HARRY JEROME. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1926.—256 pp. $3.50.

The investigation here reported upon forms part of two important series of studies. One of these, planned by the Committee on Scientific Problems of Human Migration, originally appointed in 1922 by the National Research Council, is concerned with the character, causes and effects of mass-movements of men. The second involves research into various aspects of the phenomena of business cycles, and has already resulted in several volumes issued by the National Bureau of Economic Research. It was at the request of the Committee that the National Bureau undertook to investigate "shortage and surplus of labor in the United States in its relations to immigra-

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tion and emigration." The inquiry was thus strictly delimited. Professor Harry Jerome was loaned to the Bureau by the University of Wisconsin to assume charge of the undertaking.

The reviewer has had earlier occasion to refer in the *Quarterly* to the uniformly authoritative character of the publications of the National Bureau of Economic Research. In all that pertains to scholarly, painstaking and exhaustive study of subject matter, the present volume shares in the merits to which he has already given praise. But it will also serve as an illustration of another virtue the display of which, in social studies of quantitative character, becomes of increasing importance as their number increases. In his presidential address before the American Statistical Association in December 1926, Leonard P. Ayers pointed out the urgent necessity for statisticians to make their methods and findings intelligible to those for whom, when brought within the range of lay comprehension, they would have practical administrative, diagnostic and predictive value. Success in this will be partly a matter of interpretation, and partly a matter of the *form of presentation* of material. The achievement in this latter respect which Dr. Jerome shares with other co-workers is the virtue to which reference has been made. The varying degrees of familiarity with the two major subjects of attention that different readers may bring to his volume are kept clearly in mind in arranging his material. By the aid of an initial "Summary of the contents of succeeding chapters", reinforced by an itemized summary at the end of each chapter, and supplemented by an effective and succinct organization of sub-headings, he has made it unnecessary for any reader, either technical or practical in interest, to be long delayed in finding the particular methods or conclusions that concern him.

The problem of the author in brief is to correlate immigration and emigration with the business cycle. So stated, however, the problem is greatly oversimplified. Neither "immigration" nor "the business cycle" are the simple coherent social movements of which the public is accustomed to think. Both are the net resultants of innumerable separate forces and activities, at least partially independent, and sometimes moving in opposing directions. Stated more specifically, answers have been sought to the following questions:

1. To what extent do cyclical and seasonal fluctuations in migration correspond, in time and degree, with fluctuations in industrial activity, particularly as measured by employment or unemployment?

2. What noteworthy variations in cyclical and seasonal fluctuations

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appear when migrants are classified by sex, prior occupation, race, or country of origin?

3. What is the relative influence of the "push" or the "pull" upon fluctuations in migration, i. e., are such fluctuations primarily determined by changes in the country of emigration or in the country of immigration?

4. What is the economic significance of the ascertained tendencies?

Since the relation of the flow of working immigrants to employment conditions in this country is the essential problem under consideration, male immigration (rather than both sexes) is the primary immigration series used. And inasmuch as a large proportion of immigrants engage in relatively unskilled occupations in factories, mines and construction operations, it becomes clear that the series representing employment conditions should be based in large part upon the market for common labor. But statistics of migration are available from 1820 onward, and no direct indices of employment for common labor are obtainable until recent years. As the most available barometers of employment conditions in different periods then, Dr. Jerome has resorted to annual and quarterly statistics of imports of merchandise, annual statistics and monthly estimates of pig-iron production, monthly estimates of factory employment, and a few other short-period indexes of employment. The major periods into which the entire time is broken are, first, that prior to 1890; second, the quarter century, 1890-1914; third, the war and post-war years. Each of these in turn has been broken for various analytical purposes into shorter time-segments. Marked seasonal fluctuations in migration have been found throughout, necessitating adjustment of the data for this factor. Because of the violence of changes in migration, the flexible method of moving averages offers the preferable means of estimating trends.

With reference to the first of the four questions stated above, the author's analysis gives a convincing answer. When immigration is not restricted, it tends to correspond both cyclically and seasonally to changes in employment in this country. The same is true of emigration. The response, however, is not immediate. There is a "lag", more commonly of from one to five months for the cycles, but in some cases as much as a year in length. That there is a true causal relation between the fluctuations in migration and employment is indicated (the second question) by the fact that the former are more sensitive in the case of precisely those gainfully employed elements which would be expected on a priori grounds to adjust their

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movements in accord with the second. Thus, "the movements of those immigrants who have no gainful occupation are decidedly less responsive . . .". "Male migration is more susceptible than female; the immigrant and emigrant are somewhat more susceptible than the nonimmigrant and nonemigrant groups and the unskilled immigrant and emigrant respond to industrial conditions more readily than the skilled, professional and 'no occupation' groups". Moreover, (the third question) the study reveals that migration, especially immigration, "is on the whole dominated by conditions in the United States. The 'pull' is stronger than the 'push.'"

It is the fourth question, concerning the economic significance of the tendencies disclosed, around which the most practical interest will center. While it is "pull" rather than "push" that appears as the controlling factor, low cyclical employment occurs concurrently, to a large extent, in the country of emigration and the country of immigration. Hence "migration as it occurs is not, and scarcely can be, a consistently beneficial factor in its relation to cyclical unemployment"—although in reference to one country alone, it is in some instances "an ameliorative influence, in that in limited portions of depression periods it is withdrawing more workers than it is contributing." Dr. Jerome believes that more often it is a contributory factor to unemployment, in that the number of immigrants (to this country) has usually exceeded the emigrants even in time of depression. Moreover, the two cycles are not closely timed together. An interesting difference of opinion appears here between the author and Col. M. C. Rorty, a director of the National Bureau, who holds that increases in population due to immigration together with the "natural increase" from births, must both be considered as part of a hypothetical increase that would otherwise result from the latter alone. Thus a surplus of immigration over emigration in a period of depression, may still represent a *reduction in the rate of increase of the working population.*

With reference to seasonal fluctuations, the author is cautious in ascribing responsibility for relationships. A significant conclusion is "that after the introduction of the quota principle of restriction, with provisions which tend to modify the seasonal movement in immigration, it would appear that although the flow of immigrants is reduced in volume its distribution by months is now less likely than formerly to be well adjusted to the seasonal variations in employment."

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*Sarajevo: a Study in the Origins of the Great War.* By R. W. SETON-WATSON. London, Hutchinson and Company, 1926.—303 pp. 18*s*.

Professor Seton-Watson who during the war furnished us with a volume on *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, and since the war has been preparing a larger work on "the Jugoslav national movement from its origins to the achievement of unity and independence," in this more detailed study seeks "to place in their proper European perspective both the Austro-Serbian quarrel and the crime of Sarajevo which resulted from it." The volume is "an attempt to subject much new and hitherto undigested material to a critical and detailed analysis" for the sake of elucidating the truth.

Among the new material most students would assign great importance to the startling statements of Mr. Ljuba Jovanovitch, former Minister of Education in the Pashitch Cabinet, which appeared in the summer of 1924. Yet the author confesses that "a considerable portion of the present volume had already been completed when the publication of an amazing article by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovitch aroused acute controversy at home and abroad, and led to a determined attempt to saddle Serbia with the main responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War" (Preface, dated November, 1925). This article, however, was well known in England before the visit of the author to Yugoslavia in the spring of 1925, during which he "was able to obtain much additional information from first-hand sources, and especially from the survivors of the revolutionary movement inside the Dual Monarchy, whose spontaneous nature has been too often overlooked."

The Jovanovitch revelations trouble the author not a little, putting him upon the defensive, and though he attempts "to reduce this incident to its true proportions" and prefers to believe that Jovanovitch "has misrepresented the true facts" rather than that the Serbian Government "became guilty of conniving at a crime which they certainly had not prompted", recent disclosures make the maintenance of such a position increasingly difficult. Jovanovitch has not only insisted that his statements are true but has offered to publish the documentary evidence if Serbian officials will consent. Thus far they have protested against such publication. Friends of Jovanovitch state that what he relates was a matter of public knowledge in Serbia during the war. Nor is it still true that Jovanovitch's former colleagues "have refrained from giving him the lie

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publicly", for Premier Pashitch, who secured his expulsion from the Radical Party, has stated in words deserving fame, "*Was Herr Ljuba Jovanovitch gesagt hat, weiss Ich nicht, aber er hat eine Unwahrheit gesagt*".

To accept the main contention of the book is also becoming very difficult—that the plot to murder the Archduke was the result of a *spontaneous* movement *within* the Dual Monarchy. That the Serbian Government in publishing the Constitution of the Black Hand after the Saloniki trial of 1917 eliminated all reference to revolutionary activities of the organization in neighboring countries is now clear. The full text of the Constitution of the "Union or Death" conclusively proves that activities outside the Serbian Kingdom were a definite object of the society (Article 4) and that all important revolutionary activities, whether within or without Serbia, were directed by the Central Committee at Belgrade (Articles 18, 19).

The intense antagonism which Professor Seton-Watson asserts existed between the Black Hand and the Narodna Odbrana must be modified in the light of recent evidence. The two organizations were working for the same great end, though using different means, and upon occasion they could and did cooperate. The Narodna Odbrana seems to have been by no means entirely opposed to "direct action" in its early days, while the Union or Death was formed by the more active of the members of the Narodna Odbrana when they had grown impatient with the slow results of propaganda.

The Serbian Government, in spite of its antagonism to the Black Hand, sympathized with its ultimate object, Greater Serbia, and was by no means ignorant of its acts since it had its own spy within the organization, the notorious Tsiganovitch. The secrets of the Serbian Government would certainly be generally known to the Black Hand officials if the members kept their pledge (Article 28). Leaders of the Radical Party would scarcely hesitate to use so convenient an instrument when it suited their purpose. "Place your Black Hand at my disposal, my young friend, and you will see what Milovanovitch will accomplish in a short time for the Serbian nation", is reported to have been the offer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dimitrijevitch. Dimitrijevitch told Bogitchevitch that "he had actually placed at his disposal important sums exclusively for propaganda against Austria-Hungary."

This volume, in attempting to prove that the revolutionary movement within Austria-Hungary was "spontaneous" and hence separate and distinct from Black Hand activity, presents a certain Vladimir

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Gatchinovitch as the ideal of the young Serbs of Bosnia, the leader who "held the half of revolutionary Bosnia in his hands" and who by his writings "hypnotized the younger generation." That he was "in close touch with Russian revolutionaries" is particularly stressed. But the young conspirators within the Dual Monarchy read the writings of Russian revolutionaries (often furnished them from Belgrade) to learn methods which might be used for nationalistic, not anarchistic, ends. The author confesses that Trotsky "disapproved of Gatchinovitch's views as too exclusively nationalist" (*sic*) in a footnote on page 74.

To prove the author's contention Gatchinovitch is a most unfortunate choice since he learned his revolutionary doctrine largely at Belgrade, became a member of the Black Hand, and was its agent within Austria, though Professor Seton-Watson was ignorant of this fact, as even his informant may have been. Gatchinovitch was also a member of the Narodna Odbrana (according to Bogitchevitch) and was financed by the Narodna Odbrana, the Black Hand and the Propaganda Division of the Serbian Foreign Office, which gave him a stipend so that he could study at Lausanne. His famous pamphlet glorifying Zerajitch, which had so great an influence upon the youth of Bosnia and Herzogovina, though written in Vienna, was printed, as the book confesses, in Belgrade "by the extremist newspaper" *Piemont*. But *Piemont* was the organ of the Black Hand. Moreover, under orders of the propagandist committee from Belgrade, this pamphlet was scattered among the schools of Bosnia and Herzogovina and thousands of copies of it were found in this region in 1915.

The account of the Toulouse Conference (p. 74), when read in the light of the corrections of Bogitchevitch (*Kriegsschuldfrage*, February, 1926), makes one wonder whether the intimates of Gatchinovitch whom Professor Seton-Watson found still living in Sarajevo, and upon whose story he relies, were misleading him through ignorance or malice. If we accept the statements of Bogitchevitch, which seem to rest upon good authority, the conference at Toulouse with Gatchinovitch took place in January, 1914 (not 1913), was attended by but three persons, had been conceived by Tankositch in Belgrade, and then and there determined upon the murder of the Archduke. Since it was not until March that it became generally known that the Archduke would attend the manoeuvers at Sarajevo, that journey furnished not the motive for the assassination but only a convenient opportunity for carrying out a purpose previously formed.

Gatchinovitch then wrote Printsip—at that time living in Sarajevo

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—summoning him to Lausanne that they might together work out the plans for the assassination. Printsip, going to Belgrade to get authority for this journey, was told by Tankositch that it was now unnecessary, since they had also decided upon the murder of the Archduke at Belgrade. Printsip was therefore kept in Belgrade until the end of May, instructed in shooting and furnished with four Browning revolvers, which Dimitrijevitch is said to have paid for himself. Ilitch, the Sarajevo schoolmaster, was summoned to Belgrade for final instructions, where he had a personal interview with Dimitrijevitch. Ilitch was the organizer of the preparations in Sarajevo, Printsip merely the tool, as the author acknowledges, but he does not state that in making these preparations Ilitch was but carrying out the orders of Dimitrijevitch. Ilitch and Printsip were members of the Black Hand, as were others among the conspirators. Nor does the author stress the fact that the " tunnel " which conducted them so expeditiously to Sarajevo, arousing their wonder, was one with whose construction they had nothing whatever to do. Bogitchevitch thinks that Professor Seton-Watson received his misinformation from a comrade of the young conspirators who had backed out just before the crime, and of whom they wrote bitterly.

Lack of space prevents additional evidence and further discussion, but those who have been interested in the subject since the Ljuba Jovanovitch revelations, those who listened to Professors Seton-Watson and Sidney B. Fay at the Richmond meeting of the American Historical Association, those who have since followed the writings of these historians as well as of Miss Mabel Durham, of Bogitchevitch and of others, will probably agree with the reviewer that the author has failed to prove his thesis, and that his eagerly-awaited volume, while adding some new material, must be used with great caution by those who are seeking the truth (still to be fully revealed) about this fascinating yet intricate historical problem, the origin of the crime of Sarajevo.

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*Investment Trust Organization and Management.* By LELAND REX ROBINSON. New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1926.—xiii, 448 pp. $6.00.

American students of investment conditions and of investment practice in this country and abroad have long been familiar with the investment trust, especially with the important part such institutions have played in England and Scotland in facilitating investment in foreign securities. In this country, however, the investment trust, as an available institution for the American investor, was practically unknown until after the termination of the Great War. The latter tended to break down our former "provincialism" in investment matters, and in the search for new and improved methods for supplementing our investment machinery the investment trust was hit upon. It is only within the last few years, therefore, that the term, "investment trust", has been working its way little by little into the American vocabulary; it is still used sparingly by the rank and file of people who have money to invest. As a matter of fact the American public has yet to be educated up to a knowledge of the important service that investment trusts, if properly managed, are capable of rendering investors.

The volume before us is the most thoroughgoing attempt that has been made, so far as we are aware, to gather together in one volume the available information regarding American and foreign investment trusts as well as other forms of financial institutions that are patterned more or less on the technical investment-trust plan. Of course, we should not wish either to overlook or to belittle Lawrence M. Speaker's splendid work entitled *The Investment Trust*, which appeared in 1924, and which was a prize-winning monograph in the well-known Chicago Trust Company contest. This was a relatively small volume, however, as contrasted with the larger one before us, and less comprehensive in scope and plan of presentation. It would seem that Mr. Robinson was especially well-fitted to prepare a book on investment trusts, particularly because of his wide knowledge of foreign and domestic financial affairs and his practical experience in this special field of finance in his dual capacity as trustee and vice-president of one of the few outstanding investment trusts of the United States.

The investment trust, like many other types of institutions in the business field, is difficult to define because of the numerous deviations

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in the actual formation of companies from the well-recognized typical organization.

As the investment trust is conceived by the author, it would seem to possess in the typical instance, the following, among other, attributes: (1) capital is raised ordinarily by issuing stock, although bonds are often sold; (2) the money raised in these ways is invested usually in a wide range of securities, thus obtaining geographically broad distribution of holdings, by enterprises and by types of issues; (3) the form of organization appeals to conservative investors by offering them in attractive denominations the obligations or securities of the investment trust company in question, particularly the type of security that the buyer likes the best, to be chosen from stock, either common or preferred, or bonds. The return upon such securities is dependent primarily upon the skillful management of the supporting or underlying securities in the nature of a collateral trust to be found in the portfolio of the investment trust itself; (4) there usually is held out to common stockholders the hope of an increase in earning power on their shares which may be achieved in various ways, such as by superior management or by the reinvestment of borrowed funds to yield a greater return than is being paid for such funds; (5) the turnover of a part of the content of the portfolio when the management believes a favorable opportunity has arisen.

In addition to the investment trust power, considerable attention is given by Mr. Robinson to a presentation of forms of business organizations which in certain respects are in the nature of investment trusts, as defined above, such as the bankers' share companies and the financing investment trusts. The former organizations also have been called stock-conversion trusts and have attracted considerable attention in this country only since about 1924. The bankers' share companies are much the same as investment trusts excepting that in a good many instances they issue common stock only. This carries a *pro rata* participating ownership in underlying securities which have been deposited with a bank or trust company. Ordinarily these securities represent a selected group of different business organizations within the confine of a single industry. Usually, the composition of the underlying stock which is the basis of the bankers' shares issued cannot be changed either by the organizer or the trustee after the common shares of the bankers' company have been sold to the public.

The financing investment trust differs from the investment trust proper primarily in that a controlling or appreciable interest in

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various business undertakings is sought. In passing it may be said that many so-called investment trusts on the Continent of Europe are of the financing type.

The volume is well written; most of the subject matter is well organized, and the text contains a liberal amount of documentary material extracted largely from prospectuses of actual investment trusts or allied organizations. There is a description of practically every one of the American investment trusts, technically speaking, and of specific allied organizations as referred to above. An extensive appendix contains a great deal of pertinent data including, among other features, tables of British investment trust companies; the specialized holdings of certain American investment trusts; a chronological table of the organization of leading British investment trusts; composition of the portfolio of a typical foreign trust, and so on. The book should make a considerable appeal to all thoroughgoing students of investments in general as well as those who are particularly interested in the investment trust problem here and elsewhere. Prospective organizers of the various types of finance companies considered also would do well to study the volume.

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*The British General Strike.* By SCOTT NEARING. With an Introduction by Ellen Wilkinson. New York, Vanguard Press, 1926.—xxi, 186 pp. $0.50.

The interest which prompted this rather hasty study could hardly have been purely scientific. Indeed, the "left wing" slant is apparent throughout. The preface starts it off in prophetic Marxian strain. The writer and speaker most depended upon in the first half of the book is the irreconcilable A. J. Cook, Secretary of the Miners' Federation. Some tribute is paid to Swales, Bevin, and Purcell, the more advanced members of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress; but scant respect is shown to moderates like Chairman Pugh and J. H. Thomas of the Council, or to Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson, who were called into consultation with them as representatives of the Labor party during the dispute. And Dr. Nearing agrees with the Baldwin Ministry at least in this, that he persistently proclaims the strike to have been a revolutionary movement, "the beginning of direct action" and "a challenge to the established order".

It is this insistence upon the syndicalist or communist interpre-

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tation of the struggle that is most shocking to students of the British labor movement, accustomed to praise its sanity and moderation. Almost every other criticism of the book, in fact, depends upon the soundness of this contention. In this sense a "general strike" means the use of an economic weapon to accomplish an essentially political purpose. It implies either that regularly constituted channels for the expression of popular opinion and the securing of redress have not yet been opened up, or that in a particularly trying set of circumstances there is too great impatience to await the slow processes of majority government.

But a strike may be general without being a "general strike"; and certainly in the view of the duly chosen leaders of the unpleasantness which occurred in Great Britain between May 3 and May 12, 1926, it was nothing more than a plain, industrial demonstration on behalf of the miners. Dr. Nearing himself admits that they so regarded it, but thinks they were unaware of the real nature of the beast they were riding or whither it was carrying them. It may well be granted that the times in Great Britain have been such as to try men's souls; that, with the Conservatives so strongly intrenched, the hope of political reform has seemed remote; that the Trades Union Congress had evolved some new machinery which it was eager to try out; and, finally, that there was undoubtedly a minority who supported this new step in the hope that it might lead to something revolutionary. Nor need it be doubted that the concern and discomfort that such a strike would cause to the Ministry was present in the minds of those who proposed it. The Government could not help being involved because it had participated as a conciliator in all the negotiations between the miners and mine-owners that had preceded, had been paying a temporary subsidy to the industry since the previous summer, had appointed the Samuel Commission to investigate and make recommendations, and had been trying somewhat feebly and uncertainly to get the respective parties to accept the report of this commission made in March, or at least to come to some terms and avoid a suspension. Its part in the matter as the guardian of the public welfare was thus almost wholly voluntary and extra-legal, and the failure of its efforts due to the obduracy of the miners and mine-owners, with the resulting stoppage of the coal industry, did not signify any defiance of the law. Neither, therefore, did the threat of a sympathetic strike of other trades made by the General Council acting on behalf of the Conference of Trade Union Executives which met in London the last days of April indi-

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cate any such spirit of defiance or revolutionary zeal. Apparently the Council was taken completely by surprise when the Prime Minister, doubtless overwrought and driven on by threatened revolt in his own official family, suddenly developed a touchy attitude, broke off communication, called their bluff, and announced that the strike, if it were carried out, would be regarded as an attack upon constitutional government to be opposed by all the resources at his command. The Government had been quietly organizing and preparing for months for just such a contingency, and within a very short time after the strike was actually called the Organization for the Maintenance of Supplies was functioning with comparative smoothness and adequacy. The members of the Council, on their side, the supposedly deep-dyed conspirators, were obviously caught quite unprepared, loath to declare even a partial strike, and eager to resume negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

In the light of all this, Dr. Nearing's further criticisms of the Council appear somewhat unfair. The charge that they were "goldbricked" by the Samuel Memorandum falls to the ground because the miners refused to give up the struggle and there was no way of testing the reliability of the promises made. As the Chairman of the one-time Commission, Sir Herbert Samuel had some title to confidence, and doubtless had more real authority as a go-between during the strike than he was permitted to profess. The criticism of the Council and of Chairman Pugh in particular for attempting to suppress discussion of the strike at the Bournemouth Congress in September, is not in keeping with the statement previously made that the Council and the miners had agreed that such discussion should await the outcome of the miners' dispute which was still pending, and also with the fact that the Council was responsible to the Conference of Union Executives for the conduct of the strike rather than to Congress. When the miners' cause was finally lost and it was possible in January, 1927, for the Council to render its report to the reassembled Conference of Executives, it was endorsed by this presumably representative body by a vote of two to one, the miners themselves constituting the bulk of the opposition. Events, indeed, have proved that the judgment of the Council was better than that of the miners' leaders with regard to the acceptance of the original Samuel Commission report or some similar formula, even though it might involve some concessions in point of wages pending the much needed reorganization of the industry.

The author's distrust of politics is naturally equal to his faith

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in "direct action" when properly used. Yet his slurring comment on the meager accomplishments of the MacDonald Labor Ministry in 1924 is unjustified in view of his own admission that it had no majority in Parliament. A somewhat longer view of the legislative gains made by British labor since the origin of the Labor Party in 1900, and particularly since it assumed a place in the House of Commons in 1906, convinces us that much can be done through labor politics without resort to the "general strike".

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*Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson.* By FRANCIS W. HIRST. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926.—xviii, 588 pp. $6.00.

The Sage of Monticello—"one of the most lovable characters among modern statesmen"—receives sympathetic treatment in this noteworthy study published just one century after his demise. As befits the effort of a biographer trained by John Morley, the book possesses undeniable literary charm. Much of the material is soundly and even brilliantly presented and represents the best general account now available of Jefferson's versatile talents and interests—his scientific attainments, his wide scholarship and learning, his skill in mechanics and architecture, his great services in legal, social, educational and humanitarian reform, and his almost universal curiosity.

Yet one may certainly question whether Mr. Hirst's vindication of the career and character of the "flaming Republican" is not too plainly motivated by the orthodox preconceptions of modern Manchesterian political economy — Liberalism, Pacifism and Anti-Imperialism. Free from violent prejudice and unthinking adulation the author surely is, but is he objective? If there is a single candid adverse criticism of Jefferson's personality or policies, the present reviewer has been unable to discover it.

It is to be regretted, also, that the scholarship of the book, undoubtedly representing years of reading and reflection, should be marred by a fairly formidable sequence of factual errors, misconceptions, and anachronistic interpretations. Some of these would seem to flow from insufficient acquaintance with specialized historical literature, others from the above-mentioned preconceived ideas, the remainder from sheer carelessness. The whole complex of forces which brought on the American revolt from Great Britain appears

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to be inadequately comprehended by the author. We are told (p. 40) that the American colonists "were jealous of their rights and by no means inclined to welcome, much less to support, a garrison of British soldiers", yet George Washington, among others, petitioned for stronger British forces on the frontier. The notion that "nothing is more certain in history than that King George the Third was the principal agent and contriver of the war" for American Independence (p. 59, n.) has been as badly exploded as Emperor William the Second's personal authorship of Armageddon. The English Whigs are still presented in their Burke-celebrated rôle of intelligent and virtuous opposition to black-hearted and blundering Tories as though Alvord's *Mississippi Valley in British Politics* had never been written (pp. 60, 83, etc.). The Boston Tea Party is still naïvely explained in an exclusively "no Taxation" style (p. 60). It is, of course, impossible to weigh all the motives of the American leaders in pounds sterling, but it is equally impossible to accept a too thoroughgoing denial of an "economic stimulus to patriotism" in the colonies (p. 104). That "the merchants, largely Scotch, were for peace and submission" (p. 104) is another loose statement. "Praise of the Declaration [of Independence] is superfluous, criticism is vain" (p. 122), for, John Locke's influence to the contrary, who can doubt the originality of Jefferson's contributions to political philosophy (p. xv).

The Constitution was "finally adopted largely through the influence" of *The Federalist* (p. 238). Daniel Shays, "an American Jack Cade, . . . led a revolt of farmers in the mountain districts, who refused to pay taxes" (p. 241, n.). Jefferson's great opponent, Alexander Hamilton, is treated very fairly on the whole, but we are not allowed to forget that he was "dissolute" (p. 241) with "private morals so bad that he ought not to have been trusted with office" (p. 267). "Whether Hamilton really gained anything either in financial reputation or political influence by the assumption of State debts may be doubted" (p. 294). It is condescendingly stated that Hamilton's salary as Secretary of the Treasury was so small that "we cannot blame him for enlarging it by journalism" (p. 283). Far from receiving remuneration from his editorial minion, Fenno, Hamilton helped to subsidize the *United States Gazette*. Jefferson was "not at all vindictive" (p. 375) but his hated cousin, John Marshall, was "a Federalist politician" (p. 266) and "the crafty Chief Justice" (p. 267). A judiciously expurgated excerpt from Jefferson's indiscreet letter to Mazzei is quoted (pp. 332-333).

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Who was the "President of the French Republic" when Monroe served as American Minister to France? (p. 327). John Breckinridge, not George Nicholas, introduced Jefferson's resolutions into the Kentucky legislature in 1798 (p. 355). What was the Judiciary Act of 1797? (p. 388).

The discredited story of Levi Lincoln's interference with the midnight appointments of 1801 is reiterated (pp. 374-375). Jefferson, "according to one account", rode horseback to the capitol for his first inauguration, and at any rate the equestrian rôle was more "picturesque" than prosaic pedestrianism (p. 378). Hamilton's "Napoleonic project" for an Anglo-American alliance and attack upon Spanish-America in 1798 (p. 361) seems to the reviewer no more reprehensible than Jefferson's proposal for an Anglo-American alliance "to overcome Spanish obstinacy and secure Florida" in 1805 (pp. 408-409). The acquisition of Louisiana is described in one place as Jefferson's "stroke of genius" (p. 309), but again, and more veraciously, as favored by "the march of events" (p. 392). Jefferson was "a peaceful expansionist" (p. 399) showing "no spirit of imperialism" (p. 395), yet he had professed his readiness to have the American people "marry the British fleet and nation" to prevent French occupation of New Orleans (p. 390). Sir William Grant, not Sir William Scott, rendered the decision in the *Essex case* (p. 341). William Pinkney, not Charles Pinckney, was Monroe's coadjutor in London in 1806 (p. 432).

Remarkable chronology appears in the statement (p. 451) that Madison "got the nomination, was reëlected after a close struggle and began to use menacing language against Great Britain in the winter of 1811-1812." The whole frontier impulse to the War of 1812 is egregiously distorted in the statement that "significantly enough the most bellicose states were those which would be furthest removed from hostilities" (p. 451). Jefferson "acquiesced sadly" in the war, but at first "hoped for the conquest of Canada"—as a peaceful expansionist, of course—which conquest he believed would be a "mere matter of marching". Duane's *Aurora* was not a Virginia newspaper (p. 458). Jefferson's "learned tract" was on the *Batture* not the *Battle* of New Orleans (p. 465). The author claims "orginality" for Jefferson's "contributions to the science of finance" (p. 467) and asserts that it was unfortunate that President Madison and Secretary Dallas were not so well versed in that science (p. 475). Even the octogenarian Jefferson was omnipotent, for "the Monroe Doctrine was prompted by Jefferson, infused with his spirit,

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drafted and enounced by his political pupil and disciple, the last of the noble line of Virginian dynasts" (p. 541).

The value of the book while sensibly diminished is not entirely vitiated by this faulty scholarship. The reviewer, for one, would like to see a new edition carefully emended and rendered somewhat more penetrating and objective. Jefferson's perplexing psychology needs to be more deeply probed. In the words of Henry Adams, the contradictions in the great Virginian's character which have always made it such a fascinating study for historians could be delineated only touch by touch with a fine pencil, and the perfection of the likeness would depend upon "the shifting and uncertain flicker of its semi-transparent shadows".

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*Ciudadanía y Naturalización.* By HIGINIO ARBO. Buenos Aires, Pedro Garcia, 1926.—186 pp.

This book, while concerning itself primarily with the problem of citizenship and naturalization in the Republic of Paraguay, includes also a brief discussion of the subject as dealt with by each of the American republics. The author presents first a study of alien population, its character, and influence on the political and economic life of the country.

Citizenship and naturalization as they existed in ancient Greece and Rome are reviewed briefly as the bases of the practice later observed by Spain in her American colonies. Upon gaining her independence in 1811 Paraguay established citizenship on the principle of the *jus soli.* During the despotic dictatorship of José Rodríguez de Francia (1811-1840), however, Paraguay was held in almost total isolation, as both immigration and emigration were prohibited equally to nationals and aliens. The succeeding dictator, Carlos Antonio López, adopted a much more liberal attitude. The Constitution of 1870, now in force, retains the *jus soli* and admits also the *jus sanguinis*, subject to the limitation that children born abroad of Paraguayan fathers or mothers are not citizens unless and until they become domiciled in the Republic.

After a brief examination of the laws and constitutional provisions of the twenty-one American republics, Dr. Arbo finds that in sixteen states the principle of the *jus soli* predominates, combined to some extent, however, in almost all cases, with the *jus*

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*sanguinis*. In Cuba and Venezuela both principles are frankly recognized; in Mexico and Salvador the *jus sanguinis* predominates. In Haiti both principles are observed, conditioned, however, by racial considerations. Thus in sixteen states, while minor divergencies exist, the fundamental provisions relative to citizenship and naturalization are much the same. If those sixteen states would establish uniform legislation recognizing the *jus soli*, the author believes that the five followers of the *jus sanguinis* could be induced to concur. This is of especial interest in view of the discussions in recent years at the annual meetings of the American Society of International Law, as well as the studies made by the League of Nations Committee for the progressive codification of international law.

The naturalization of aliens, together with the status of naturalized citizens, next receives the author's attention. The requirements of each American state are briefly mentioned and compared. The Constitution of Paraguay provides, among other prerequisites for naturalization, for two consecutive years of residence. In this respect Paraguay is more liberal than the majority of the American republics. As regards, however, the extent of rights accorded by the several American countries to naturalized citizens, Dr. Arbo finds Paraguay among the most conservative. He urges a revision of the constitutional provisions covering this point, and concludes with a brief discussion of the suspension and loss of citizenship.

The last chapter of the book is given over to the presentation of a law of citizenship and naturalization proposed for Paraguay. The matter is dealt with under the following headings: (1) native citizens (*ciudadanos naturales*); (2) naturalized citizens; (3) process of naturalization; (4) rights and duties of citizens; (5) suspension and loss of citizenship; and (6) general provisions.

This book is not an attempt to penetrate deeply into the philosophy of citizenship and naturalization. It appears rather to have been the aim of the author to present briefly and concisely, in convenient form, the facts which govern the treatment of the subject in Latin America. For that reason, while the more complete work of Zeballos remains the classic in the field, the present study is a distinctly valuable contribution, making for a clearer understanding of the citizenship problem in the new world.

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*The Cambridge Medieval History.* Volume V. *The Contest of Empire and Papacy.* Edited by J. R. TANNER, C. W. PREVITE-ORTON, Z. N. BROOKE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926.—xliv, 1005 pp. 9 maps. $13.50.

The period to which the latest volume of the Cambridge Medieval History is devoted lies between the middle of the eleventh century and the beginning of the thirteenth; "a period, on the one hand, of new movements and new ideas—the appearance of new monastic orders, a renaissance of thought and learning, the rise of towns and the expansion of commerce; on the other, of consolidation and centralisation—the organisation of the monarchical government of the Church, the development of monarchical institutions in the various countries of Europe, and, to give direction and solidity to the whole, the revived study of Civil and Canon Law." Despite this richness and variety of interests, the period is most clearly marked by the bitter struggle between the spiritual and the temporal authority which provides for this volume its title; and the greater part of the work is given over, properly enough, to narrative.

The chapters can be grouped by subjects, somewhat as follows: i and ii give the history of the church from the opening of the eleventh century to the Concordat of Worms, Professor Whitney tracing the story of ecclesiastical reform to the death of Alexander II and Mr. Brooke dealing with Gregory VIII and the first contest between empire and papacy; chapters iii, x, xii, xiv are given over to the Germanies; chapters iv, xi, xiii are concerned with Italy; vi, vii, viii turn from Europe to the Near East, Professor Stevenson writing on "Islam in Syria and Egypt, 750-1100" and "The First Crusade", and Mr. Kingsford on "The Kingdom of Jerusalem"; chapters xv-xvii give an account of the development of Normandy and that of England from the Conquest through the reign of Henry II; while chapter xviii is devoted to France under Louis VI and Louis VII. Two chapters that serve admirably to illuminate or to summarize matters dealt with in the narrative portions of the volume are Mr. Previte-Orton's "The Italian Cities till c. 1200" (chap. v), and Mr. Passant's "The Effects of the Crusades upon Western Europe" (chap. ix). Possibly Miss Lodge's account (chap. xix), of "The Communal Movement, especially in France" should be mentioned with them. The last four chapters, unconcerned with narrative history, are among the most informative in the whole book: Professor Hazeltine treats "Roman

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and Canon Law in the Middle Ages"; Professor Thompson, "The Monastic Orders"; Miss Deanesly, "Medieval Schools to c. 1300"; and Mr. Reade, "Philosophy in the Middle Ages."

That in a work characterized throughout by scholarship of a high order, one should pick out for special mention the chapters that deal with particular topics rather than with the chronological sequence of events is well-nigh inevitable for those are the chapters that add most to one's knowledge, that throw light on subjects that have been more than half hidden in an area of low visibility. Yet, though the chapters of narrative follow a well-beaten trail and describe persons and events often told of before, they not only tell the story well but they tell it with a fullness and a clarity which, page after page, increase the reader's indebtedness to the authors. Noteworthy are the chapters (xv, xvi), of the late Mr. W. J. Corbett, "whose original researches in English history", to quote the just tribute in the Preface, "have already lent distinction to Volumes I and II, and whose last work appears in the present volume." It is unfortunate that the editors did not correct the obvious slip of the pen by which (p. 510) Stigand "appears in Domesday as holding a personal barony . . . ".

A certain amount of repetition is unavoidable in a work in which different chapters touch upon different aspects of the same matter, and particularly is this the case when the different chapters come from the pens of more than one contributor. A more vigorous wielding of the editorial blue pencil might have eliminated some of these: thus both Mr. A. L. Poole in the chapter "Frederick Barbarossa and Germany" and Count Balzani in the chapter "Frederick Barbarossa and the Lombard League" carefully explain the ambiguity of the terms *conferre* and *beneficia* employed in Pope Hadrian's famous letter to the emperor (pp. 390-91, 424-25) and both describe the picture of the coronation of Lothar III which Innocent II had hung in the Lateran palace (pp. 365, 393). Inevitably, too, there are differences in point of view and emphasis, differences which it would be unwise to smooth over; yet the present writer has found none on any matter of particular moment.

Some of the statements made are erroneous or open to question: "Many abbots were now privileged to wear mitres and to ordain," says Professor Whitney (p. 30), in dealing with the pontificate of Leo IX. That the first authentic grant of the mitre to an abbot dates from 1063—nine years after Leo IX's death—is of slight importance; it is the statement about ordination that calls for support.

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Abbots wore pontifical vestments; they sometimes performed functions that were normally restricted to the episcopate, ceremonial functions for the most part, and a few had the right to administer confirmation, to consecrate the holy oils, and the like; but if they, as well as bishops, conferred holy orders, a great many works on ecclesiastical polity and canon law need revision. Or has Professor Whitney merely found instances of abbots being raised to the episcopate and serving, not as diocesans but as suffragans or auxiliary bishops? On the other hand, mistakes that occur in the preceding volume of the *Cambridge Medieval History* have, where opportunity has arisen, here found correction. Thus Professor Stevenson avoids, in his account of the First Crusade, the mistakes into which the late M. Chalandon fell in his narrative in volume IV.

The bibliographies (pp. 834-939), are not entirely satisfactory; in some instances they are antiquated (though in some lists very recent works are cited, e. g. Ogg's edition of Selden's *Ad Fletam Dissertatio,* Cambridge, 1925); in others they are inadequate and find no place for books that one would almost take for granted. And it is regretable that Mr. Passant, the author of the chapter on the influence of the Crusades upon western Europe, feels that "the nature of the subject precludes a separate Bibliography"; though there is no little warrant for so feeling, the reader would welcome further guidance than his brief reference to bibliographies appended to other chapters. The index is in the main a list of names of places and persons; wherever the present writer tested it for accuracy and completeness it showed itself entirely reliable. Seventy-four entries, by actual count, are other than proper names, not including repetitions such as *Assize of Windsor* and *Windsor, Assize of.* Some of these entries refer to books, others to laws or legal codes, still others to offices or ranks of society, while some are general headings such as *Law, Roman,* and *Popes, legitimate.* Unquestionably a complete subject index is out of the question and, in view of the completeness of the Tables of Contents, unnecessary;—one wonders what limitations the editors imposed on themselves in admitting entries other than names of places and persons.

A minor criticism that may be proper is concerned with the size of the volume. A large book containing close to eleven hundred pages is not easy to handle, and this volume is one that will be referred to constantly by students of the period. A far more important criticism is that the work, despite its size, leaves such wide fields untouched: nothing is said of Christian Spain, of the Scandinavian

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lands, or of Poland and the western Slavs. Nor is the matter of space allotted to the fields that are treated entirely above criticism: that three chapters should be devoted to English history between the years 1066 and 1189 seems disproportionate when only one chapter is given to the history of France. Space could have been saved and repetitions avoided, without loss of value, had Germany and Italy been treated together and by one writer instead of separately and by different hands. It is unfortunate that the writers of the excellent concluding chapters do not follow the example of their colleagues who deal with narrative history and keep more closely within the time limits given in the Introduction, instead of carrying their subjects well beyond the opening of the thirteenth century. Yet, when all criticisms, great and small, have been enumerated, the fact remains that this volume renders easily accessible a vast amount of information, scholarly and well-written, a boon to the student of the Middle Ages.

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*A History of Russia.* Volume IV. By V. O. KLUCHEVSKY. Translated by C. J. Hogarth. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1926.—vii, 382 pp. $4.50.

Kliuchevskii's *Course of Russian History* has long been regarded, and with much justice, as the best general treatment of the subject. His synthesis rose above the polemics that had so long supplied the place of history, and eluded the German metaphysics that had thwarted his predecessor's researches. Subordinating the notion of "inner tendencies" to his belief in the importance, not alone of the natural environment, but of the constant operation of economic factors, Kliuchevskii was able to work out an interpretation of the history of the Russian people and of the evolution of the Russian State that did not depend on cataclysmic interruptions. In Kliuchevskii's treatment Peter the Great ceased to be the *deus ex machina*, whose timely appearance rescued Russia from her Asiatic past ( or overturned the cradle of an infant civilization, according to the predisposition of the observer). The present volume, covering the eighty years from the accession of Peter I to the deposition of Peter III in 1762, develops Kliuchevskii's estimate of what is so frequently dubbed the "Europeanization of Russia". Seven-tenths

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of its pages are devoted to discussion of Peter's aims and activities, and to appraisal of the true significance of the "tsar-revolutionist". Considerations of space forbid extended comment on Kliuchevskii's findings, which have since become common property, for the subject under review is, properly, Hogarth, not Kliuchevskii.

Not that the reviewer wishes to compile a *corrigenda*, or unduly to emphasize such exaggerations and unnecessary substitutions as "early manhood" (p. 1) for "infancy" (p. 1), "bureaucratic magnates" (p. 115) for "coryphei of the bureaucracy" (p. 150), "enlightenment" (p. 207) for "education" (p. 264), or "radically investigating" (p. 208) for "historical study" (p. 265). To whatever page one turns, comparison of Hogarth and Kliuchevskii discloses an incredible number of discrepancies, ranging from substitution of "Lord of the World" (p. 208) for "God on earth" (p. 266) to such serious blunders as translation of "undivided" (p. 150), first by "portionless", then by "non-divisible" (both on p. 266). Hogarth's wayward fancy renders "began to view other wise" (p. 266) by "began to have their eyes changed" (p. 211), while carelessness with declensions turns Prince Kaunitz into "Princess Kaunitz" (p. 209). Whether from whim or from ignorance, the sentence: "Thus Peter's reform became the stone on which Russian historical thinking was whetted for more than a century" (p. 269) appears as: "Hence for two centuries Russian historical thought has split upon the rock of the Petrine reforms, . . ." (p. 210). It may be that translation of novels has bred in Hogarth a disdain of literal translations, somewhat dangerous in dealing with an historical work. But such transmogrifications, coupled with apparent absence of historical background, destroy the sense of the original: "into evaluation of the reform were introduced the moral and the national motifs" (p. 267) degenerates into "sometimes popular-moral considerations were imported into those appraisements' composition" (p. 209). More often an opposite tendency, a striving for effect, displays itself: "starting from the cosmopolitan thesis that all that is national is nothing before that which is human" (p. 268) is eclipsed in "combated the cosmopolitan thesis that Nationalism is as nothing compared with Humanism" (p. 210), while "the dispute was renewed" (p. 268) is whipped up into "the dispute . . . had developed into a regular European feud" (p. 210). "Historical destiny" (p. 213) is hardly an equivalent for "historical characterization" (p. 272); but philosophy of history suffers on every side. Hogarth perhaps never heard of Hegel; at all events,

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"the historical scene" (p. 270) is called "the European cultural stage" (p. 212). Solov'ev's famous "clan theory" is summarized by Kliuchevskii as follows: "In private, civil life measures were taken for protection of individuality: it was freed from the shackles of the clan union by Peter's exclusive attention to personal merit, . . . " (p. 270); Hogarth writes: "through his measures for protection of the person in private and civil life, and through [sic] his attention to State service, . . . , [the Russian people acquired] release of the subject's personality from the shackles placed upon it by the country's close-locked hereditary class" (p. 211).

These instances, picked at random, by no means exhaust the supply; from any one page might be culled as long a list of errors, which, many of them petty in themselves, but cumulative in their effect, fundamentally alter the tone of Kliuchevskii's exposition. How little of Kliuchevskii has survived Hogarth can, however, best be shown by reproducing, *in extenso*, a typical passage, illustrating alike Kliuchevskii's attitude and Hogarth's method. Kliuchevskii writes (p. 292):

> Begun and carried on by the supreme power, the people's usual guide, it [Peter's reform] took on the character and methods of a violent overturn, a revolution of a sort. It was a revolution, not in respect to its aims and results, but only in respect to its methods and to the impression which it produced on the minds and nerves of contemporaries. It was rather a shock than an overturn. This shock was an unforeseen consequence of the reform, but was not its deliberate aim.

Hogarth writes (p. 228):

> And though those reforms were begun by the Supreme Power, and subsequently carried on by the Supreme Power, merely in that Power's capacity as director of its people, the reforms eventually assumed the character and conditions of a sheer upheaval, of a revolution, of a convulsion which, though centred about the aims and the results of Peter's innovations rather than about their scope, impressed contemporary nerves and imaginations the more because of the novelty of the alterations effected. For it was not only that the Petrine reforms represented social change: there followed upon them the unforeseen, the undesigned, consequence of social shock.

It is decidedly a shock that such a fate has befallen Kliuchevskii's lectures. Professor Kliuchevskii devoted the last ten years of his life to careful preparation of an authorized Russian edition of his work, with the expressed desire of safeguarding it from pirating. The Communists, respecting the work of this conservative scholar, have re-

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printed his lectures without emendation or comment; in adding a fifth and final volume they took care to state in a preface that it was based on old notes and was not what his final version would have been, had he lived. It is all the more a matter of consternation and regret that his lectures have been posthumously introduced to an English-speaking audience through the medium of an occasional translator of Russian fiction, who, evidently without historical training, has failed to understand the text and striven to make up the deficiency by exercise of an unruly and inexpert imagination, thus rendering an admirable *Course of Russian History*, brilliantly conceived and lucidly couched, into a fumbling *History of Russia*, misconceived and bunglingly delivered.

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*A History of American Immigration: 1820–1924.* By GEORGE M. STEPHENSON. Boston, Ginn & Company, 1926.—vi, 316 pp. $2.40.

To the social scientist the most significant paragraph in this book is an almost incidental one appearing on page sixty-two. The author is presenting some general observations by way of introduction to his consideration of the "new immigration," and remarks, "It is not the province of this book to enter into the field of scientific investigation and theory and to pass judgment on the merits of the controversy raging between the 'Nordics' and the 'non-Nordics.' It is sufficient to say that the student of immigration will do well to suspend judgment until 'all the evidence is in.' . . . The historian studies the past; if the present is explained by the past, that is no affair of his." Still less, it may be assumed, is the future an affair of the historian. "It is not the province of the historian to prophesy" (page 85).

To the extent that this is an accurate presentation of the rôle of the historian, it appears to mark a sharp cleavage between history and social science, at least applied social science. The problem upon which the student is counseled to suspend judgment is clearly much broader than any controversy between Nordics and non-Nordics. It is the whole great question as to whether the "new immigration" offers as satisfactory materials for American citizenship as the "old immigration." Now in any such matter as this it is clear that the evidence is never all in until the effects have had time to show them-

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selves. No conclusive comparison of the new with the old immigration can be made until the new immigrants have been here as long as the old—which is to say, never. The effects of any of the immigration currents of the past century will not be fully developed for at least another hundred years—strictly speaking of course, once again, never.

In every such matter, by the time even approximately all the evidence is in, it is too late to do anything about it. Here the social scientist admits frankly that his methods must fall far short of the theoretic ideal. While the historian is refusing to apply the lessons of the past to the understanding of the present and the control or even the prediction of the future, the social scientist is striving earnestly to base approximately sound judgments on partial evidence and to use the resulting conclusions to direct the course of social movement so far as that is subject to volitional control.

It is worth noting, perhaps, that Professor Stephenson himself inadvertently departs from his principle when he remarks on page 103 that our liberal naturalization laws "have been justified by the results." Certainly not all the evidence is yet in with respect to this very debatable question.

The book as a whole is a very readable and useful summary of some of the important phases of the immigration movement to the United States. It is divided into two parts: first, "The European Background," in which is presented a brief review of the conditions and causes which are accountable for some of the most significant immigration currents, and, second, "The Immigrants in America." As the entire text, apart from the bibliography (which is very good) and the index, comprises only 281 pages, it goes without saying that no aspect of the problem can receive extended treatment, and many important topics must be omitted altogether. Probably the most valuable contribution of the volume is found in the sections dealing with the political aspects and influences of immigration in this country. This phase of the problem has been much neglected in the past, and Professor Stephenson's treatment shows evidence of much fruitful original research.

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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*Addresses.* By SAO-KE ALFRED SZE. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1926.—ix, 131 pp. $1.25.

These five addresses, delivered on various occasions in the United States present the point of view of the foreign-educated Young Chinese regarding the treaties which provide for the control of the Chinese customs by foreigners and the exemption of the nationals of a number of nations from Chinese jurisdiction. The causes of China's discontent and the steps which should be taken to satisfy Chinese aspirations are admirably stated by a skilled advocate in excellent English and in the convincing manner which would be expected of an author of the wide experience and international culture of the Chinese Minister to the United States. No one who wishes to understand the Chinese situation should fail to read this book, but on the other hand, it is necessary to remember that it is the plea of an advocate and cannot be taken as a fair statement of the facts.

Mr. Sze was educated in the United States and has lived so long outside China that it is often said that he does not understand the states of mind of the Chinese masses, and that the opinions of the relatively small group which he represents are not those of the Chinese people as a whole.

He very cleverly bases his arguments largely on theoretical considerations and avoids as far as possible the obstinate and unpleasant actualities, such as military control, which dominate the "Middle Kingdom" to-day. Almost always he stresses the rights of his country in international matters, and constantly he omits all reference to its failure to observe its international obligations. He argues that the Chinese Government has a moral and legal right to tear up all treaties which it finds inconvenient because present conditions are very different from those upon which the treaties were based. He wishes to cancel the treaties which protect foreigners from the oppression of Chinese courts on the ground that they are no longer necessary, while the foreigners doing business in China insist that this is not true, and point to the interference of the military with the courts, the absence of any legal central government to appoint the judges and the numerous cases of maltreatment of foreigners who do not enjoy extraterritoriality.

It is to be regretted that the author did not face the facts squarely, as he is able enough to have proposed settlements of the difficulties by degrees and through compromises, thus rendering a great service

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to his country and to the cause of international peace. The facts are too well known to be denied, and there are solutions which would be reasonably satisfactory to all concerned. Apparently he has not thought situations through to the end, and does not realize that if the Chinese cancelled their treaties, they would be regarded as international law-breakers, and would lose the friendship of the United States and of Great Britain to which they owe so much and which is so necessary for the future. The first result would be that the Japanese would be released from their existing obligations to return the South Manchurian railway and the Leased Territory in Manchuria. The Treaties guaranteeing the sovereignty and integrity of China and the "Open Door" would disappear with the rest.

Many prominent Chinese do not hesitate to tell their countrymen that the Chinese Government is not yet ready to assume the international duties which abrogation of the treaties would entail. Experienced foreigners usually feel that it is futile to discuss granting immediately the demands of Young China in full until there is a Chinese Government in existence competent to enforce the provisions of new treaties, and to provide reasonable security for the lives and property of foreign residents in China.

CHARLES C. BATCHELDER.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

*The Economics of Wages and Labour.* By NORA MILNES. London, P. S. King and Son, 1926.—vii, 197 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*

This is not a great contribution to economic theory. Its main purpose is to show that increases in wages must in the main come from the elimination of waste and from an increase in industrial productivity. The establishment by state action of a minimum wage for the groups farthest down might, it is admitted, permanently increase wages by breaking the vicious circle of poverty, by forcing out inefficient employers and transferring the workers to more efficient firms, and by stimulating many concerns to greater effectiveness. But if those above the subsistence level seek by trade-union or state action, to improve their wage scale their efforts will in the end largely be in vain. For unless the efficiency of men or management is correspondingly increased, such an increase must come "out of price or out of profits." If it is the former, the demand for the product will be checked and if the latter, the supply of capital will be reduced. It is implied that these forces will be sufficient to prevent the workers from enjoying a permanent increase in wages.

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But this is certainly inexact reasoning. As Miss Milnes recognizes, if the demand for a product be inelastic then an increase in wages, even if accompanied by a proportional increase in price, will not cause a corresponding reduction in the number of units purchased. The total wage area will therefore be greater than before and such wage-earners as are thrown out of employment can be maintained with no diminution of income from the extra earnings of those who are employed. A balance will moreover be left which will represent the net gain. It is true that this gain will be the loss of other classes, but these classes will be broader than the fellow wage-earners of the former group; capitalists, professional workers, and self-employed persons will in part pay for the increase.

But what if all labor should by organized effort secure an increase? We would here be dealing not with the atomistic competition assumed by Clark and the marginalists but with a semi-monopoly when the requested rate must be paid in order to secure any labor. Granted then that a higher rate must initially be paid, will not the employer hire fewer men and will not unemployment gradually beat wages back to the original social margin? This might well be true if the social curve of imputed productivity were elastic. If it had an elasticity of less than unity however, the relative diminution in the number employed would not be as great as the increase in the incomes of those employed. The unemployed could then be maintained from these surplus gains and thus prevented from undercutting the rate, and the group as a whole would enjoy a surplus.

Reasoning in another way, it can be said that the competition between business men and investors would initially at least be as keen as before and that consequently the other elements in money costs would not increase commensurately with wages. The workers income would therefore rise more rapidly than the price level and their real earnings would increase at the expense of other classes.

But either of these contingencies would of course mean a decrease in real profits and in the real rate of interest. Here the author, like the wage-fund theorists, assumes that the decrease in savings which would result would be sufficient to restore the old balance between capital and labor and thus reduce wages back to their original level. But this again is loose reasoning. The real problem is whether such a reduction in the rate of interest would actually reduce the supply of capital and if so, by how much? Here it should be remembered that Sargent in 1867 argued that a reduction in the rate of interest would actually increase proportionately the volume of saving. Even

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Cassel holds that a reduction in the rate of interest down to three per cent would not alter the amount of saving. Finally, even though the amount saved were to decrease, there is certainly no surety that it would decrease proportionately. The supply of capital, like that of gold, is many times the amount of its annual accretion. An alteration in the rate of flow would not correspondingly affect the total supply for some years. This rate of flow may, moreover, be relatively inelastic and not contract to anywhere near the degree to which its remuneration might be reduced.

In brief, the final results of the distributive process will largely depend upon the relative elasticities of supply of the different factors of production. These may be such as to permit permanent gains from bargaining as well as unequal gains from the progress of industry. We shall not introduce precision into our thinking until we work out the differing results which flow from differences in the elasticities of supply. Nor shall we transform our discipline into a science until we secure quantitative coefficients of the actual elasticities of the supply of the factors. When we have done this, we can begin to state definitely what the results of disturbing an original equilibrium will be. Until we do so however, it behooves all who employ only the literary and deductive method to be chary about drawing the sweeping conclusions which they are so fond of doing. For the validity of their conclusions depends upon the relative degree of those very variations which they either loosely assume or blithely ignore.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Pinckney's Treaty. A Study of America's Advantage from Europe's Distress, 1783-1800.* By SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1926.—(The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1926) xii, 421 pp. $3.00.

The beginnings of the foreign policy of the United States must be told in at least four parallel stories. Interesting, but by no means final efforts have tried to cover the relations with England, France and the Netherlands. The story of the relations between the United States and Spain has never been adequately presented. This volume fills the gap. It is done with a thoroughness which is exemplary. It is far more than a study of the Treaty of San Lorenzo of 1795; it is an analysis of Spanish American Relations in the entire period

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mentioned in the sub-title. The main thesis is also contained in the sub-title, and is not now likely to be controverted. The French relations of the period might now well be treated again in the light of Mr. Bemis' study.

Among the signal contributions to knowledge made by Mr. Bemis are the extent of the Spanish aid to the United States during the Revolution, the eagerness and futility of the Spanish efforts to take advantage of the western separatist tendencies immediately following the Revolution, the relationship between the Spanish proposals for an alliance and the foreign policy of Washington as enunciated in the Farewell Address, the unrecognized part played by William Short in the negotiations between Spain and the United States, the psychological background of Jefferson's attitude toward the problem of the Southwest, and the delightful thumb-nail portraits of Floridablanca, Aranda, Short, Carmichael, Jaunenes and Godoy.

Although this volume is intended to do for the story of the settlement of the southwestern boundary what the same author's *Jay's Treaty* did for the northwestern boundary problem, it shows an advance in literary style and vigor of presentation which cannot be too highly commended. The lighter, but decidedly enlightening, details about Mrs. Jay and the live-stock which the Spanish King contributed to the Jay and Washington stables in a transparent and perfectly useless effort to influence the opinion of those gentlemen, is delightful.

One cannot but be impressed with, and grateful for, the acumen with which Dr. Bemis has ferreted out the motives underlying the rapidly shifting policies of both Spain and the United States in this period. The reason why Spain, after years of procrastination, suddenly yielded every essential point to the United States is summed up in Mr. Bemis's phrase "America's Advantage from Europe's Distress", but the details are laid bare in England's conduct at the seige of Toulon, the pressure of French armies on the northern frontier of Spain and Godoy's fear that the Jay Treaty (of which, apparently, he did not know the details) heralded an Anglo-American *rapprochement* which would be fatal to the Spanish colonial empire. The concluding paragraph which conjures up the spirit of Philip II is in excellent and restrained taste and may mark the growing appreciation by the younger American historians that the style of the *genro* of American historical scholarship has left much to be desired.

The light which this volume sheds upon the early injustice done

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a "career diplomatist" in the person of William Short, points out a defect in the organization of the foreign service which waited another century and a quarter for remedy. Whatever Pinckney's share in the treaty, his part in the story is slight. Five maps, a valuable bibliographic note and full appendices make this contribution to the chronicle of American diplomacy one of the most satisfying which has appeared in recent years.

RANDOLPH G. ADAMS

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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## BOOK NOTES

*The United States and France, Some Opinions on International Gratitude*, Selected with a Foreword by James Brown Scott (New York, Oxford University Press, 1926; lxxii, 175 pp. $2.75), is a compilation of documents, official and unofficial, bearing upon the French-American Alliance of 1778. Among the latter the most important is a series of articles from the pen of Jared Sparks which appeared in the *National Intelligence* in 1847 and the purpose of which was to refute some aspersions by an anonymous writer of the same year upon the good faith of our French allies. In the main, Sparks made out his case, but his argument has to be corrected and modified at an essential point in consideration of facts which have come to light since he wrote, especially in M. Doniol's great work. Sparks was a severe critic of Jay's tactics in the peace negotiations of 1782. We of today, however, know that Jay's apprehensions lest France should try to keep the United States in the war until Spain, her other ally, was satisfied, and lest indeed she should throw her weight with Spain in the quarrel between the latter and the United States concerning the disposition to be made of British territory west of the Alleghenies, were well founded. That Jay's initiative obviated these dangers is fairly apparent. While it may be of interest to the special student to have these various papers brought together; the serviceability to the lay reader of an out-of-date account of things is questionable, to say the least. And it is evidently to the lay reader that the book is addressed. This is shown by the fact that while the editor translates passages in French for the benefit of the reader, he does not, except in one instance, indicate their source. —EDWARD S. CORWIN.

A thorough-going inductive inquiry of statistical character, provides the foundation for a careful and well-reasoned contribution to the theory of business cycles in *Cyclical Fluctuations, Retail and Wholesale Trade United States, 1919-1925*, by Simon S. Kuznets (New York, Adelphi Company, 1926; xx, 201 pp. $3.00). It is seldom that a book has come to the present writer's attention, whether from the field of natural or of social science, in which painstaking search for factual accuracy has been so effectually combined with scholarly theoretical interpretation. The author has spared no



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pains to prevent the reader from giving his data a significance or generality beyond that which he deems warranted. Nor has the systematic care exhibited in presenting his material prevented the use of a clear and straight-forward literary style, almost conversational in character, which gives an occasional touch of charm to a technical subject. Dr. Kuznets has systematically analyzed a number of series of business data consisting of monthly index numbers, publication of which was begun in the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, January, 1919. Although short, the period includes "one violent and one moderate business cycle", and the data have not hitherto received a general analysis. They consist of nine series on the dollar volume of sales by as many groups of retailers and five similar series for groups of wholesalers. For each of these the secular and seasonal factors were removed by approved methods to disclose its cyclical character. Corresponding derived series for commodity volume of sales and of output were obtained by deflating the dollar series by price indexes. When the cycle indexes for the several series are correlated, they show in general about the relationships that would be expected. That is, with some lead or lag each trade group represented by one of the series passed through cycles in the same direction at about the same time. When the amplitudes of the various cycles are compared, however, a significant fact is disclosed: cyclical variations from "normal" are comparatively slight in retail trade, but they become greater as the trade process gets farther back from the ultimate consumer. That is, the cyclical fluctuations have greatest amplitude in the case of manufacturing output, lesser amplitude in the case of wholesale trade, and least of all in the case of retailers. In the endeavor to account for the comparative evenness of retail sales several new series of indexes are employed to ascertain cyclical fluctuations in the distribution of incomes. The last of the four chapters is devoted to a theoretical examination of possible explanations of the uniformly greater fluctuations in production and wholesaling.—STUART A. RICE.

In an aggressive, damaging assault upon current educational content and method, Dr. Joseph K. Hart's book, *Adult Education* (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1927; xiii, 341 pp. $2.75) shows prevailing educational psychology to be the authoritarian instrument of Plato, Locke and Herbart redefined to a modern mechanistic efficiency, devoted to the task of moulding children into proper and unquestioning subjects of the machine until they come to enjoy their chains and fear freedom. Dr. Hart indicates suggestively the re-

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sponsibility of the vested interests in maintaining educational institutions that subjugate the masses to ignorance and develop attitudes unfavorable to any essential change in the conditions under which they live and work. He projects in a very hazy way, as a remedy, the adoption of the Danish folkschool, believing that the change in our system must commence through the education of young adults. The book is replete with strikingly effective generalizations and apt quotations, yet it is verbose and repetitious. It is unfortunate that Dr. Hart considered it necessary to be so obviously journalistic in this book. For certainly one of the prime needs of adult education is that it be de-sentimentalized, "de-bunked", in a word, de-journalized.—BERNHARD J. STERN.

The recent Institute of Economics study on *World War Debt Settlements* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926; xiii, 448 pp. $2.00), by Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, is in fact and intention little more than a convenient reference book. Two-thirds of the space, in the form of appendices, is given to reprints of the various American and British debt agreements, and of certain documents bearing on Reparations. The text proper is a summary statement of the more important facts, policies and developments which led up to the various settlements, with Germany and as between the Allies. Controversial issues are avoided as far as possible, and when inescapable both sides of the argument are presented. The book is attractively gotten up, and, as the only thing of its kind, should prove extremely useful.

The extent and the competitive nature of the retail market for men's clothing and furnishings in the United States has been analyzed by Horace Secrist, Director of the Bureau of Business Research of Northwestern University, in a volume of the Northwestern University Business Studies entitled *The Widening Retail Market and Consumers' Buying Habits* (Chicago and New York, A. W. Shaw Company, 1926; viii, 186 pp. $3.00). Retail clothiers, the author holds, are linked together in one competitive nation-wide market through "transmitted competition", i. e. through national and local advertizing on the part of sellers, and through the habits of buyers, who purchase goods in overlapping trade areas. In the present study the buyers (rather than sellers) have provided the sources of information. They were represented by 2,166 university and college students, who furnished data under a uniform plan concerning the buying habits of their fathers or guardians as well as themselves. Some forty instructors in various institutions cooperated in securing this information.—STUART A. RICE.

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As Mr. J. Morgan Rees states in the preface to his book on *Unemployment as an International Problem* (London, P. S. King and Son, 1926; xv, 188 pp.) it is based almost entirely upon statistics and information collected by the League of Nations and the International Labour Office. In his opinion the two greatest problems before the world today are world peace and unemployment, and they are so closely linked that the former cannot be solved without first resolving the latter. Moreover, in doing away with unemployment the most important step is the stabilization of prices. In developing these ideas Mr. Rees begins by surveying the international, political and economic situation at the close of the World War and the effects of the treaty of Versailles on foreign trade. The chief points he wishes to make in this survey are that the Big Four at Versailles were either ignorant of or for selfish reasons disregarded the economic consequences which would necessarily follow the political changes they brought about in Europe; that Germany will not be able to meet her obligations on reparations; that in order to rehabilitate the buying power of Europe the whole reparation program so far worked out, probably including the Dawes Plan, will have to be drastically revised if not abandoned; that the United States and Russia will have to enter the League; and that there will have to be a general all-round cancelling of war debts. Having disposed of these minor considerations in the first quarter of his book, Mr. Rees goes on to summarize the fluctuations of employment in all countries for which data are available from 1914 to 1924. The facts which he presents are fairly well known to students of the problem except, perhaps, on such a detail as the almost total non-existence of unemployment in Finland during the post-war years when it assumed such large proportions in other countries. As a summary of more voluminous reports from various sources this section serves a useful purpose. One of the most interesting points raised in the book is the contention that export trade in the post-war period has played a "relatively unimportant part" in the revival of employment. The International Labour Office figures seem to show that in Great Britain, the United States, Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, the *volume of exports* (not their value) was between 1920 and 1924 higher in years with considerable unemployment and lower in years when employment was good. In France and Italy the reverse was true. It is particularly interesting to note that although British exports were greater in 1924 than in 1920 the unemployment rate was four times as great in 1924. Con-

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sequently, we find Mr. Rees seeking some other escape from unemployment than stimulating export trade. And, as suggested above, he finds the chief remedy in stabilized prices. His work has convinced him that "the rate of unemployment falls as prices rise and rises as prices fall" (p. 116) and that "the United States has proved through the action of the Federal Reserve Board in 1920, 1921 and in 1925 that it is practicable to control the volume of unemployment by Bank Rate and Credit Policy in such wise as to turn a depression into a boom" (pp. 130, 131). From this he proceeds to the conclusion that a "world stable level of prices is therefore the essential requirement of a low volume of unemployment" (p. 183). A return to the gold standard by all of western civilization will not meet the situation. As part of the machinery necessary he suggests a possible "world unit of reckoning and an international currency." There must also be some "international machinery to ration raw materials at stable world prices between the countries of the world" (p. 184). Short of these objectives he sees no possibility of the end of unemployment or the attainment of world peace. — CHARLES A. GULICK, JR.

Except in respect of the brevity of its compass, Mr. T. G. Williams' new volume *The History of Commerce* (London and New York, Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1926; ix, 333 pp. $1.50) is not a very significant addition to the numerous sketches of the history of commerce. As there are no maps, plates, graphs, or reading references, it can scarcely be classed as a text book; the limitations of space, however, prevent any great departure from the treatment common to the better texts. The narrative is clear, compact, and well balanced; problems of policy and organization are emphasized rather than statistics and the bare annals: but the thought is that of the older literature. The research of the last twenty years has really unsettled these views, and, in the minds of some of us, destroyed them. The most notable cases of this extreme conservatism are afforded by the discussion of commerce in the time of Charlemagne, and by the treatment of the period of the discoveries. Besides these larger matters of interpretation there are various problematical statements in detail. Such cautious adherence to the older views is perhaps safe, but it is no longer new or fresh. The volume closes with a discussion of world trade since the war, largely based on the "Survey of Overseas Markets" issued by the Committee on Industry and Trade. The figures seem to show that England is definitely holding her own in world commerce, but one is left with

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some doubt of the significance of the shipping figures as an index of economic conditions. Little stress is placed on the sinister decline in the income "available for overseas investment" from £181,000,000 in 1913 to £29,000,000 in 1924. There are perhaps compensating factors, but it is difficult to share the official optimism of the author. —ABBOTT PAYSON USHER.

Kumar Ajit Sen's *Studies in Hindu Political Thought* (Calcutta, Chuckervetty, Chatterjee & Company, 1926; vi, 179 pp.) is a collection of seven essays on the theory and practice of government in pre-Mughal India: "Is Hindu Politics Theological?"; "Scope and Nature of Hindu Political Literature"; "The Hindu View of the State of Nature"; "Origin of Kingship"; "Checks to Tyranny in Hindu Political Thought"; "The Concept of Law and the Early Hindu View"; and "The Arthasastra of Kautilya and the Nitisara of Sukra". The book suffers from three grave faults: an effort to prove a thesis, a lack of historical sense, and a misunderstanding of the evolution of legal systems, in India as elsewhere, from rules believed to be of divine origin to laws regarded as purely secular. The author is quite right in protesting against the common view that Indian thought is exclusively religious, but he apparently fails to realize that the conflicting evidence in his sources represents an uncritical juxtaposition in the native text-books of two opposing theories—the early theological concept and the later secular basis. Mr. Sen fails to give any critical attention to the dates of his sources, although this question is of much importance for any student of the history of political science. The antiquity of all Sanskrit literature except the Vedic is so constantly exaggerated that lay reference to it should always be checked with much caution. As regards the political literature, the following points should have been noted: (*a*) the most important source, Kautilya's *Arthasastra*, though assigned to the reign of Chandragupta (4th cent. B. C.), was evidently not composed till some centuries later; (*b*) Sukra's *Nitisara*, ascribed to the same period, was not actually written until after the introduction of gunpowder into India; (*c*) Manu's code, the most revered of all, probably assumed its present form only in the third century of our era; (*d*) the great epic, the *Mahabharata*, one of the chief sources, was not completed until approximately the same period; (*e*) Kamandaka's *Nitisara* dates only from the third or fourth century A. D.; (*f*) Narada flourished about a hundred years later; and (*g*) Brhaspati lived in the sixth or seventh century. When these late dates are borne in mind, much of the author's argumentation

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seems to lack real foundation. The weakest parts of the book are discussions of the theories of the character of the state of nature and of kingship and law. A purely objective presentation of all three subjects in Indian literature is needed before deductions can safely be drawn. Statements are occasionally made which are scarcely warranted, as that Manu's code "represents a stage of Hindu revival against Buddhistic onslaught" (p. 129), for the late date of Manu is fatal to such a theory. The best part of the book is the last essay, which gives a summary of the two most notable texts; but even so, the work can scarcely be greeted with enthusiasm.—LOUIS H. GRAY.

Students of the history of Northern Europe will welcome *Sveriges ekonomiska och sociala historia under och efter världskriget* (Stockholm, P. A. Norstedt och Söners Förlag, 1926; xv, 365 pp., viii, 304 pp.) edited by the well-known Swedish scholar, Eli F. Heckscher. This imposing work is the first volume published of the Scandinavian Series in the Social and Economic History of the World War, edited by Professor James T. Shotwell. It is a fine exemplar of cooperative scholarship. Professor Heckscher and his seven collaborators have covered a wide range of subjects in their attempt to trace the manifold effects of the war period upon the social and economic life of Sweden. They have produced a survey characterized by unity in conception as well as execution. Minor repetitions and even some discrepancies there are, to be sure, but not enough to jar the sensibilities of the reader. And fortunately for the student, the work is carried considerably beyond the four years of the War; in most of the sections, the story covers the first half dozen years of the period since 1918. The range of topics discussed is suggested by the following: the food-supply problem; industry and the pressing questions connected with its regulation; unemployment; relations between capital and labor; the financial and monetary situation; the influence of the War upon Swedish shipping and commerce; the question of housing and the regulative legislation relative to rents, etc.; cooperation, especially along economic lines, between Sweden, Norway and Denmark during the war years. The method of treatment adopted by the authors is, in general, the same. A brief survey of the pre-war period is followed by a description of the war years and disclosed by a summary of the developments since 1918. Putting it broadly, their conclusions suggest that so far as it is now possible to speak of the permanent effects of the War upon Sweden, these effects consist of a marked intensification of tendencies

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already evident before 1914 rather than of the appearance of new departures or hitherto unknown problems. This applies particularly to the basic question of growth of population, the increasing solidarity of the working classes, as reflected in the upward swing of the trade-union movement, and the strong tendency toward greater political democracy. As regards economic life, it is perhaps safe to assume, with Professor Heckscher, that with the exception of the iron industry it has recovered from the war-time disturbances and is on the road toward a condition which may be termed, for want of a better word, normal.—JOHN H. WUORINEN.

The devastating effects of the World War on monetary arrangements are disclosed by the disruption of the Latin Monetary Union. A study of this disruption appears in Dr. Erich Egner's *Der Lateinische Münzbund Seit Dem Weltkriege*, which is Volume IV in Dr. Bruno Moll's *Probleme Des Geld Und Finanzwesens* (Leipzig. Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, M. B. H., 1925; viii, 108 pp.) In this essay, Dr. Egner naturally gives an account of the origin and the history of the Latin Union. He shows how before the Great War it was possible to adapt the Union to the serious monetary changes that accompanied the decline in the price of silver and the breakdown of the bimetallic standard. But the pressure of the Great War was too serious and too uneven in the different countries concerned to permit the Union to survive. Each country, driven by its own interests, developed a monetary policy of its own. Recovery after the War has also been so uneven and the interests involved are so diverse that the Union has been split asunder. Not only does Dr. Egner set all this forth in an interesting and authoritative way, but he also takes times to consider what the trying experiences of the Latin Union have to offer to the monetary theorists. Theoretical, as well as historical students, will therefore find in the book much to engage their attention.—E. E. AGGER.

For many years Mr. Alleyne Ireland has been a student of colonial administration in the Far East, and for many years he has planned a study of Japanese colonial government. It was a happy decision when he shifted the field of his attention from Formosa to Korea. An extensive literature on Korea is already available, but Mr. Ireland's *The New Korea* (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1926; xii, 352 pp. $5.00) is unique in both method and point of view. With no emotional reaction to either imperialist or nationalist shibboleths, he excludes from his discussion any question of the legal and moral "right" of Japanese occupation of Korea. The final sentence

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of the first chapter states the thesis of the book: "I have formed the opinion that Korea is today infinitely better governed than it ever was under its own native rulers, that it is better governed than most self-governing countries, that it is as well governed as any of the British, American, French, Dutch, and Portuguese dependencies which I have visited, and is better governed than most of them, having in view as well the cultural and economic development of the people as the technique of administration." The chief sources used are the *Annual Reports on Reforms and Progress in Chosen,* compiled, published, and distributed by the Government General. Supplementing these Mr. Ireland has used "translations of official material which has not hitherto been accessible in English", the exact nature of which is not disclosed. For an account of the methods and results of Japanese administration in Korea, probably the official reports are the most trustworthy sources available. But that anyone familiar with diplomatic circumlocutions should turn to propagandist reports to discover the true aims of an imperial power seems almost incredibly naïve. On pages 94 and 95 Mr. Ireland quotes from the Proclamation of Annexation of 1910 a paragraph which he interprets as guaranteeing freedom of religious belief. As a matter of fact some missionaries at the time suspected and subsequent experience proved that it was intended as a warning for the Christians, who were blamed for the assassination of Mr. D. W. Stevens and Marquis Ito. The Korean Conspiracy Case of 1912 is commonly regarded as religious persecution, though in the final court tests practically all the charges collapsed. In still other connections the author takes the word for the deed, especially concerning the period between 1910 and 1919. The objective and unemotional viewpoint of the author has resulted in one serious lack. Mr. Ireland may not be particularly interested in justifying or criticizing the imperialist principle, but most of his readers will be. The chief use of a book of this type is found in the light which it sheds on the outcomes of imperialism. But after giving us detailed information about the growth of Korean commerce the author does not tell us whether this commerce is under the control of Koreans or Japanese. The reader is left equally in the dark regarding the ownership of the rich Korean mines. We also learn that in 1924 there were 2,702,838 farming households in Korea, and of those 1,123,275 owned none of the land which they cultivated. Who does own that land? Back in 1912 while the Governor General was piously urging the Provincial Governors "to exercise their best efforts to prevent

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the sale of lands by peasant proprietors as far as possible", the semi-official Oriental Development Company was buying up lands rapidly. Is it still in the land business? Some statistics to show whether Koreans or Japanese have benefited most from the economic progress of the land would add much to the value of the book. There is a final criticism which is, perhaps, a little unfair to Mr. Ireland since it condemns him for not doing something which he wisely refrained from doing. The attempt to clarify the problem of Japanese rule in Korea by sticking steadfastly to material facts fails in this: facts by themselves are not wholly true. Korea was chosen for this study largely because it "presents the rare spectacle of one civilized race ruling another civilized race". The most interesting and important features of such a spectacle, however, are the emotional results for ruler and ruled, the imponderables of political and cultural nationalism and racial animosity. Such intangibles are no less real than good roads and just courts. The Japanese official policy of assimilation through coercion, followed from 1910 to 1919, bred in Korea an answering nationalism. The Korean Independence Movement of 1919 gained for Korea, not the hoped-for independence, but world sympathy everywhere, even in Japan, and a consequent reform of government. "The New Korea" of which Mr. Ireland writes is really the Korea which has developed since the reforms of Governor General Saito ushered in a new era. Officially assimilation is still the policy; Saito was only charged with changing the methods. The Korean elementary schools still require from nine to twelve hours a week of "the national language" and only three or four of the Korean tongue. In order to see the facts arrayed in "The New Korea" in their proper perspective we need a companion study of Korean nationalism. Was the Independence Movement a flare in the pan? Is good government a cure for nationalism or does it profit by the opportunity to spread? For those familiar with the Korean situation up to and including 1919 *The New Korea* will fill an important gap. It gives in accessible, coherent, and useful form answers to many questions raised and left unanswered during the intense criticisms of Japanese administration in 1919. For those who have not read the partisan literature on the subject Mr. Ireland will be a doubtful interpreter, ignoring as he does the very existence of much that is controversial. Perhaps the uninitiated might supplement this volume with judicious samples of Mr. Homer Hulbert's polemics by way of antidote, since the suggested study of Korean nationalism still lies on the knees of the gods.—MARGARET WILLIS.

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Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee has attempted in *The Rural Economy of India* (New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1926; 249 pp. $2.50) to state the important factors which affect agriculture in India. Inasmuch as 75 per cent of the people are directly dependent on agriculture, any book which contains a serious and careful effort to assess its strength and weakness is likely to be considered important. Many books on the rural life of India are content to call the attention of the readers to the difficulties and hardships experienced by the ryots: their holdings are small, their rains uncertain, the landlords unsympathetic, the money-lenders exorbitant, the capital equipment meager, the cattle, because of religious veneration, not economically self-supporting. But Professor Mukerjee takes these handicaps for granted and proceeds to present some applications of modern science to agriculture. In so doing, however, he experiences trouble. Much of the data is applicable for special areas in India but not useful for the country as a whole. This is particularly true in his chapters on "Robbery of the Soil", "Permanent Agriculture", and "Use and Abuse of Water". In dealing with such subjects as fertilizers, subsoil irrigation, rotation of particular crops, horticulture and problems of alkaline soil, this danger is particularly great. The escape from it is obviously to study the application of modern methods to restricted areas where a degree of similarity of climate, soil and crops exists. Because it is constructive and because it points the way to a still wider application of scientific research to agriculture, Professor Mukerjee's book is worthwhile. It should be considered, however, only a beginning. Either he or someone else properly qualified should attempt a much larger work in which would be set forth all that has been discovered by science for specific zones or regions. What Baden-Powell has done for land tenure and assessments, someone else should do for scientific agriculture. Much of the material for specific areas already exists—for example, the recent reports on the Punjab. All of this material would need to be collected, coordinated and appraised. —W. E. WELD.

In the second edition of his well-known work *Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung* (Munich, Duncker and Humblot, 1926; xiv, 369 pp. 14.50*m.*) Professor Schumpeter has made no fundamental changes from the first edition. The basic propositions are set forth in the author's trenchant style; and while their relation to the author's highly individual method of approach is made plain, this is not done in such a way as to involve weakening qualifications.

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He presents his view of the creative function of the *entrepreneur,* and of this activity as the source of demand for capital, which is considered as a fund of purchasing power available for the purchase of concrete instruments. On this hangs his conception of interest as essentially a phenomenon of economic development, and of the business cycle.

In a small volume of lectures on *Business Economics* (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1926; vii, 71 pp. $1.00) Sir William Ashley, while retaining the standpoint of the economist, undertakes to present some illustrative facts and principles which are of direct interest to students of business policy and of the problems of industrial efficiency, and which receive little notice in the academic discussions of economic theory. The greater part of the book is concerned with the subject of overhead costs and their effects on policies of production, sales and prices, in the pursuit of the economies of increased output and full utilization of industrial equipment.

There are in the market two or three good collections of readings on trade unionism and labor problems. Their grist is mostly secondary materials; the output of students of the labor movement who are not members of it. What has been lacking is a book whose grist should be the utterances of the labor movement regarding itself. Now, fortunately, David and Bertha Saposs in their *Readings in Trade Unionism* (New York, George H. Doran Company, 1926; xxv, 451 pp. $1.60) have competently supplied just this sort of compilation. Their collection is described in its subtitle as dealing with "Labor organization principles and problems as discussed by trade unionists in their official publications and writings." In these pages are gathered together excerpts from labor papers, trade-union official organs, convention proceedings, public speeches of labor leaders, etc. The excerpts are for the most part short; indeed, one wonders whether a more useful purpose might not have been served if the selected items had been fewer and longer. It is obvious from this multitude of selections that the labor movement is not reticent in talking about itself. The bulk of the material comes from persons and organizations affiliated with the American Federation of Labor; in view of the very large importance of such independent groups as the Railroad Brotherhoods, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the amount of space given to latter groups seems scarcely adequate. The selections range over the whole gamut of topics usually covered in a text book

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on labor problems, the theory of the labor movement, government, structure, policies and functions of unions, ordinary and extraordinary union activities, the latter including workers' education and labor banking and investment. The value of the volume is increased by the inclusion in the appendix of figures showing the voting strength of the international unions that are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor for each year from 1916 to 1924; the membership of the Federation itself each year from 1881 to 1925; an organization chart of the Federation showing the interrelations between city centrals, local unions, international unions, etc.; a brief Who's Who of the labor movement and a selected list of labor publications. This volume of readings represents, by and large, the opinions of the conservative groups now in the saddle in the American labor movement. It makes no pretense to serve as a mouthpiece for insurgent groups within unions; it is, in other words, chiefly a manual of readings in right-wing trade unionism. In another book Mr. Saposs has taken account of the flapping left wings in our unions. In this case, however, he has not permitted them to wing their own way. His *Left Wing Unionism, a Study of Radical Policies and Tactics* (New York, International Publishers, 1926; 190 pp. $1.60) is not a book of readings. It is a very careful, well documented analysis, partly historical and partly descriptive, of the activities of intransigent minorities in American unions. The policies and technique of these minorities are given thorough and incisive discussion. The genesis of the methods of dual unionism and boring from within is explained and the attitudes of different radical groups are set forth. Dual unionism as practised by the I. W. W. is of considerably less importance now than the currently practised technique of boring from within, today so generally resorted to by the communists. Mr. Saposs does not expect that left wing unionism will soon be extirpated from the labor movement. The presence of a very large mass of unorganized workers, which is not being perceptibly reduced by the activities of the organized groups, furnishes the disgruntled minorities with unlimited material for further enterprise. The author believes that the present "increase of unrest among the unorganized and the consequent spontaneous strikes foreshadow a swing of the pendulum of radicalism towards some form of dualism." The success of these future efforts in dual unionism will depend, he thinks, upon whether they regard themselves, as was the case with the I. W. W., merely as vehicles for "propagating their doctrines, rather than agencies that must

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attend to the daily economic problems of the workers." The allegiance of the rank and file, he thinks, can be retained "only by effective disciplinary machinery and tangible economic benefits and services." The book is an admirable appraisal by an experienced student and investigator.—PAUL F. BRISSENDEN.

Two useful volumes in "The Whitehall Series", now in course of publication, are *The Dominions and Colonial Offices* (London and New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926; 288 pp. $2.00) by Sir George V. Fiddes, formerly Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and *The India Office* (London and New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926; 299 pp. $2.00) by Sir Malcolm C. C. Seton, Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the India Office. The purpose of the series is to furnish accurate information, in brief compass, concerning the organization and procedure of the British departments of state. In the past the work of the governmental offices has been shrouded from the public gaze, but democracy does not love mysteries of state, and it is doubtless in the public interest that the veil should be withdrawn. The volumes in hand have to do with the imperial departments of the British government, corresponding to the three divisions of the empire, the dominions, the colonies (including the protectorates and mandated territories) and India. Like most of the other developments in the history of the British Commonwealth the establishment of the Dominions Office was the result primarily of dominion rather than of British initiative. Twenty years ago, at the Colonial Conference of 1907, Mr. Deakin, then prime minister of Australia, pointed out that the dominions had outgrown the methods which the Colonial Office followed in its administration of the dependent colonies, and shortly afterwards a Dominions Division was created within the Colonial Office. But it was not until 1925 that a separate Dominions Office was set up, with a secretary of state at its head and a full administrative staff of its own, distinct from that of the Colonial Office. The difference between the Commonwealth and the Dependent Empire was thus formally recognized in British administrative organization. The new department had been in existence for only a few months when Sir George Fiddes wrote, and its organization, as he tells us, was still provisional. We have no right to complain, therefore, that he throws very little light upon its functioning, but the editor of the series would perhaps have been better advised if he had reserved the Dominions Office for treatment in a separate volume to be published at a later date. In order to make clear the activities of the Colonial

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Office the author felt obliged to deal briefly with several subjects in the internal history of the colonies. Sir Malcolm Seton, likewise, found it impossible to give an intelligible account of the India Office without some description of the government of India and its problems. The Secretary of State for India, he says, "might be in danger of being made to resemble the proverbial 'chimœra bombinans in vacuo' if nothing were said about the authorities to whom his despatches are addressed, the manner in which the Indian Constitution has developed, or the composition of the Indian Services."

In *The Amarna Age* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926; 458 pp. $4.00) Rev. James Baikie continues his work of presenting interesting and important periods of the ancient world to modern readers. It is written in that same appealing, moving and absorbing style that has made his other books so delightful to both the general reader and the professional student. The heart of this book is that strangely fascinating, yet elusive figure of the heretic king, Akhenaton, who lived in an age which witnessed a true crisis in the history of the ancient world. The description of Akenaton and his living faith is certainly one of the best in the English language. Yet the book is not a biography, but the record of an age whose central figure was this religious and pacific monarch. The setting of the Amarna Age is so clearly described that the reader visualizes without effort how that age was connected with its own Egyptian past and future and how it was linked with the past, contemporary and future history of its great neighbors. In places, the sources permit considerable latitude in interpretation, and although some may differ from the author, yet one feels that Mr. Baikie has shown a sympathic and keen insight into historical characters and events as well as a sane and critical judgment in proposing solutions to controverted points. The book includes thirty-two admirably chosen plates, tables, maps and an index. It is highly recommended to both the general public and the specialist.—IRVING W. RAYMOND.

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